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In the past decades, European labour markets have undergone profound changes, 
witnessing a process of liberalisation and flexibilisation, in part through the spread of 
various forms of atypical employment. These new forms of employment have been 
argued to be of generally lower quality than standard employment, presenting several 
disadvantages across a range of employment-related dimensions. Nevertheless, the 
disadvantages experienced by atypical workers are argued to differ depending on 
nationally specific institutional settings, as employment regulations, welfare 
institutions and collective representation are commonly claimed to play a significant 
role in the shaping of disadvantage. 
Within the field of comparative political economy, a literature has emerged dealing 
with issues of dualisation and insider-outsider divides associated with these new forms 
of employment, mainly focusing on institutional divides in employment and welfare 
protection and political representation between standard and atypical workers and their 
consequences in terms of social inequalities. Authors within this literature have argued 
divides to be different across groups of countries within Europe. Specifically, an 
important distinction has been claimed to exist between Liberal countries, where 
divides are argued to be limited, and Southern European countries, where they are said 
to be among the highest. But this literature has mostly considered disadvantages from 
an institutional perspective, without empirically investigating whether institutional 
divides actually translate into individual disadvantages. At the same time, within 
sociology, authors have investigated individual disadvantages experienced by atypical 
workers under the broad concept of precariousness. Nevertheless, these scholars have 
not provided a systematic analysis of the relation between different institutional 
frameworks and individual disadvantages. This thesis aims at partly bridging these two 
literatures, by providing an analysis of how different institutional settings impact on 
disadvantages as experienced at the individual level.  
To do this, this thesis explores the disadvantages experienced by a specific category 
of atypical workers, namely temporary agency workers. It focuses on two countries 
which have been argued to present very different institutional divides across a broad 
range of employment-related dimensions. The UK is seen as the main example of 
Liberal country in the European context, providing limited employment protection to 
all workers, a fragmented system of industrial relations and a social protection system 
mainly based on means-testing and mostly aimed at poverty prevention.  In contrast, 
Italy has been considered one of the European countries with the most highly 
segmented labour market, with high employment protection for core workers but very 
little for workers at the margin. At the same time, both its industrial relations system 
and it social protection system are said to strongly discriminate against people in 
atypical forms of employment. These claims are explored through semi-structured 
interviews with temporary agency workers in the service sector, trade unionists and 
other relevant stakeholders involved in atypical employment.  
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The study demonstrates that temporary agency workers in the two countries experience 
partly different disadvantages. Although differences in the institutional settings can be 
said to contribute to explaining these differences, the analysis reveals a more complex 
picture. I show that institutional divides do not necessarily translate into individual 
disadvantages, as they interact among each other and with other factors in moulding 
individual experiences in a variety of ways. At the same time, individual disadvantages 
are present even when no institutional divide exists. Thus, the study argues that 
considering disadvantages only in terms of institutional divides oversimplifies a more 
complex and varied reality, and calls for more attention to be paid to how institutional 
































1.1 Atypical Employment and Labour Market Divides…………………………..…16 
1.2 Disadvantages Experienced by TA Workers in Italy and the UK………………..17 
1.3 Chapter Outline…………………………………………………………….……20 
 
2. Towards and Analytical Framework……………………………………….……24 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...……24 
2.2 Dualism: Conceptualising Institutionally-driven Disadvantages………………..25 
2.3 Institutional Divides in Post-industrial Labour Markets…………………………27 
2.4 Institutions and Disadvantages: Focusing on the Individual…………………….33 
2.5 Analysing Institutionally-driven Disadvantages: a Cross-country Comparison...39 
2.5.1 Atypical vs. Standard Employment………………………………………….40 
2.6 Dimensions of Disadvantage…………………………………………………….42 
2.6.1 Disadvantage in Employment……………………………………………….44 
2.6.2 Disadvantage in Work……………………………………………………….46 
2.6.3 Disadvantage in Income Protection………………………………………….51 
2.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………55 
 
3. Research Design………………………………………………………………...58 
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..…58 
3.2 Comparative Framework……………………………………………………..…58 
3.2.1 Case Selection.................................................................................................61 
10 
 
3.3 Choice of Employment Contract and Sector……………………………………67 
3.4 Operationalisation of Dimensions of Disadvantage……………………….……69 
3.4.1 Employment Experience……………………………………………………70 
3.4.2 Work Experience……………………………………………………...…….70 
3.4.3 Income Protection Experience………………………………………....……72 
3.5 Selection of Interviewees……………………………………………….….……73 
3.6 Data Collection and Analysis………………………………………….…….….77 
3.7 Ethical Issues……………………………………………………………….…...79 
3.8 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……….80 
 
4. Comparing TAW in Italy and in the UK………………………………….…….82 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...……82 
4.2 Use of TAW by Employers……………………………………………………...83 
4.3 The TA Workforce in Italy and the UK…………………………………………84 
4.4 Temporary Agency Sector Regulations…………………………………………85 
4.5 TA Workers’ Employment Rights……………………………………………....90 
4.6 Collective Representation……………………………………………………….93 
4.7 Income Protection……………………………………………………………….97 
4.7.1 Protection in Case of Unemployment……………………………………….97 
4.7.2 Protection in Case of Sickness…………………………………………..…102 
4.7.3 Protection in Retirement………………………………………………...…104 
4.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..…108 
 
5. Employment Experience……………………………………………………….110 
5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…110 
5.2 Employment Paths………………………………………………………….….111 
5.2.1 The ‘Precariously Unstable’…………………………………………….…112 
5.2.2 The ‘Precariously Stable’……………………………………………….…113 
5.3 Role of TAW in the Workers’ Employment Paths………………………….…114 
5.3.1 TAW as a Stepping Stone into Employment………………………………117 
5.3.2 TAW as a Stepping Stone into Standard Employment…………………….121 
5.3.3 TAW and the Employment-Unemployment Trap………………………….124 
11 
 
5.3.4 TAW as a Trap in Temporary Employment………………………….……126 
5.4 TAW and Employment Precariousness………………………………….…….132 
5.4.1 Employment Precariousness among the ‘Precariously Unstable’………....134 
5.4.2 Employment Precariousness among the ‘Precariously Stable’………...….136 




6. Work Experience………………………………………………………………144 
6.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………144 
6.2 Working Conditions………………………………………………………...…145 
6.2.1 Pay…………………………………………………………………………145 
6.2.2 Working Time……………………………………………………………..148 
6.2.3 Relation with Colleagues………………………………………………….151 
6.2.4 Job Content………………………………………………………………..153 
6.3 Individual Bargaining Power……………………………………………….…155 
6.4 Collective Representation……………………………………………………..162 
6.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….....170 
 
7. Income Protection Experience………………………………………………...174 
7.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………174 
7.2 The Experience of Income Insecurity…………………………………………175 
7.3 Income Protection in Case of Unemployment……………………………...…179 
7.3.1 Public Unemployment Benefits………………………………………...…179 
7.3.2 Redundancy Pay……………………………………………………...…...186 
7.4 Income Protection in Case of Sickness…………………………………….....188 
7.5 Income Protection in Retirement……………………………………………...191 
7.5.1 Statutory and Occupational Pension Schemes…………………………….192 
7.5.2 Private Pension Schemes……………………………………………...…..196 
7.6 Personal Sources of Income Protection…………………………………….....198 
7.6.1 Formal Credit……………………………………………………………...199 






8.1 Disadvantages in Atypical Employment……………………………………...210 
8.2 Comparing TA Workers’ Disadvantages……………………………………..211 
8.2.1 Comparing Disadvantages in the Employment Experience………………212 
8.2.2 Comparing Disadvantages in the Work Experience………………………212 
8.2.3 Comparing Disadvantages in the Income Protection Experience…………214 
8.3       Further Considerations: Evaluating Divides between Atypical and Standard  
Employment……….…………………………………………………………...215 
8.4  Limitations and Future Research…………………………………………...…218 
Appendix 1.List of Interviewees…………………………………………………...222 
Appendix 2. Informed Consent………………………………………………….....224 




















List of Figures 
Figure 1: EPL index for individual dismissal of permanent employees for selected    EU 
countries, 2013............................................................................................................62 
Figure 2: Social spending per capita (PPP) for selected EU countries, 2014……….65 
Figure 3:  The ‘Precariously Unstable’ Employment Path…………………………112 
Figure 4: The ‘Precariously Stable’ Employment Path…………………………….114 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of TA workers by country, 2013…….85 
Table 2: Summary Comparative Table for TAW Regulation in the UK and Italy…89 
Table 3: Summary Comparative Table for TA Workers’ Employment Rights in the 
UK and Italy………………………………………………………………………...93 
Table 4: Summary Comparative Table for TA Workers’ Collective Representation in 
the UK and Italy…………………………………………………………………….96 
Table 5: Income Protection in Case of Unemployment in Italy and the UK, and 
between Standard and TA Workers………………………………………………..102 
Table 6: Income Protection in Case of Sickness in Italy and the UK, and between 
Standard and TA Workers…………………………………………………………104 
Table 7: Income Protection in Retirement in Italy and the UK, and between Standard 
and TA Workers……………………………………………………………………107 
Table 8: Employment Transitions and Role of TAW………………………………116 


































































1.1 Atypical Employment and Labour Market Divides 
In the past few decades, European labour markets have undergone profound transformations 
as a result of globalisation, deindustrialisation and technological change (Häusermann and 
Palier, 2008; Kalleberg, 2009). Among these, one of the most prominent has been the spread 
of atypical employment, which differs from the full-time permanent employment relationship 
which came to be seen as ‘standard’ during the industrial age (Castel, 2002; Fudge and Strauss, 
2014). These new forms of employment have been introduced in order to make labour markets 
more flexible, in an attempt to adapt them to the needs of post-industrial economies (Esping-
Andersen and Regini, 2001). Nevertheless, it has been widely argued that these new forms of 
employment are of lower quality compared to their standard counterparts, producing, among 
others, more employment insecurity, worse working conditions and scant collective 
representation (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Barbier, 2004). Furthermore, these atypical forms 
of employment have been claimed to give access to more limited income protection, given that 
European welfare states were designed after Second World War for industrial societies 
characterised by standard employment relationships, and are ill-equipped to deal with the risks 
associated with these new forms of employment in post-industrial societies (Bonoli, 2005). 
Altogether, the emergence of these forms of employment has been said to foster new 
inequalities in post-industrial labour markets between those in full-time, permanent 
employment and non-standard workers (Kenworthy, 2008). Some scholars have even 
postulated the existence of an insider-outsider divide where insiders are generally identified 
as those in full-time, permanent jobs, whereas outsiders are those in atypical employment and 
the unemployed (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Rubery, 2006).  
The disadvantages experienced by atypical workers are argued to be different in every country, 
as is the divide between standard and atypical workers. Different institutional frameworks are 
argued to influence the disadvantages experienced by atypical workers and in turn in leading 
to a divide with standard workers, either by reducing it, fostering it or even creating it from 
scratch (Barbier, 2011; Palier and Thelen, 2012). Scholars variously emphasised the role 
played by labour market reforms, employment regulations, social protection schemes and 
industrial relations systems in shaping the disadvantages atypical workers face in various 
countries, as well as the gulf between atypical and standard workers (Davidsson and Naczyk, 
2009). Overall, a distinction has been drawn between Liberal regimes, with deregulated labour 
markets and mostly flat-rate social protection, and Continental countries, which have 
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deregulated their labour markets only at the margins, and rely predominantly on contribution-
based systems of social protection (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Eichhorst and Marx, 
2010). While the latter have been claimed to have greatly increased employment and social 
protection divides, the former have been argued to have contained inequalities in both 
employment and social protection between people with different employment statuses, 
allowing flexibility to manifest mostly through wage inequalities (DiPrete et al., 2006; Barbieri 
2009). Within the Continental group, Southern European countries have been argued to occupy 
an extreme position, with an even wider gap in both employment and social protection between 
those in standard and those in atypical employment (Polavieja, 2005; Berton et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, authors within this literature have not empirically investigated whether these 
institutional divides translate into individual disadvantages. 
This thesis investigates the disadvantages experienced by one specific category of atypical 
workers, namely temporary agency workers. In order to investigate the role employment-
related institutions play in shaping those disadvantages, two countries with very different 
employment and welfare frameworks, namely Italy and the UK, are compared. Comparing 
these countries allows me to investigate whether and how different institutional divides 
translate into differently experienced disadvantages at the individual level.  
The study demonstrates that Temporary Agency (TA) workers in Italy and the UK experience 
somewhat different disadvantages compared to their standard counterparts and that the 
different institutional configurations of labour markets, industrial relations and welfare 
systems do indeed play an important role in explaining those country differences. 
Nevertheless, there is necessarily no close correspondence between the divides shaped by the 
institutional framework and experienced disadvantages. Other non-institutional factors are 
shown to be important in shaping individual disadvantages, as well as the interaction between 
those and institutional factors.  
 
1.2 Disadvantages Experienced by TA Workers in Italy and the UK 
Disadvantages derived from atypical employment arrangements have been variously 
conceptualised in the academic literature. With some degree of oversimplification, we can say 
that scholars from two main fields have studied employment-related disadvantages. On the 
one hand, within political economy, authors in the literature on dualism have focused on labour 
market institutions and welfare institutions and how they directly or indirectly engender a 
differentiated set of rights and entitlements for people in different employment categories 
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(Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009; Emmenegger et al., 2012). As the name suggests, they 
hypothesise a ‘dualistic’ structure, where a divide exists between those in standard (insiders) 
and those in other employment arrangements (outsiders). On the other hand, within sociology, 
authors in the precariousness literature have focused on the individual situation of insecurity 
and vulnerability derived from employment status and how this is shaped by the interaction 
between socio-demographic characteristics and labour market institutions, and, more broadly, 
by the socio-economic system (Barbier, 2011; Kalleberg, 2013). 
Considering the disadvantages from an institutional perspective, the literature on dualism has 
hitherto largely ignored the issue at the individual level, assuming that institutional divides 
will translate into individual disadvantages. By contrast, scholars in the literature on 
precariousness have taken a more individual perspective, investigating how disadvantages are 
shaped by the interaction between individual and contextual characteristics. However, they 
have not necessarily focused on the divides engendered by the institutional settings. This 
research tries to partially bridge these two streams of literature, exploring the disadvantages 
TA workers experience compared to standard employees and how this can be attributed to the 
institutional configuration of the two countries. In order to do so it considers the actually lived 
experience of these workers, in the conviction that individual perceptions of workers are 
fundamental in order to grasp whether institutional divides translate into actual disadvantages 
from the workers’ point of view, and what other factors contribute to shaping those 
disadvantages.  
The research compares the disadvantages experienced by TA workers in two European 
countries which can be regarded as polar cases in the European context, having followed very 
different paths towards labour market liberalisation and presenting different employment and 
welfare regimes. The UK is characterised by a Liberal employment regime, with weak 
employment protection for all workers, in line with that of other Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Pochic et al., 2003). It has deregulated hiring and firing practices and legislative protections 
from unfair dismissal are comparatively loose (Deakin and Reed, 2001; Koslowski and 
McLean, 2015). The UK is a Liberal welfare regime, relying on a Beveridgean system of social 
protection aimed at poverty reduction and leaving a prominent role for private welfare schemes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Taylor-Gooby and Larsen, 2004; Clasen and Goerne, 2011).  
By contrast, Italy can be considered a latecomer in labour market deregulation, and 
flexibilisation has mostly happened at the margins, initially only in order to integrate social 
groups with low labour market attachment (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Berton et al., 2009; 
Checchi and Leonardi, 2016). Employment protection for core workers, namely those in full-
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time, permanent employment in medium-large firms, is high in comparative perspective and 
has been little modified in recent reforms (Lodovici and Semenza, 2008; Jessoula et al., 2011; 
Fumagalli, 2017). Italy has a sub-protective welfare regime, with a Bismarckian system of 
social security but limited protection for those on low means (Matsaganis et al., 2003; Jessoula 
et al. 2010; Durazzi, 2015). As in other Southern European countries, the family has been 
shown to play a significant role in complementing and even substituting for public social 
protection (Naldini and Guerrero Jurado, 2009). According to the literature, the status of 
atypical workers is structured by very different institutional frameworks. They thus represent 
excellent cases for exploring how institutions contribute to shaping disadvantages actually 
perceived by atypical workers and how they influence the experienced divide between those 
in standard and those in atypical employment.  
The research focuses on temporary agency workers employed in low and medium-skilled 
service occupations. Given that the large increase in atypical jobs in post-industrial countries 
is concentrated in certain occupations within the service sector (Kenworthy, 2005; 
Häusermann and Schwander, 2012), workers in declining sectors, namely the manufacturing 
and agricultural one, have not been considered in the analysis.  Besides, the higher 
concentration of temporary agency jobs in the service sector and the fact that countries are 
moving increasingly towards a service-based economy (Gregg and Wardsworth, 1999; 
Pontusson, 2005; Gallie, 2007) make an analysis of jobs in this sector relevant for 
understanding future trends in the European context. The research was carried out through 
qualitative interviews with a number of temporary agency workers in Bologna and in 
Edinburgh and with a number of actors involved in temporary agency work. These two cities 
have been chosen as they present significant similarities in a number of socio-demographic 
and economic characteristics. 
Comparison of the disadvantages between TA workers in Italy and in the UK is structured 
around three employment-related dimensions. The first, the employment dimension, considers 
issues of employment security, focusing on employment protection and employment 
opportunities. The second, the work dimension, investigates the experience at the workplace, 
in terms of pay and working conditions, including working time, job content and relations with 
colleagues, but also possibilities for individual and collective representation. Finally, the 
income protection dimension explores disadvantages related to a number of social risks, 
namely unemployment, sickness and retirement. These dimensions are meant to incorporate 
the most significant areas where TA workers might experience disadvantages, thus providing 
a global picture of the experienced divide between them and standard workers in the two 
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countries analysed. For each dimension, hypotheses were drawn from the institutional divides 
stemming from the institutional configurations in the two countries. The empirical part 
investigated whether and how these institutional divides translated into experienced 
disadvantages at the individual level.   
The findings reveal a complex relationship between institutional divides and the actually 
experienced disadvantages. In some cases, institutional divides have not necessarily translated 
into individual disadvantages while in other, often overlooked, institutional characteristics 
play a more important role. Moreover, while certain individual disadvantages were perceived 
as normal and legitimate, others were considered unfair. Furthermore, a number of factors 
besides labour market and welfare institutions are shown to be significant in shaping 
experienced divides, including socio-demographic characteristics, hirers’ behaviour and 
family support. Thus, the differences between the two countries can only be partly attributed 
to their different institutional frameworks. This thesis therefore argues against any form of 
‘institutional determinism’ in diagnosing individually experienced divides among different 
groups of workers, and suggests a need to consider the interplay between multiple factors that 
shape the disadvantages actually experienced by TA workers. 
 
1.3  Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 critically discusses the literature that has informed my research. I first introduce the 
concept of ‘dualism’ and trace its historical development from labour economics in the 1970s 
up to its recent popularity within the comparative social policy literature. The sociological 
literature on precarity/precariousness is then reviewed, arguing that it provides an analytical 
complement to the dualism literature for investigating disadvantages in the labour market. I 
also discuss the importance of considering those disadvantages from an individual perspective 
and suggest how this can contribute to enhancing our understanding of employment-related 
divides. In the second part of the chapter, the analytical framework is then outlined. The three 
dimensions which structure the empirical analysis are introduced: employment experience, in-
job experience and income protection experience. For each dimension the relevant 
comparative literature which helped me formulate research hypotheses is discussed. 
Chapter 3 presents the research design. I show how a comparative framework is needed to best 
explore the impact of institutional arrangements on individual disadvantages. I also introduce 
the two national cases which have been selected and elaborate on how they represent 
contrasting institutional settings within the European context as regards several employment-
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related institutions. Furthermore, I justify the empirical focus on temporary agency work, 
which represents a common form of atypical employment both in Italy and in the UK and has 
fairly similar characteristics in the two countries.  In the second part of the chapter, the 
methodology is explained and justified, along with the data collection and analysis and the 
relevant ethical issues involved in the research. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed comparison of the relevant institutional frameworks for the 
analysis of disadvantages of TA workers in the two countries. In particular, I discuss the 
regulation of the temporary agency sector, employment regulation and the income protection 
system. In each case, I highlight salient differences for TA and standard workers. I also show 
that, although these macro-institutional characteristics closely reflect those highlighted in the 
comparative dualism literature, specific micro-institutional features might contribute to 
shaping disadvantages at the individual level. This helps the refinement of hypotheses for the 
empirical analysis. 
Chapter 5 analyses the employment experience dimension. I first map the employment 
bibliographies of interviewees in the two countries, showing that two main employment paths 
are present, of which one is only present in Italy. I then consider the role of temporary agency 
work (TAW) in employment biographies and show how it is strongly influenced by the hirers’ 
reasons for employing TA workers which, in turn, is strongly shaped by the different 
institutional framework in the two countries. In the UK, employers take on TA workers only 
for short periods in cases of labour shortages or to use TAW as a screening device. In Italy, by 
contrast, employers tend to use TAW not only for these reasons, but also as a way to avoid 
hiring workers on a permanent basis. I then compare the implications for the individual 
experience of TA workers. The second part of the chapter analyses the experience of 
employment precariousness from a static perspective. It shows that, for a certain group of 
workers in Italy, the experience was very similar to workers in the UK, despite the different 
employment regulations. The last part of the chapter considers the role of public employment 
agencies as an alternative to private employment agencies in looking for work. I show that 
public employment services did not constitute an alternative to temporary agencies (TAs) in 
the eyes of the interviewees in either country, albeit for very different reasons. 
Chapter 6 discusses work experience. In the first part, it is shown that TA workers in Italy and 
in the UK experience very similar disadvantages in a number of working conditions including 
pay, working time, relations with colleagues and job content, notwithstanding partly different 
regulations. I argue that this is mainly due to the intrinsic characteristics of TAW, but also 
results from several forms of discrimination, despite formal equality provided by the 
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institutional framework. The second part of the chapter analyses disadvantages in both 
individual and collective representation in the two countries. Individual representation appears 
generally weak, as in both countries TA workers experience limited bargaining power. I argue 
that the experience can be classified into three categories of increasing imbalance of power 
between workers and hirers. The experience of collective representation shows similarities but 
also significant differences between the two countries which can be attributed to the different 
institutional framework. In both countries, TA workers had limited opportunities for collective 
representation for very similar reasons, despite the different organisation of collective 
representation in the two countries. 
Chapter 7 considers TA workers’ experience of income protection. After briefly describing 
the interviewees’ experience of income insecurity, disadvantages in income protection for a 
number of social risks are analysed, that is: unemployment, sickness and retirement. For each 
of these social risks, TA workers in both countries experience disadvantages compared to 
standard workers. Nevertheless, I argue that these disadvantages only partly reflect 
institutional characteristics of the income protection system. In unemployment protection, the 
Italian contributory system appears to provide a sense of inclusion which cannot be read off 
from the analysis of the institutional system alone, while the British system, mostly means-
tested, was mainly experienced as exclusionary and stigmatising. In sickness protection, the 
different legal employment status of TA workers in the two countries granted protection equal 
to standard workers in Italy but only limited protection in the UK. British TA workers 
experience serious disadvantages, as they are not entitled to contractual sick pay. Finally, with 
respect to retirement, in both countries TA workers feel disadvantaged. Nevertheless, while in 
Italy those disadvantages were experienced only by those with irregular working histories, in 
the UK lack of entitlement to contractual pension schemes made all TA workers worse off. 
The second part of the chapter shows the role of private sources in the experience of income 
protection, namely formal credit and the family. While disadvantages in relation to formal 
credit were similar in the two countries, the family provides a more encompassing income 
protection role in Italy compared to the UK and is often an effective substitutive form of 
income protection to the public social protection system. 
The final chapter draws the main conclusions for each dimension. Furthermore, findings from 
the analysis are connected to broader debates in the dualism and the precariousness literatures. 
I argue that the analysis of individual experiences shapes our understanding of the impact of 
institutional divides in contemporary labour markets and it can add to the current academic 
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knowledge on contemporary divides in the labour market. Additionally, the chapter highlights 


























2. Towards an Analytical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature which has studied the relation between institutional 
settings and disadvantages among atypical workers and which this thesis draws from. The 
question of how institutional arrangements affect disadvantages among atypical workers has 
been analysed by scholars in two main streams of literature: the dualisation/dualism literature 
and the precariousness literature.  
Authors in the literature on dualism have considered disadvantages in relative terms, in relation 
to those holding standard employment contracts, and they have therefore conceptualised 
disadvantages in terms of ‘divides’ between atypical and standard workers. Furthermore, they 
have directly investigated how institutions shape disadvantages, making it a valuable approach 
in answering the research question of this thesis. Nevertheless, I argue that the analysis of 
disadvantage in the dualism literature has remained mostly anchored to a formalistic 
conceptualisation of disadvantage, referring to lack of rights and entitlements, with limited 
insights into the actual disadvantages ‘outsiders’ face. Therefore, scholars in the dualism 
literature have de facto ignored the role institutions play at the individual level, in a way 
assuming that given some institutional divides, individual disadvantages automatically follow. 
For analysis from an individual perspective, I argue that the literature on precariousness 
provides an interesting, yet partly different, approach to draw from. Although this literature 
does not focus directly on institutions, it provides a useful tool to investigate disadvantages 
stemming from atypical employment using an individual perspective. By using individuals as 
a unit of analysis, it avoids a deterministic relation of cause-effect between institutional and 
individually-experienced disadvantages, allowing for interactions between institutional 
arrangements, individual characteristics and the broader socio-economic context. I will argue 
that in order to understand how institutions affect the disadvantages atypical workers face, it 
is constructive to draw from both approaches if we are to avoid a deterministic interpretation 
of the relation between institutions and disadvantages.   
The first part of the chapter critically discusses the dualism literature and how it relates to other 
theoretical perspectives in the analysis of employment-related disadvantages. Section 2.2 
introduces the concept of dualism, briefly reviewing its early theorisations. Section 2.3 shows 
more recent theories of dualism, mostly from the political economy literature, which try to 
explain recent labour market developments in comparative perspective. Section 2.4 explains 
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the main insights the analysis of the individual disadvantages has provided and shows the 
contribution this can offer in understanding the impact of institutions on individual 
disadvantages. 
 
2.2 Dualism: Conceptualising Institutionally-driven Disadvantages 
Theories of dualism emerged in the field of labour economics to explain the existence of low 
paid, insecure, dead-end employment in mature industrial societies. In the three decades after 
World War II, industrial capitalist societies have been argued to be characterised by what has 
been called the  ‘standard employment relationship’ (SER), featuring full-time, permanent 
contracts between a single employer and an employee (Castel, 2002; Debels, 2005). It has 
been said that the centrality of this form of employment for the functioning of industrial 
economies and for social cohesion meant that many employment and social protection rights 
in industrial countries were legally tailored to standard employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Bonoli, 2005). Nevertheless, some authors highlighted that a minority of the working 
population continued to be employed in unstable, low-paid jobs with limited career 
opportunities, which were systematically disadvantaged compared to standard jobs (Rubery, 
1978). The survival of these forms of employment in mature industrial societies was initially 
explained by neoclassical economic theory in terms of mismatch between labour supply and 
demand. Orthodox neoclassical theorists argued that given that those different categories of 
workers were imperfect substitutes for each other in terms of skill and productivity, they 
prevented the labour market from clearing, impeding access higher-quality jobs for certain 
workers (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).  
Other labour economists distanced themselves from this explanation, arguing for the existence 
of an institutionally-driven segmentation in the labour market, in which one segment is 
systematically disadvantaged in a number of employment and social rights (Rubery, 1978). 
Two main theories of labour market segmentation were developed in the 1970s: dual labour 
market theory and radical theory. Both theories postulated the existence of two distinct labour 
market segments shaped by labour market institutions (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Reich et 
al., 1973). The two theories differed in the importance given to different institutional factors 
in the creation of a segmented labour market, with dual labour market theory focusing on in-
firm training as a factor influencing employers’ willingness to retain workers and radical 
theory focusing on the employers’ control of the workforce. Nevertheless, both theories 
adopted a different approach from orthodox neoclassical theories to explain the existence of 
lower quality employment, postulating the centrality of labour market institutions in the 
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persistence of ‘disadvantaged’ employment arrangements. Hence, rather than being a passive 
agent within structural economic forces, institutions came to be seen as a mediating factor in 
shaping the existence of a segment of the labour force employed in lower quality jobs. 
Other labour economists argued for an institutionally-driven segmentation of the labour 
market. Lindbeck and Snower (1988) developed an alternative framework to conceptualise 
dualism in the labour market: the insider-outsider theory. In contrast to dual labour market and 
radical theories, which attributed the divide to employers’ behaviour, insider-outsider theory 
explained labour market divides through workers’ strategies, given that the incumbents’ 
(insiders’) market power allows them to bargain for higher wages and better employment 
conditions.  Although initially developed to mainly explain the persistence of unemployment, 
by illustrating how wages may be pushed above the market-clearing level, it was applied to 
other situations in which some labour market participants had more privileges than others, 
including permanent and temporary workers, unionised and non-unionised workers and 
workers with low and high seniority. The phrasing of dualism in terms of a divide between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ has brought the attention to the fact that outsiders are somehow 
excluded or left ‘out’ from something insiders can instead enjoy, thus loading dualism with a 
connotation of lack of integration. As we will see, this jargon has become widespread in 
contemporary debates on employment-related disadvantages, which try to emphasise the idea 
of exclusion of certain categories of workers from employment and social rights. 
All these theories highlighted the mediating role of labour market institutions in shaping 
disadvantaged segments within the labour market. Nevertheless, most dualism studies ignored 
cross-country differences in the functioning of labour market institutions, assuming universal 
mechanisms were in place in all capitalist industrial societies. This reflected nomothetic 
tendencies typical of much of labour economics, which has historically focused mostly on 
universal mechanisms rather than on idiosyncratic ones. Despite a few exceptions (see, for 
instance, Rubery, 1978; Eyraud et al., 1990), most authors underplayed cross-country 
differences in dualism, concentrating their studies on the American labour market (and, to a 
lesser extent, on the British one) and assuming common tendencies in other capitalist 
countries.  
The review of the early dualism literature has been intended to present the concept of dualism. 
As has been shown, dualism theories conceptualise employment-related disadvantages in 
terms of a divide between different employment segments, suggesting a ‘dualistic’ structure 
of the labour market. Within this framework, labour market institutions are said to be an 
important factor in shaping these disadvantages, excluding one labour market segment from 
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rights and entitlements. As is discussed in the next section, the concepts of dualism and of 
insider-outsider divide have been re-used in the political economy literature to account for 
more recent employment-related disadvantages, especially after the flexibilisation reforms 
implemented in European countries from the 1980s onwards. In common with earlier 
conceptualisations, scholars in political economy emphasise the role of labour market 
institutions in structuring the labour market in a segmented way and in creating divides 
between different employment categories, and more specifically between standard and 
atypical workers. However, compared to labour economists, these authors pay much more 
attention to cross-country differences in institutional arrangements. Most of these scholars 
generally take a European perspective, whose diversity among member countries has been apt 
to cross-country comparisons. This brings these authors close to the empirical question at the 
root of this thesis, which is specifically focused on employment-related disadvantages among 
atypical workers in Europe. 
 
2.3 Institutional Divides in Post-industrial Labour Markets 
The literature on dualism helps understand the role institutions have been considered to play 
in creating a divide between standard workers and the growing number of workers in atypical 
forms of employment in contemporary labour markets. As is shown, atypical workers have 
been argued to face systematic disadvantages compared to standard workers in a number of 
employment realms, but authors in this literature also highlight notable differences between 
countries depending on their institutional arrangements. The review of this literature helps 
pinpoint the main dimensions in which institutions are argued to have contributed to shaping 
a divide between standard and atypical workers. These dimensions are later used in the 
analytical framework (see section 2.6) to identify the main disadvantages atypical workers 
should face in different institutional settings. These dimensions have contributed to structuring 
the empirical investigation. Furthermore, this literature provides a categorisation of European 
countries depending on the institutional divide between standard and atypical workers. This 
categorisation has guided the case selection for the empirical analysis, as Italy and the UK 
have been chosen as two countries presenting different institutional divides between standard 
and atypical workers.  
Labour markets have undergone deep changes in the past few decades. Among these, the 
erosion of the so-called standard employment relationship and the parallel expansion of 
atypical jobs, featuring limited employment protection, low skill and low pay, has been among 
the most prominent (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Castel, 2002; Green, 2006). These new jobs 
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closely resemble the ‘outsider’ jobs discussed by labour economists in the previous section. 
The explanation for the expansion of these jobs given by many economists (see, for instance, 
Acemoglu, 2002) but also sociologists (e.g. Castells, 2000) has been mainly structural. 
Technological change, increased competition, globalisation and post-industrialisation have all 
been cited as relevant socio-economic factors that have led to the expansion of these new forms 
of employment (Kenworthy, 2005; Green, 2006; Gallie, 2007; Kalleberg, 2013). However, 
these socio-structural explanations have failed to account for what appear to be differences in 
the quantity and quality of these jobs across countries.  
For this reason, some scholars in the political economy literature have argued that structural 
factors alone cannot explain the expansion of atypical jobs and that it is important to 
investigate the mediating role of institutions in translating structural pressures into social 
outcomes if we are to understand the expansion of atypical employment in post-industrial 
labour markets (Häusermann and Palier, 2008). In that sense, they closely reflect earlier 
conceptualisations of dualism, which introduced institutions as a prominent variable in 
explaining the existence of disadvantaged labour market segments. According to these 
theories, different institutional frameworks can explain variation in labour market outcomes 
across countries, despite common structural pressures towards flexibility (Emmenegger et al., 
2012). Specifically, the labour market reforms conducted by most countries in the past few 
decades have been argued to be the main causal explanation for the structuration of 
contemporary labour markets and for the expansion of atypical employment (Esping-Andersen 
and Regini, 2001).  
In a seminal comparative study on dualist tendencies in European labour markets, Goldthorpe 
(1985) argued that labour market deregulation as it had been implemented in Liberal countries, 
such as the UK, fostered employment dualism, as market interactions pushed towards 
dualisation without an institutional constraint to counterbalance this trend. As power in 
employment relations was left to market forces, employers tried to increase flexibility by 
relying on sub-contracting and non-standard employment, pushing an increasing share of the 
labour force into secondary labour markets. Goldthorpe found an opposite tendency in 
Corporatist countries, such as Sweden, Norway and Austria, where social partners together 
with a strong role of the State in labour market regulation could structure the labour market in 
a more inclusive way, reducing the divide between different labour market segments. 
Continental European countries, such as France, Germany and Italy, were placed somewhere 
in-between, as they adopted a more timid and inconsistent approach, alternating periods where 
social partners and the State seemed to foster inclusiveness to periods in which dualist 
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tendencies predominated. Following Goldthorpe’s argument, Brown and King (1988) argued 
that direct concertation of state, unions and employers’ organisations, typical of Corporatist 
countries, produced more inclusive labour market outcomes than in Liberal countries, since 
markets alone would have pushed towards a dualisation of the labour market. 
As Continental European countries promoted deeper labour market reforms to increase 
flexibility, a different view emerged.  More recent scholars in the comparative political 
economy literature have drawn a clear distinction between Liberal, mostly Anglo-Saxon, and 
Continental European countries (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Thelen, 2014). They 
argue that Liberal countries have historically provided more limited employment protection 
than their Continental counterparts and they have opted for a thorough liberalisation of labour 
markets, providing limited employment protection for all workers. By contrast, Continental 
European countries have pursued a flexibilisation ‘at the margin’ (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) 
or a ‘partial and targeted’ deregulation (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009), liberalising atypical 
contracts but making little change to the existing protection for standard workers (Eichhorst 
and Marx, 2010; Bentolila et al., 2012).  
The consequence of those different reforms has been argued to be a higher insider-outsider 
divide in Continental Europe compared to Liberal countries, since the former have pursued 
only a partial flexibilisation, where costs are mostly borne by atypical workers, while the latter 
have implemented a more encompassing flexibilisation, where protection has been reduced 
across employment statuses (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Debels, 2005). Within 
Continental European countries, Mediterranean/Southern European countries have been 
claimed to constitute an extreme case of dualism, as employment protection for standard 
employment has remained comparatively very high, while at the same time there has been a 
relative deregulation of atypical contracts (Barbieri and Sestito, 2012). Thus, by putting 
European countries on a continuum, Southern European countries are argued to occupy one 
extreme, being the most dualised (Lodovici, 2001a; Toharia and Malo, 2001; Polavieja, 2005; 
Berton et al., 2015; Molina and López-Roldán, 2015), while Liberal countries are claimed to 
be among the least, together with the Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 
2001; Polavieja, 2005; Koslowski and McLean 2015). However, the latter have followed a 
different liberalisation process, combining labour market deregulation with generous income 
support and active labour market policies for the unemployed (Eichhorst and Marx, 2015). 
Moreover, scholars in political economy argue not only that Continental European countries 
have become dualised in terms of employment and social protection, but that this gap in 
employment protection can explain the higher spread of atypical employment in Continental 
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European vis-à-vis Liberal countries (Eichhorst and Marx, 2010). They claim that the way 
employers make use of non-standard contracts varies depending on the incentives and 
constraints provided by institutional regulations and this, in turn, explains the relative 
prevalence of atypical employment in different countries (Booth et al., 2002; Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2015). For instance, Rodgers (1989) claims that in a country with highly regulated 
standard employment such as France, employers will find it more convenient to use temporary 
employment in order to avoid tight employment regulations. However, in a country like the 
UK, where employment regulations are quite loose for both standard and atypical workers, 
there are fewer incentives on the employers’ side to use temporary workers. This argument is 
supported by empirical studies investigating the prevalence of atypical employment in 
different countries (e.g. Polavieja, 2005; Hevenstone, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2015). These 
studies find that, in countries with high protection for standard employment and low entry 
barriers to atypical employment, such as most Continental European countries, the use of 
atypical employment is comparatively high, as employers are thought to use atypical 
employment to circumvent tight dismissal regulations for standard employment.  
Furthermore, the divide between standard and non-standard workers has been claimed to be 
also reflected in collective and political representation (Rueda, 2005; Davidsson and Naczyk, 
2009). Dualism theories have argued that a divide in collective representation exists at the 
workplace, where unions have been seen as representing the interests of ‘insiders’, i.e. standard 
workers, at the expense of other workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Palier and Thelen, 
2010). Within this context, countries where unions have comparatively more bargaining power 
and whose constituency is mostly constituted by standard workers, such as those in Continental 
Europe, have been said to present a greater divide in collective representation. By contrast, 
countries with lower union power, such as the Liberal countries, or where the higher 
unionisation rate among atypical workers has had unions supporting pro-outsider policies, 
such as Scandinavian countries, have been argued to be less dualised (Olsen, 2005; Rueda, 
2007; Benassi and Vlandas, 2015). Moreover, atypical workers have been claimed to suffer 
from a representation deficit in the broader political system, and of being politically alienated 
and disengaged (Standing, 2011; Marx, 2015). In that respect, the parties traditionally 
supporting the working classes, such as the Social Democratic parties, have been claimed to 
tend to privilege the representation of interests of ‘insiders’ at the expense of atypical workers 
(Rueda, 2005; Thelen, 2014), fostering a divide between standard and political workers also 
when it comes to party representation. 
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Building on the divide between atypical and standard employment, the social policy literature 
has extended the idea of dualism to social protection (Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011). The reason 
behind this focus lies in the fact that standard employment has historically been not only a 
source of employment rights but also of social rights, especially social security. Authors in the 
comparative social policy literature have argued that, compared to the industrial age, where 
most workers were employed in a standard employment relationship and they were protected 
by relatively generous social protection schemes, the de-standardisation of employment 
relationships, which has characterised post-industrial labour markets, has engendered new 
types of employment statuses, which do not necessarily grant access to the social protection 
schemes granted to standard workers (Palier and Thelen, 2012). 
Considering the issue from a comparative angle, these theories have argued that the 
Bismarckian/Corporatist welfare systems of Continental Europe are those with the largest 
insider-outsider divide, as the type of social protection workers have access to strongly 
depends on their contribution history. More precisely, those who have paid regular 
contributions have access to contribution-based, generally earnings-related, benefits, while 
those who have not can only rely on means-tested, flat-rate benefits (Palier and Thelen, 2010; 
Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011). Within this group, some authors have argued that Mediterranean 
countries again occupy an extreme position, providing more piecemeal and less generous 
means-tested benefits (Jessoula et al., 2010; Sacchi, 2011). By contrast, welfare systems which 
are based on means-tested principles, such as those in the Liberal countries, are argued to be 
more inclusive, as the employment history of a person has less impact on the income protection 
received, thus providing a more equal access to income protection to all workers. Finally, the 
Scandinavian countries, whose social protection system is mostly based on universal 
principles, are argued to be the least dualised (Emmenegger et al., 2012).  
DiPrete et al. (2006), by comparing France and the US, provide a different conceptualisation 
of labour market divides using two dimensions: wage and employment protection. They argue 
that the deregulated labour market in the US has allowed wage flexibility, thus increasing wage 
inequality, while in France and in other European countries, where tolerance for income 
inequality is lower, flexibility has mainly been achieved through the use of temporary and 
other atypical contracts. Thus, they conclude that there has been a trend towards a ‘generalised 
inequality’ (p. 317), which, however, has taken different forms depending on the institutional 
setting of each country. While the highly deregulated American labour market has seen an 
increase in income inequality, the partly-liberalised French one has seen an increase in 
employment security inequality.  
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A similar argument has been put forward by Maurin and Postel-Vinay (2005), who analysed 
labour market inequality trends in 13 European countries. They found that countries which 
allowed wage inequality to grow have seen a more moderate increase in the expansion of 
atypical employment, suggesting that a trade-off exists between income and employment 
security. Thus, according to these scholars, Continental European labour markets are not 
necessarily more dualised than Anglo-Saxon labour markets. What differs is the type of labour 
market divide, one based on wages and the other based on employment contracts. On a similar 
note, Barbieri (2009) has classified Western countries along two dimensions: an inequality 
dimension and an insecurity dimension. Liberal countries are the ones characterised by high 
wage inequality but low job insecurity, while Continental and Mediterranean countries have 
lower wage inequalities but high job insecurity. Hence, in contrast to previous theories which 
conceptualised dualism in terms of a divide related to employment protection between 
standard and atypical workers, these authors argue that dualism can take different forms 
depending on the labour market under consideration. So, while the divide between atypical 
and standard employment might be wider in Continental Europe than in Liberal countries, the 
overall wage inequality, regardless of the type of employment, might be more prominent in 
Liberal than in Continental countries.  
The review of the literature on dualism has highlighted the main institutionally-driven divides 
that have been identified between standard and atypical workers in European countries. The 
review shows that atypical workers have been argued to be at a disadvantage compared to their 
standard counterparts in all of these dimensions, although important differences between 
countries have been highlighted. These studies offer important insights for this thesis. First of 
all, they allow to draw an early distinction in dualist outcomes between Liberal, mostly Anglo-
Saxon, and Continental European countries, with Southern European countries as an extreme 
group within the latter. This categorisation has informed the case selection for this thesis. The 
comparison of insider-outsider divide between these countries is discussed in more detail in 
section 2.6. For now, it is important to highlight that Italy and the UK have been regarded as 
polar cases in the European context with respect to the divide between standard and atypical 
workers, the former belonging to the Southern European group and the latter being an example 
of a Liberal regime. The institutional characteristics of the two countries are discussed in 






2.4 Institutions and Disadvantages: Focusing on the Individual 
Hitherto, I have considered disadvantage from an institutional perspective, presenting how 
institutions have been argued to shape disadvantages among atypical workers. Nevertheless, 
little has been said so far on how these institutional divides translate into individual 
disadvantages. In order to do this, we have to consider two streams of literature which are 
intertwined and which closely overlap: the already mentioned literature on dualism and 
literature on precariousness (Hipp et al., 2015). Scholars from both streams regard institutions 
as an important factor in shaping disadvantages in the labour market. Nevertheless, while 
dualist scholars, as we have already seen, adopt what can be argued to be a deterministic 
approach, assuming a direct connection between institutional and individual disadvantages, 
authors in the literature on precariousness adopt a different perspective, considering how 
institutional characteristics, individual-level variables and the broader socio-economic context 
interact with each other in creating a situation of ‘precariousness’ or ‘precarity’ in which the 
individual is not fully socially included. I argue that it is constructive to draw also from the 
literature on precariousness if we are to fully understand the link between institutional settings 
and the disadvantages they produce. Moreover, by considering individuals as units of analysis 
and not only institutions, we avoid adopting an overly deterministic approach, allowing for 
variation in the impact institutions may have on individuals and exploring possible complex 
interactions between individual situations and institutional arrangements.  
The literature on dualism has conceptualised the disadvantages experienced by ‘outsiders’ in 
different ways. As already mentioned, the concept of ‘outsider’ itself suggests that somebody 
is excluded, that she does not have access to or she is not part of something. In its original 
version, outsiders were identified as those who were employed in the secondary labour market. 
While workers in the primary labour market were generally unionised, had access to high pay 
and fringe benefits, relatively high job security and well established internal career paths, 
workers in the secondary labour market only had access to low wages and limited fringe 
benefits, had limited employment stability and little employment protection and had few 
opportunities for career progression (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Hence, disadvantages were 
mostly associated with worse employment and working conditions compared to standard 
workers.  
The insider-outsider theory adopted a more general stance, considering as an outsider everyone 
who, in a specific domain, did not have the same contractual power which was afforded to 
others (insiders), and who therefore could not bargain for the same pay and employment 
conditions of insiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Here, disadvantages were associated with 
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any right and entitlement which could not be negotiated because of a weaker bargaining 
position. Thus, depending on the field in which insider-outsider theory was applied, outsiders 
might be the unemployed, those employed in the informal sector, the non-unionised, those 
employed short-term or the unskilled workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). 
The conceptualisation of disadvantages has partly changed in more recent decades. Although 
many studies have continued to identify outsiders as those employed in low-skilled 
occupations, generally in the service sector but also in peripheral jobs in the manufacturing 
sector, an increasing number of studies have identified outsiders as those in non-standard 
employment (Rosenberg, 1991; Rubery, 2006). These new employment arrangements, which 
have spread after labour market flexibilisation reforms from the 1980s onwards, have been 
regarded as epitomising ‘outsiderness’, as workers on these employment contracts generally 
have access to lower pay and worse working conditions, limited employment security and 
limited bargaining power compared to standard ‘insider’ workers (Rubery, 2006). Like in 
previous conceptualisations, disadvantages have been related to employment and working 
conditions, but the employment status has come to be seen as the main source of systematic 
disadvantages.  
Finally, literature on dualism in social protection has identified outsiders as those in reception 
of social assistance and/or other means-tested benefits, as they are not entitled to the more 
generous contribution-based benefits and occupational income protection schemes which are 
granted to insiders (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Seleeib-Kaiser et 
al., 2012). Following this definition, outsiders are people with low labour market attachment, 
such as the long-term unemployed, but also individuals who, because of their intermittent 
employment experience, or because of their non-standard employment status, have limited 
access to contributory and/or private income protection schemes (Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011). 
Thus, scholars in the literature on dualism in social protection have switched the focus to 
disadvantages in income protection rather than in employment and work. Moreover, although 
not necessarily focusing on people in atypical employment, they have brought attention to the 
lower income protection that non-standard workers might have access to compared to their 
standard counterparts, as people working part-time, or those on temporary contracts and the 
solo self-employed workers might constitute a large part of outsiders in a given country 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012).  
It is clear from this brief review of this literature that ‘outsiders’ are mainly defined in 
opposition to ‘insiders’. Insiders are those who have access to ‘standard’ rights and 
entitlements, including pay, working conditions, career prospects, collective representation, 
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employment security and access to income protection. Outsiders are those who, because of 
their employment status, are eligible for fewer or more limited rights and entitlements. 
Nevertheless, these scholars adopt a mostly top-down approach in describing the 
disadvantages experienced by outsiders, focusing on institutions and investigating which 
rights and entitlements are granted to individuals with different employment statuses. 
Therefore, disadvantages are mainly conceptualised in terms of institutional barriers to access 
rights and entitlements, but little emphasis is given to how these impact the ‘outsider’ in 
practice and how these institutional divides are individually perceived. In this approach, it 
appears to be implicitly assumed that institutional divides automatically translate into 
individual disadvantages, but this assumption is not explored empirically.  
Moreover, given the focus in the dualism literature on the macro-characteristics of the 
institutional setting, these authors pay little attention to individual socio-demographic 
characteristics and how these might interact with institutional arrangements in shaping 
‘outsiderness’ or even in counteracting it. Even less attention is paid to possible diversities 
among ‘outsiders’, given that institutions might have differentiated impacts on diverse groups 
of individuals and that individuals might ‘need’ or ‘use’ different rights and entitlements in 
different ways. I argue that in order to avoid simplistic assumptions about the impact of 
institutional divides on individual disadvantages, it is important to consider the impact of 
institutions at the individual level. I therefore now turn to another stream of literature which 
has considered disadvantages from an individual-level: the precariousness literature. 
While literature on dualism is strongly rooted in the political economy tradition, literature on 
precariousness emerged within the field of sociology. Scholars in the precariousness literature 
take a bottom-up approach in the analysis of employment-related disadvantages. Rather than 
using institutions as units of analysis, they focus on individuals and, from the analysis of 
disadvantages they experience, they relate back to the institutional and other contextual factors 
which caused them. The concept of precariousness dates back to the 1970s and the 1980s when 
it was used in connection with poverty and social exclusion but not necessarily with 
employment (Barbier, 2004). Precariousness can be broadly defined as an individual situation 
of insecurity and vulnerability stemming from a specific social status (Vosko et al., 2003). An 
individual is regarded as being ‘precarious’ when she is vulnerable to incidents and sudden 
changes in her life which can disrupt her status.  Precariousness entails ‘instability, lack of 
protection, insecurity and social and economic vulnerability’ (Rodger, 1989, p.3). Thus, a 
situation of precariousness is closely connected with a risk of social exclusion (Barbier, 2004). 
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In that respect, the concept of being ‘precarious’ recalls the idea of being an ‘outsider’, as a 
precarious person is not fully integrated into society and she is at risk of being left out.  
Most of the literature on precariousness has subsequently concentrated on employment 
statuses, which might foster a risk of detachment and exclusion from mainstream society. 
These scholars have increasingly associated precariousness with employment conditions, 
particularly as new employment arrangements have been seen as the main cause of insecurity 
and vulnerability in contemporary societies (Kalleberg, 2000; Vosko et al., 2003; Nienhüser, 
2005). Thus, similarly to some of the dualist theories, contemporary authors in the 
precariousness literature have investigated predominantly atypical employment. Scholars 
studying precariousness agree that people in atypical employment are more likely to be in a 
situation of precariousness as they tend to present several interrelated disadvantages (Rodgers, 
1989; Tucker, 2003; Nienhüser, 2005; Kalleberg, 2014). For instance, they might be subjected 
to both employment insecurity and low pay or they might present a higher risk of 
unemployment and have a more limited access to unemployment protection. 
However, precariousness does not have to be equated with non-standard employment (Fudge, 
2005; Keune, 2015). In fact, not all atypical workers can be regarded as precarious, as certain 
individuals might be voluntarily employed in atypical jobs because this might best suit their 
life needs or because it is easier to combine those types of jobs with other activities they deem 
relevant, thus improving their work-life balance (Rodgers, 1989; Zeytinoglu et al., 2004). For 
instance, a mother might prefer to work part-time to carry out her caring responsibilities or a 
student might want to take only temporary and seasonal jobs to generate some income while 
in education. More generally, a person might complement income from an atypical job with 
that from a permanent job of another member of the household to create their preferred work-
life balance.  
According to these scholars, precariousness is a multidimensional concept, which includes 
several interconnected dimensions, both related and unrelated to the labour market, in which 
an individual faces a vulnerability. It is the cumulative effect of being vulnerable in multiple 
dimensions at the same time which engenders a situation of precariousness (Rodgers and 
Rodgers, 1989; Barbier, 2004). Therefore, it is the interaction between individual situations 
and characteristics, employment regulations, income protection and industrial relations system 
which might engender a situation of precariousness (Laparra et al., 2004; Kalleberg, 2013). 
Compared to scholars in the dualism literature, scholars in the literature on precariousness 
consider disadvantages at the individual level and they are careful to assume that an individual 
who is not granted a right or an entitlement will automatically experience a disadvantage. They 
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are instead more interested in considering the interaction between institutional disadvantages, 
individual characteristics and the macro socio-economic environment in engendering a 
situation of individual disadvantage. Furthermore, they consider how an individual 
disadvantage is subjectively perceived, as some disadvantages might be perceived as ‘natural’ 
and legitimate, while others might be regarded as ‘unfair’. Despite this more articulated 
approach in the analysis of disadvantages, to my knowledge, this literature offers no systematic 
qualitative analysis of cross-country differences in precariousness based on institutional and 
other contextual factors. Therefore, it does not provide an analytical tool to explore the impact 
of different institutional arrangements on individual disadvantages, with most comparative 
studies focusing on finding a common definition or precariousness which can travel across 
borders (see for instance, Tucker, 2003; Barbier, 2011). 
This section has reviewed how these two streams of literature have conceptualised individual 
disadvantages. On the one hand, disadvantage has been defined in terms of ‘outsiderness’, and 
it has been associated with being excluded from rights and entitlements. On the other hand, it 
has been thought of as precariousness, which is caused by a complex interaction between 
institutional barriers and constraints, individual socio-demographic characteristics and the 
broader socio-economic context. Despite this apparent distinction, these different 
conceptualisations of employment-related disadvantage closely overlap in reality, as already 
noted by some authors (e.g. Barbier, 2011; Doogan, 2013; Hipp et al., 2015). For instance, 
atypical workers might be precarious because they are granted lower employment protection 
than a standard worker (i.e. labour market outsider), they are less likely to be unionised than a 
standard employee (i.e. outsider as regards collective representation) and they might not have 
accrued enough social insurance contributions to access contribution-based benefits (i.e. social 
protection outsider).  
Nevertheless, while the literature on dualism offers a systematic analysis of cross-country 
differences in institutional configurations and discusses their impacts in terms of institutional 
divides across a number of employment-related dimensions, to my knowledge no systematic 
cross-country comparison on the impact of different institutional settings on individual 
disadvantage is offered by the precariousness literature. Hence, while the dualism literature 
provides an important analytical framework to investigate institutional configurations 
engendering a differential set of rights and entitlements between standard and atypical 
workers, the precariousness literature provides a more apt approach for the study of 
disadvantages experienced by atypical workers from an individual perspective. Therefore, this 
thesis draws from both streams of literature in the analysis of the impact of institutions on 
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individual disadvantages, relying mostly on the dualism literature to identify institutional 
divides, but exploring the disadvantages empirically at the individual level, and considering 
the interplay between the institutional setting and individual and contextual factors, as 
suggested by the precariousness literature. It is thus possible to explore whether and how 
institutional divides translate into actually experienced disadvantages and how they may 
interact with other non-institutional factors in shaping an individual situation of disadvantage.  
Furthermore, while the literature on dualism considers disadvantage in ‘objective’ terms, 
considering disadvantages in terms of lack of rights and entitlements, the literature on 
precariousness is also interested in the ‘subjective’ aspect of disadvantage, considering how 
disadvantages are perceived at the individual level. I argue that considering both aspects is 
important for analytical purposes. On the one hand, it allows to distinguish between 
institutional divides which translate into individual ones and those that do not. On the other 
hand, it enables us to consider how individual disadvantages are subjectively perceived, as 
some disadvantages might be regarded as ‘fair’ or legitimate, while others might be 
experienced as ‘unfair’ or discriminatory. 
A final point must be mentioned. While the literature on dualism identifies disadvantages only 
in relative terms, identifying outsiders always in relation to a group of insiders, the literature 
on precariousness tends to consider disadvantages in absolute terms, never mind the portion 
of the workforce who experience the disadvantage. Thus, while in the former, there will always 
be, by definition, someone in the labour market who does not experience a given disadvantage, 
in the latter there can be a large portion or even the whole workforce who experience the same 
disadvantage. For instance, low employment protection for both standard and atypical workers 
would not be regarded as a disadvantage in the insider-outsider literature, given that the 
workforce is more or less equally affected; in the precariousness literature it might be 
considered so, as it might foster a situation of employment insecurity, regardless of the 
proportion of workers involved. On the contrary, the existence of a two-tier social security 
system, organised around contribution-based benefits for those who have contributed and 
means-tested benefits for those without sufficient contributions, may be regarded as 
segmenting in the dualism literature, but it might not be regarded as such in the precariousness 
literature, provided that the means-tested benefits are generous enough to provide an adequate 
source of income security. 
I argue that integrating both a relative and an absolute perspective is the most fruitful way of 
exploring employment-related disadvantages from an individual perspective. Firstly, a group 
of workers might experience a disadvantage although no institutional divide is in place, given 
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that they might be more negatively affected than other groups by the same institutional 
arrangement. Secondly, if we are to take into consideration interactions between different 
disadvantages, a person who experiences a relative disadvantage in combination with an 
absolute disadvantage might perceive herself as more ‘excluded’ than a person who 
experiences only the relative one alone, contributing to aggravating an already existing divide. 
Finally, given that the experience of being an outsider might be due to cumulative 
disadvantages, considering both absolute and relative disadvantages is important, as they 
might both play a role in shaping the person’s situation. We can argue that a person who 
experiences both a relative and an absolute disadvantage might be worse off than a person who 
experience only the relative one. Therefore, the thesis considers disadvantages from both an 
absolute and a relative perspective, considering it important to investigate interactions between 
different types of disadvantages and how they are individually experienced. 
 
2.5 Analysing Institutionally-driven Disadvantages: A Cross-country Comparison 
This section lays out the analytical framework for the thesis. As already discussed in section 
2.2, the dualism literature has identified a clear difference in the labour market and social 
protection structure of Liberal vs. Continental European countries. Among the latter, Southern 
European countries have been regarded as an extreme case, which places them in an even 
starker contrast to the Liberal countries. The characteristics of the institutional framework have 
been argued to produce very different consequences in the insider-outsider divide of workers 
in the two groups of countries, with Liberal countries being among the least dualised and the 
Southern European being among the most. Following this literature, the overarching 
hypothesis of this thesis is that atypical workers in Southern European countries systematically 
experience deeper and more wide-spread disadvantages compared to atypical workers in 
Liberal countries. In the following sections, this general hypothesis is re-framed as more 
specific ones within each of the main employment-related dimensions in which dualist theories 
have argued for the existence of an insider-outsider divide.   
This part of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.5.1 defines standard and atypical 
employment.  Section 2.6 introduces the dimensions of disadvantage which are investigated 
from an individual perspective in the empirical analysis, namely employment (section 2.6.1), 
work (section 2.6.2) and income protection (section 2.6.3). These are the core dimensions in 
which the dualism literature has identified a divide between standard and atypical workers. 
For each dimension, I discuss the main findings from the literature on dualism with respect to 
the divides between atypical and standard employment. The focus is mostly on comparative 
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European literature. For each dimension, I formulate some initial hypotheses which have 
guided the subsequent empirical analysis. Section 2.7 draws the conclusions which lead to 
discussion of the research design in the following chapter. 
 
          2.5.1. Atypical vs. Standard Employment 
Any cross-country comparison in labour market divides involves two comparisons: one 
between countries and another between two groups of workers. As already mentioned, this 
thesis focuses on two countries, Italy and the UK, and two employment categories: standard 
and atypical workers. Before discussing the state of the art of dualism literature in different 
employment-related dimensions, it is relevant to clarify what is meant by standard and atypical 
employment in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding in what will be analysed later 
on. As will be clear from below, atypical or non-standard employment, which are used 
interchangeably in this thesis, are generally defined as a residual category to what constitutes 
‘standard’ (or ‘typical’) employment. It is therefore useful to first discuss how standard 
employment has been defined. 
According to some authors who have studied precariousness, the definition of standard 
employment varies between countries depending on employment regulations and labour law. 
Many Continental European countries have the definition of standard employment enshrined 
in their labour code, such as in France, Spain or Italy. For instance, The Italian Statuto del 
Lavoratori defines standard employment as an open-ended contract with statutory protection 
against dismissal (Barbier, 2004). Other scholars have noted that this is not the case in the UK 
labour law, where the distinction between standard and non-standard remains somehow fuzzy 
(Koslowski and McLean, 2015). Nevertheless, Barbier (2004) argues that, even in the UK, 
although lacking a legal definition, the practice shows a clear conceptualisation of what is 
standard or regular employment, that is full-time, permanent employment for a single 
employer. 
In the academic literature, different definitions of standard employment are also used, although 
they overlap in many respects. A general definition entails any employment relationship which 
is full-time, permanent and directly hiring by a single employer (see, for instance, Hevenstone, 
2010; Eichhorst, 2014). Some authors have added other characteristics, such as working 
regular hours, over a whole year, primarily at the employer’s premises (Whatman, 1994, cited 
in Tucker, 2003). Brosnan and Walsh (1996, cited in Tucker, 2003) suggest a similar 
definition, but they add working between 7 am till 6 pm and only Monday till Friday. Booth 
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et al. (2002) define standard employment as being ‘employed on a permanent contract, 
working at the employer’s premises, during the day, and for between 30 and 48 hours per 
week’ (p.2). Despite differences both from country to country and between researchers, there 
appears to be a common understanding of what constitutes standard employment, that is a full-
time, permanent employment relationship between an employer and an employee which 
entails some protection against dismissal. This is the definition used in this thesis, unless 
otherwise specified. As we have seen, this is also the legal definition in Italy, although no 
equivalent definition exists in the UK.  
Although boundaries of atypical employment vary with the definition used, casual and 
informal work, intermittent and seasonal, fixed-term, temporary agency work and solo self-
employment are all types of employment which can be regarded as non-standard or atypical. 
It is contended whether part-time (permanent) employment should be regarded as non-
standard. While some scholars consider it a specific type of atypical employment (see for 
instance, Vosko et al., 2003; Tucker, 2003), other authors argue that part-time may or may not 
be included depending on a number of factors, including country-level characteristics (see, for 
instance, Barbier, 2011; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). A part-time employee generally enjoys 
the same rights and entitlements (though in some cases on a pro-rata) as a standard employee, 
including employment protection, with the significant difference being the number of hours 
worked (Hipp et al., 2015). However, non-standard employment arrangements can be part-
time as well, including, for instance, fixed-term contracts or temporary agency contracts. 
Given that the main interest of this thesis is the contract type rather than the number of hours 
worked, reference to atypical employment will not generally include part-time (permanent) 
employment, unless specifically mentioned. Atypical work will thus refer to any employment 
arrangement which is non-permanent. 
As it has been defined in the literature as a residual category, it is not surprising that atypical 
employment includes many different types of employment, which are not necessarily very 
similar to each other. Hence, within a country, we expect to find high heterogeneity among 
atypical contracts also as regards their relative differences to standard contracts (Barbier, 
2011). For instance, a person working full-time on a four-year fixed-term contract might be 
considered much closer to ‘standard’ employment than a person working as a solo self-
employed in a seasonal job for 18 hours a week. Moreover, both Marshall (1989) and Tucker 
(2003) state that it is important to bear in mind that different forms of atypical employment 
may overlap. For example, a person may be working seasonally as a temporary agency worker, 
or she might be employed temporarily as a quasi-self-employed worker. Furthermore, to make 
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atypical employment an even less uniform category, we have to remember that some atypical 
contracts have been crafted by specific national legislation, and therefore they might exist in 
one country but not in another. For instance, Berton et al. (2012) identify parasubordinati 
contracts (a type of quasi-self-employed contract) as a typically Italian phenomenon. Eichhorst 
and Tobsch (2014) regard mini-jobs as a peculiar German creation, while, according to Crouch 
(2015), zero-hour contracts are a specific British invention, with no exact equivalent in other 
European countries. Differences in the characteristics of atypical employment both within and 
between countries have led me to choose full-time temporary agency work as the type of 
atypical employment for which this thesis compares the individual experience of disadvantage 
in Italy and the UK. The reasons for this choice are explained in detail in section 3.3. 
Having clarified different conceptualisations of standard and non-standard/atypical 
employment, and presented the ones that are used in this thesis, I will now discuss what has 
hitherto been found on the divide between standard and atypical employment in several 
employment-related dimensions, adopting a comparative perspective at the European level. 
 
2.6 Dimensions of Disadvantage 
Scholars in the dualism literature have identified several employment-related dimensions in 
which the workforce appears to be present an insider-outsider divide. For instance, Palier and 
Thelen (2010) mention three areas in which they find an ongoing process of dualisation in 
Germany and France, namely labour market, welfare and industrial relations. Similarly, 
Davidsson and Naczyk (2009) identify three institutional realms in which the process of 
dualisation has unfolded in post-industrial countries, which are the labour market, the social 
protection system and political representation. Furthermore, Emmenegger et al. (2012) analyse 
divides between insiders and outsiders in Western countries over a variety of social fields, 




3) Income Protection 
We can argue that these include all the most significant core experiential dimensions related 
to being an atypical worker, as they include the employment conditions, the actual working 
conditions at the workplace and the social protection when the person is unable to work.  
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It is important at this stage to clearly distinguish what I mean by these three dimensions, 
particularly the difference between employment and work, which are related, but different, 
concepts (see, for instance Letourneux, 1998). Employment dualism refers to any divide which 
is directly attributable to the employment status of individuals (in this case, between standard 
and atypical employment). This includes employment protection, employment stability and 
possibilities of employment transition. Work dualism includes any divide in the actual 
conditions at the workplace. This entails pay, general working conditions, such as working 
time, job content and relations with colleagues, and workers’ representation, both individual 
and collective. While the employment dimension focuses on employment paths and 
employment trajectories, the work dimension considers the practical conditions related to job 
characteristics. Finally, income protection dualism considers any divide in protection against 
income loss related to the impossibility to work. Despite not being exhaustive, these 
dimensions cover the most important employment-related aspects where the literature has 
identified institutional disadvantages among atypical workers.  
A further important dimension where scholars have identified an insider-outsider divide is 
political representation (e.g. Rueda, 2007; Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Lindvall and 
Rueda, 2013; Marx, 2015). However, for the purposes of this thesis, the political representation 
dimension is not investigated. The reasons are manifold. Firstly, for the majority of workers, 
in both standard and atypical employment, political participation might not be regarded as a 
central aspect of their employment-related experience. Secondly, only a small minority of 
workers can be said to be involved in political activities other than voting, which would result 
in the analysis of political participation either relying on a very small sample within the larger 
sample of interviewees, or having to concentrate the analysis on a sample of politically active 
individuals, which is likely to bias the analysis in the other dimensions. Finally, the analysis 
of political representation would have switched the focus of the research to parties and/or 
social movements involved in the representation of atypical workers’ interests, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The following three sub-sections review the current literature on institutional divides between 
standard and atypical workers across different countries, with particular reference to the 
already highlighted distinction between Continental (and especially Southern) European and 
Liberal countries. As already mentioned, there are two comparisons involved. The first is that 





2.6.1 Disadvantage in Employment 
As already highlighted in section 2.2, according to scholars in the dualism literature, there 
appears to be a clear distinction between the path toward liberalisation chosen by Anglo-Saxon 
and by Continental European countries and its consequences for employment segmentation 
(Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Barbieri, 2009). While Anglo-Saxon countries have 
opted for a thorough liberalisation (Deakin and Reed, 2001; Thelen, 2014), most Continental 
European countries have allowed only a partial flexibilisation, generally deregulating atypical 
contracts but with little modification of employment protection for standard employment 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Bentolila et al., 2012). Within this 
comparative framework, Southern European countries are argued to be an extreme case within 
Continental European countries, as they are the ones where the gap in employment protection 
is highest (Barbieri, 2009; Rueda et al, 2015).  
In this context, the divide in employment protection is what constitutes dualism, as the 
workforce is divided between those in relatively secure standard employment and those in 
atypical employment who enjoy more limited employment protection. Thus, according to 
these theories, there exists what may be argued to be an employment protection divide 
dependent on the relative employment protection granted to standard employment vis-à-vis 
atypical employment. This employment protection divide is argued to be larger in countries 
which have followed only a partial liberalisation of their labour market and which still grant 
comparatively high employment protection to standard workers, such as the Southern 
European countries. By contrast, countries which grant low employment protection to all 
workers, such as the Liberal countries, are argued to present a more limited employment 
protection divide.  
In translating this institutional divide into individual disadvantage, we can hypothesise atypical 
workers to perceive their employment status as relatively more insecure in Southern European 
compared to Liberal countries, as they experience a larger employment protection gap in 
relation to standard workers. Hence, referring to the concept of precariousness, we expect 
atypical workers in Southern Europe to experience a higher sense of employment 
precariousness compared to their counterparts in Liberal countries. Reversely, standard 
employment is expected to be perceived as more secure in Southern Europe compared to 
Liberal countries, as it is granted higher employment protection in the former compared to the 
latter. 
Furthermore, other authors have suggested a more dynamic perspective on dualism, 
considering employment transitions rather than employment statuses (see, for example, 
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Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Berton et al., 2011; Muffels, 2015). For example, Muffels (2015) 
argues that we cannot really talk about dualisation if ‘outsiders’ are able to easily become 
‘insiders’, especially within a short time span. Thus, the ability to easily move from atypical 
to standard employment would suggest that the labour market is not dualised and that it 
guarantees fluidity between employment categories. Therefore, if atypical employment is a 
path out of unemployment and it subsequently leads to standard employment, it can then be 
regarded as a ‘stepping stone’. By contrast, if people in atypical employment are ‘stuck’ in 
this form of employment and they are unable to progress towards standard jobs, then atypical 
can be regarded as a ‘trap’ (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Origo and Lodovici, 2012).  
The type of use of atypical contracts made by employers is a relevant endogenous variable 
influencing the possibility of transition. If employers hire atypical workers mostly to reduce 
costs compared to hiring standard workers, or to make up for a temporary shortage of labour 
force, it is likely that transition into standard employment will not be frequent (Hevenstone, 
2010; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). If, on the contrary, they use atypical employment as a 
‘screening device’ for new employees before eventually hiring those most suitable, then 
atypical employment may be considered a stepping stone, at least for some (Forde and Slater, 
2005). It has been argued that the use employers make of atypical employment is strongly 
influenced by the employment regulation framework and this translates into differences 
between countries in the possibility of transition (e.g. Mitlacher, 2007; Leschke, 2009; 
Muffels, 2015). Overall, studies have found that in Southern European countries, atypical 
employment is mostly used as a substitute for standard one, translating into a trap effect for 
atypical workers, who have limited opportunities to become permanent (e.g. Güell and 
Petrongolo, 2007; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). By contrast, in Liberal countries, but also in 
Scandinavian countries, transitions into permanent employment appear comparatively easier 
(e.g. Booth et al., 2002; Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Leschke, 2009; Jahn and Rosholm, 2013). 
Continental European other than Southern European countries, are placed in between, though 
somewhat closer to the Southern European countries (e.g. Blanchard and Landier, 2002; 
Debels, 2005; Kwasnicka, 2005; Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Leschke, 2009; Biegert, 2014).  
Hence, there appears to be a significant amount of overlap between countries with large 
differences in employment protection between standard and atypical jobs and ‘trap’ effects for 
those in non-standard employment, such as Continental and especially Southern European 
countries. This has been attributed to the fact that employers in these countries use atypical 
employment as a cost reduction strategy and in order to avoid regulations concerning standard 
employment (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). By contrast, countries 
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with relatively minor differences in employment protection between standard and atypical 
workers, such as the Anglo-Saxon and some of the Scandinavian countries, seem to offer better 
prospects of transition into standard employment for those in atypical employment. This has 
been argued to be due to the fact that, contrary to Continental European countries, employers 
in those countries might use atypical employment primarily to increase their functional 
flexibility or as a ‘screening device’ for future permanent hiring (Booth et al., 2002; Jahn and 
Rosholm, 2013). Hence, atypical workers in Southern Europe are expected to experience more 
difficulties in moving to standard employment and to experience more prolonged experiences 
in atypical employment. Relating to the concept of precariousness, we can hypothesise the 
employment experience of atypical workers in Southern Europe to be more precarious 
dynamically than that of atypical workers in Liberal countries. We expect atypical workers to 
feel more trapped in atypical employment and to perceive their employment prospects as more 
insecure in the former than in the latter. 
Furthermore, other scholars argue that a different type of transition is also important, namely 
that from unemployment to atypical employment (Gray, 2002; Gash, 2005; Scherer, 2005). 
Atypical employment might offer an opportunity for the unemployed to re-enter the labour 
market. In that respect, it can be interpreted as a way of reducing the divide with those in 
standard employment, providing a stepping stone out of unemployment. There is not much 
theoretical literature on how different labour market institutions can play a role in influencing 
transitions from unemployment to atypical employment, while the empirical literature focuses 
mostly on single-country studies (e.g. Scherer, 2005; Addison and Surfield, 2006). As no clear 
evidence for differences in a stepping stone effect could be identified in a cross-country 
comparison, I formulate the hypothesis that no systematic differences in the transition from 
unemployment to temporary employment exist between Liberal and Southern European 
countries.  
 
2.6.2 Disadvantage in Work 
Working conditions are among the most prominent dimensions in which atypical workers have 
been found to be presented with a disadvantage compared to their standard counterparts, 
including pay, health and safety, working time, job content, training and relations with 
colleagues. Since their first formulations in the 1970s, dualist theories have argued for the 
existence of a segment of the workforce experiencing comparatively worse working conditions 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Reich et al., 1973; Rubery, 1978). Part of the definition of being 
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an ‘outsider’ included being subjected to lower pay, more menial tasks, less training and fewer 
opportunities for unionisation (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Rubery, 1978). 
In the following years, the spread of atypical forms of employment has fostered numerous 
empirical studies comparing the working conditions of atypical workers vis-à-vis standard 
workers (e.g. Feldman et al., 1994; Rogers, 1995; Letourneux, 1998; Goudswaard and de 
Nanteuil, 2000; Guest, 2004; De Graaf-Zijl, 2005). These studies mostly confirmed initial 
expectations from the dualism literature, showing atypical workers to be at a disadvantage 
with regard to a number of working conditions. For instance, Letourneux (1998) found atypical 
workers in the European Union to be worse off compared to their standard counterparts with 
regard to several working conditions, including pay, job content and relation with colleagues, 
though they were not systematically at a disadvantage in terms of working time. Goudswaard 
and de Nanteuil (2000), in a cross-country comparison of seven major European countries, 
found atypical workers to be at a disadvantage in many working conditions, including health 
and safety and working time. The study also highlighted many similarities between countries, 
regardless of their employment and welfare regime. 
The increasing political awareness of the divide in working conditions between standard and 
atypical workers and the growing pressure from trade unions prompted many advancements 
in national legislations to promote equal treatment (Benassi and Vlandas, 2015; Pulignano et 
al., 2015). For instance, in some countries, such as Italy, the introduction of some atypical 
employment contracts was immediately accompanied by the provision of equal treatment in 
several working conditions, guaranteed by both national legislation and collective agreements 
(Voss et al., 2013; Durazzi, 2015). In others, such as Belgium and Germany, equal treatment 
was reached subsequently through negotiations with trade unions, though equal treatment 
depended on the coverage of collective bargaining (Pulignano and Doerflinger, 2013; Benassi 
and Dorigatti, 2015).  
Finally, the European Union, in subsequent attempts to harmonise workers’ rights across 
Europe, has issued several Directives promoting equal treatment for non-standard workers, 
including the Part-Time Work Directive (1997/81/EC), the Fixed-term Work Directive 
(1999/70/EC) and the Temporary Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC). The 
implementation of EU-level legislation helped equalise the working conditions of many 
atypical workers with those of standard employees, especially in countries with a traditionally 
deregulated employment framework, like the UK, where many atypical workers were still not 
guaranteed equal treatment. Nevertheless, a number of authors have claimed that several 
derogations from the principle of equal treatment are provided in those Directives, especially 
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in the most recent Temporary Agency Work Directive, somewhat diluting equal treatment 
provisions concerning a number of working conditions (Vosko, 2009; Wynn, 2014). Overall, 
it can be said that, currently, the majority of atypical workers1 across Europe have access to 
equal treatment in most working conditions, with some exceptions2. Therefore, no institutional 
divide in working conditions between standard and atypical workers should be present where 
equal treatment is guaranteed.  
Nevertheless, some scholars in the precariousness literature have found atypical workers to 
present some disadvantages in working conditions compared to standard employees (e.g. 
Rogers, 1995; Von Hippel, 2006; Altieri et al., 2009). For instance, Rogers (1995), argued that 
atypical workers experience several disadvantages in relations with colleagues and 
supervisors, being subjected to discrimination. Similarly, Altieri et al. (2009), studying TA 
workers in Italy, found them to be generally assigned the most menial jobs and to be moved 
from one task to another within the same assignment, with little continuity, unlike their 
standard colleagues. This shows that precariousness scholars pay more attention to 
disadvantages which are not necessarily caused by work regulations, but are instead dependent 
on practices in the workplaces. Thus, we might expect some forms of disadvantage to be 
present, although no clear difference could be identified between Liberal and Southern 
European countries.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that atypical workers tend to be disproportionally employed 
in occupations with bad working conditions (Kalleberg, 2000; Keune, 2015). These might 
include occupations with lower pay, fewer fringe benefits, requiring lower skills and being at 
a higher health risk (Kalleberg, 2013). Nevertheless, this aspect goes beyond the conception 
of dualism hitherto used, as the differences in working conditions are due to compositional 
effects within the workforce rather than institutional factors. However, the correlation between 
atypical employment and bad working conditions has been used by several scholars in the 
precariousness literature to argue an increasing polarisation of the workforce (see for instance, 
Standing, 2011; Kalleberg, 2013), between those with good employment and working 
conditions, and those without. Once again, this shows the attention paid by the precariousness 
literature to absolute disadvantages, even where no relative disadvantage is present.  
When it comes to individual representation and individual bargaining power, the dualism 
literature is mostly silent. Although some early dualist scholars, mostly from radical theory, 
                                                            
1 Though this is still not the case for self-employed and quasi-self-employed workers, and for a small 
number of specific atypical contracts in some countries.  




have highlighted the more limited bargaining power ‘outsiders’ have, and how this is used by 
employers as a form of control (Reich et al. 1973), the more recent literature on dualism has 
mostly ignored the issue. Nevertheless, we can rely on insights from the precariousness 
literature to formulate some tentative hypotheses. Although most authors within the 
precariousness literature have also been silent on the issue, a few have highlighted the limited 
bargaining power atypical workers have in negotiating conditions at the workplace and how 
this is used by employers as a disciplinary mechanism (e.g. Catania et al., 2004; McKay and 
Markova, 2010; Pedaci, 2010). For instance, Pedaci (2010) argues that atypical workers, 
because of the risk of non-renewal of the employment contract, feel more obliged to fulfil the 
employers’ demands and not to voice their problems, encouraging employers to use atypical 
contracts to control the workforce. Therefore, we may hypothesise that atypical workers 
experience more limited bargaining power than standard workers when it comes to individual 
representation. Nevertheless, the lack of comparative studies on the topic makes it difficult to 
formulate hypotheses from a cross-country perspective. 
With respect to workers’ collective representation, the dualism literature has traditionally 
highlighted an insider-outsider divide between standard and atypical workers, with standard 
workers represented by unions and atypical workers excluded from collective representation 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Rueda, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010). This has been confirmed 
by empirical data, showing unionisation rates among atypical workers to be much lower than 
those of standard employees (Pedersini, 2010; Vandaele and Leschke, 2010). Furthermore, 
dualist scholars have highlighted how unions have contributed actively in creating a divide in 
employment and working conditions, by protecting and fostering the interests of their 
constituency, made up mainly of standard workers, at the expense of non-standard workers 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Burgess et al., 2013).  
Unions’ attitudes towards atypical workers have been seen as somewhat ambivalent. On the 
one hand, unions have perceived them as a threat to the employment and working conditions 
of core workers. On the other hand, they have seen the use of atypical employment by 
employers as a way to protect standard workers (Heery, 2004). Overall, union strategies have 
been argued to exclude atypical workers, by only representing the interests of standard 
workers. Representing atypical workers was seen by unions as legitimising these new forms 
of employment to which they were in principle against (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). 
However, they refused to represent atypical workers but tacitly encouraged their use to shelter 
standard workers from a decline in employment and working conditions (Olsen, 2005; Palier 
and Thelen, 2010). Furthermore, unions did not want to devote time and resources to represent 
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atypical workers in a time when resources were already limited for the representation of 
standard workers. Similarly, the dispersion of atypical workers and the temporary nature of 
their employment makes their recruitment and retainment difficult, further discouraging union 
representation (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011).  
Given that unions have been seen in the dualism literature as a tool to protect the interests of 
‘insiders’, union power has been argued to be associated to an insider-outsider divide, with 
countries with traditionally stronger unions, such as in Continental Europe, being more 
dualised than in countries with low union power, such as in the Liberal countries (Rueda, 2005; 
Palier and Thelen, 2010). An exception is the Scandinavian countries, where the high union 
density also among atypical workers has meant that unions have considered them part of their 
constituency, while the comparatively low employment protection gap between standard and 
atypical workers has meant that unions have been more inclined to adopt pro-outsider 
strategies (Rueda, 2007; Benassi and Vlandas, 2015). Therefore, if we are to translate these 
divides into individual disadvantages, we can hypothesise atypical workers in Southern 
European countries to feel more excluded from collective representation than atypical workers 
in Liberal countries, given that union power is stronger and collective bargaining more 
encompassing in the former than in the latter.  
Nevertheless, the so-called revitalisation literature has highlighted different attitudes trade 
unions have developed towards atypical workers (e.g. Heery, 2004; Benassi and Vlandas, 
2015).). Although acknowledging exclusion of atypical workers as a possible union strategy, 
they also stress how some unions have also implemented more inclusive strategies. For 
instance, Heery and Abbott (2000) and Heery (2004), investigating union strategies for TAW 
in the UK, show different kinds of response: from total refusal to represent TA workers and 
legitimate TAW to full engagement to representing TA workers and attempting to regulate 
TAW. Other authors find a similar range of union strategies in other countries (see, for 
instance, Cerviño, 2000; MacKenzie, 2009; Pulignano and Doerflinger, 2013). Many scholars 
within this literature have argued an evolution of union strategies overtime, highlighting how 
unions have moved from a strategy of total exclusion, to a gradual inclusion of atypical 
workers (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Mitlacher et al., 2014; Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015). 
These studies show how the initial strategy of exclusion has become a less viable option over 
time, as unions have increasingly recognised flexibility as a necessity of contemporary labour 
markets and therefore atypical employment as a legitimate form of employment. At the same 
time, the growing number of atypical workers has made it necessary for unions to represent an 
increasing share of the workforce (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Benassi and Vlandas, 2015). 
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Thus, contrary to authors in the dualism literature, who see unions representing standard 
workers at the expense of atypical workers, scholars in the revitalisation literature see unions 
as also representing the interests of atypical workers, and as a tool to improve their 
employment and working conditions. 
Nevertheless, some scholars in the revitalisation literature have highlighted how union 
strategies towards atypical workers can be conceived in terms of partial or selective inclusion 
(Cerviño, 2000; Durazzi, 2015). On the one hand, unions have aimed at improving the atypical 
workers’ conditions both because they want to represent these workers’ interests but also 
because an erosion in working conditions is perceived as a threat to standard workers 
(Mitlacher et al., 2014; Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015). On the other hand, whenever a 
divergence of interests between standard and atypical workers has materialised, unions have 
tended to protect their core constituency of standard workers (Cerviño, 2000; Durazzi, 2015). 
Thus, these authors argue that only when the interests of standard and atypical workers are not 
diverging, the interests of atypical workers are represented.  
Overall, the revitalisation literature offers a more positive picture of the role of unions in 
shaping the divide between standard and atypical workers. In more recent years, union 
strategies have been seen as increasingly more inclusive, contributing in improving atypical 
workers’ employment and working conditions. In that respect, it can be argued that in countries 
with higher collective bargaining power, such as those in Continental and the Southern Europe, 
atypical workers are better represented than in countries with low collective bargaining power, 
such as the Liberal countries. Nevertheless, it may also be argued that this might hold only for 
as long as their interests are not in conflict with those of standard employees.  Therefore, we 
can formulate an alternative hypothesis for the experience of collective representation of 
atypical workers: atypical workers will feel better represented in Southern European than in 
Liberal countries, as long as their interests do not diverge from those of standard workers. 
 
2.6.3 Disadvantage in Income Protection 
Income protection has been argued to be one of the core dimensions within which the process 
of dualisation has been unfolding (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009). Welfare institutions have 
been primarily held responsible for providing workers in atypical jobs with differentiated 
income protection compared to regular workers, as rules for eligibility, entitlement and 
coverage de facto exclude those workers from income protection reserved for workers in 
regular employment both when in work and in periods of non-employment (Berton et al., 
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2012). In this context, social security institutions, both public and private, are regarded as the 
primary factor in producing an insider-outsider divide, as they have been structured to provide 
differential access to income protection to different categories of workers, contributing to 
enlarging an already existing labour market divide or even in creating new ones (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010; Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Obinger et al., 2012; Peng, 
2012).  
Bismarckian welfare systems, which have historically linked income protection to the work 
position, are said to be the most dualised (Palier and Martin, 2007). As they have relied heavily 
on contribution-based benefits designed for full-time permanent workers in the period after 
World War II, Bismarckian systems are argued to strongly discriminate against workers with 
non-standard jobs. These workers are less likely to be able to meet the necessary eligibility 
criteria to have access to social insurance schemes, and they are consequently more likely to 
rely on social assistance and other means-tested benefits for income protection (Palier and 
Thelen, 2012). Palier and Thelen (2010; 2012) argue that  institutional changes in Bismarckian 
systems of social protection have been mainly meant to preserve the income protection already 
provided to ‘core’ workers, while at the same they have developed a second-best, mainly 
means-tested system of income protection for workers at the margin, who are not able to meet 
the necessary eligibility criteria to access contributory-based benefits but who can at least have 
access to some form of more basic income protection. Contribution-based social protection 
systems are said to grant relatively generous, generally earnings-related income protection to 
the ‘insiders’, meant to preserve their living standard even when not in work, but only limited 
flat-rate income protection to the ‘outsiders’, who are only prevented from falling into absolute 
poverty (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002).  
Moreover, even when those in atypical employment are eligible for contribution-based 
benefits, the amount received is generally lower than for standard workers, given that benefit 
generosity is often tied to the amount of contributions paid (Palier and Thelen, 2010; Berton 
et al., 2012). For instance, Berton et al. (2012), in analysing inclusiveness of several public 
social protection schemes, including unemployment benefits, maternity allowances, sickness 
benefits and pensions in several countries characterised by contributory social protection 
systems, find that in all countries, despite some differences, workers in temporary and other 
forms of atypical employment receive less compared to standard workers. Within this context, 
Southern European countries have once again been argued to constitute an extreme group 
within the Continental cluster, providing even lower protection for those on low means, and 
sometimes lacking a proper safety net of last resort through social assistance schemes (Jessoula 
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et al., 2010; Sacchi, 2011). Jessoula et al. (2010) introduce the concept of ‘mid-siders’, which 
includes both atypical workers and those working in micro and small firms. Focusing their 
analysis on the Italian labour market, they argue that, in Southern Europe, a significant 
proportion of the workforce is irregular while inactivity rates are comparatively high, making 
a significant percentage of the working-age population completely excluded from social 
protection, constituting the ‘outsiders’. By contrast, atypical workers generally have access to 
at least some form of social protection, albeit less generous and encompassing than that for 
standard workers in medium and large firms, who constitute the ‘insiders’. 
By contrast, Liberal systems, where access to benefits has historically been aimed at needs 
satisfaction rather than preservation of the acquired living standard, provide minimal income 
protection for those below a certain income threshold, leaving the provision of more generous 
insurance schemes to the market (Emmenegger et al., 2012). As access to benefits is generally 
means-tested and contribution-based schemes are generally meant to complement rather than 
substitute means-tested benefits, they are argued to discriminate less against people with 
different work histories or previously different employment statuses, thus leading to a more 
limited insider-outsider divide in income protection. Nevertheless, if we are to consider the 
strong reliance on the market to complement the minimal public income protection, another 
picture might emerge (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). The importance of private and occupational 
income protection schemes in Liberal countries has been argued to also create a divide, as 
access to those benefits depends on the employment status of the worker and on the 
contributions paid into those schemes (e.g. Kalleberg et al., 2000; Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011; 
Yoon and Chung, 2016). Specifically, when it comes to atypical employment, Kalleberg et al. 
(2000) argue that, when considering the important role that occupational (private) schemes 
play in Liberal systems, workers in non-standard employment are at a disadvantage compared 
to standard workers, as they tend to have more limited access to a range of occupational fringe 
benefits, including health and pension insurance. Similarly, Seleeib-Kaiser et al. (2012) argue 
that the limited access to occupational welfare protection certain non-standard workers have 
in Liberal regimes might foster dualism.  
Hence, there appears to be a clear distinction between Liberal and Southern European 
countries in the provision of public income protection and its consequences for divides in 
income protection. These findings allow the formation of an initial hypothesis as regards 
dualism in public income protection: atypical workers in Southern European countries 
experience a more wide-spread income protection disadvantage compared to atypical workers 
in Liberal countries with regard to public social protection. They are expected to find public 
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social protection schemes more exclusionary, as they experience more difficulties in accessing 
them. At the same time, they do not have access to a safety net of last resort, at least in those 
Southern European countries which still do not provide a minimum income scheme. Using 
concepts borrowed from the precariousness literature, we can expect atypical workers in 
Southern Europe to experience a higher income insecurity compared to their counterparts in 
Liberal countries and to feel more vulnerable to income losses in cases of non-employment. 
Nevertheless, if we consider also private income protection, the picture appears more complex.  
Given the stronger reliance on occupational benefits for social risks such as sickness or 
retirement in Liberal countries, we might expect atypical workers to feel more excluded  in 
sickness and retirement protection in those countries compared to workers in Southern Europe. 
On the contrary, the limited availability to all workers of occupational schemes as regards the 
risk of unemployment, may be hypothesised to make atypical workers in Liberal countries feel 
more included, as they have more equal access to unemployment protection.  
Finally, in discussing income protection, it is important to take into consideration private 
sources of income protection, such as the family or formal credit, which are not related to 
individual employment. The literature on dualism has been mostly silent about the role of these 
forms of income protection in shaping insider-outsider divides, as they have been regarded as 
external to the labour market and therefore not directly involved in any employment-related 
divide. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate any hypothesis to investigate in the empirical 
analysis with respect to these sources of income protection. Nevertheless, the precariousness 
literature reminds us how the broader socio-economic context and individual situations may 
contribute to shaping disadvantages in the labour market. Thus, disadvantages in aspects 
external to the labour market may also shape disadvantages in the labour market and vice 
versa. In Southern European countries, which are characterised by a familialistic welfare 
system (Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2006; Naldini and Guerrero Jurado, 2009), authors studying 
precariousness have found the family to provide generous and encompassing income 
protection for atypical workers (Fullin, 2004; Bertolini, 2009). By contrast, Liberal countries 
have traditionally relied on the market for the provision of income protection and the family 
is thought to play a more limited income protection role (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rhodes, 
1996). Therefore, we can hypothesise atypical workers in Southern Europe to experience the 
family as a more important source of income protection compared to their counterparts in 
Liberal countries.  
When it comes to other private sources of income protection, such as formal credit, no clear 
distinction between countries could be identified. Both the literature on dualism and the 
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literature on precariousness have mostly ignored access to forms of income protection separate 
from employment. However, a few scholars in the precariousness literature have highlighted 
the difficulties atypical workers might experience in accessing formal credit (see, for instance, 
Altieri et al., 2009), because of their unreliable income prospects. No clear cross-country 
difference could be found. Thus, we expect atypical workers in both Southern and Liberal 
countries to experience similar disadvantages in accessing income protection through the 
formal credit system compared to standard workers.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature addressing the influence of institutions on atypical 
workers’ disadvantages. Authors in the literature on dualism have explored in detail the 
characteristics of different institutional settings and the divides they have engendered in access 
to rights and entitlements between workers with different employment statuses. Thus, they 
have provided a useful framework for the analysis of the impact of different institutional 
arrangements on atypical workers’ disadvantages. The review of this literature has allowed the 
identification of several dimensions in which an institutional divide exists between atypical 
workers and standard workers and of the institutional characteristics responsible for those 
divides. In this context, this literature has also provided a classification of countries based on 
the types of divide they have shaped in the labour market, depending on the different 
configurations of labour market, political and welfare institutions. Therefore, the dualism 
literature may constitute a relevant backdrop for starting to investigate the influence of 
institutions on atypical workers’ disadvantages from a comparative perspective. This literature 
has informed the dimensions in which I focus my exploration of how institutional divides 
translate into individual disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, I have emphasised the fact that these authors have the limitation of using a top-
down perspective, adopting a deterministic approach in considering the impact of institutions 
on individual divides. Disadvantages have been conceptualised mainly in terms of the lack of 
rights and entitlements without exploring empirically how these affect individual situations. I 
have argued that the literature on precariousness provides a bottom-up approach, focused on 
the individual and on her interactions with the institutional framework and more broadly with 
the socio-economic environment. This approach is better suited for the analysis of 
disadvantages from an individual perspective, allowing for more complex causal connections 
to be uncovered and for heterogeneity of influences on individuals to be investigated. Thus, I 
have also drawn from the precariousness literature for the analysis of disadvantages at the 
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individual level, using insights from this literature to capture the nuances of individual stories, 
the subjective perception of these disadvantages and to better account for cumulative and 
interactive effects between several factors.  
This chapter has also set out the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. The 
dimensions in which I have organised the empirical investigation represent the three core 
employment-related dimensions within which the literature on dualism has identified clear 
institutional divides between standard and atypical workers. Within each dimension, a clear 
distinction has been established between Liberal and Southern European countries, as different 
institutional divides have been shaped given their respective institutional settings. In 
particular, Southern European countries have been argued in the dualism literature to be the 
most dualised in the European context within all dimensions by providing a comparatively 
high employment protection gap, more limited opportunities for employment transitions, a 
higher collective representation divide and a more discriminatory system of public social 
protection. By contrast, Liberal countries have been regarded among the least dualised given 
the low employment protection for both standard and atypical workers, the greater 
opportunities for transition, more limited bargaining power of unions and a predominantly 
income-based system of public social protection, although with a potentially dualising system 
of occupational income protection.  
The differences between the institutional characteristics of these two groups of countries has 
allowed the development of a number of initial hypotheses on the types of disadvantages 
experienced by atypical workers in these different institutional contexts. These hypotheses 
have guided the empirical investigation, in order to explore whether the institutional divides 
identified in the literature have translated into individual disadvantages, and whether other 
factors may have contributed in shaping those disadvantages. Moreover, hypotheses from the 
dualism literature have been complemented by hypotheses from other streams of literature. 
Nevertheless, before going into the empirical investigation, chapter 4 will provide a detailed 
description of the institutional framework in the two countries chosen for the comparative 
analysis. Where necessary, initial hypotheses are modified or refined to take into account 


































3. Research Design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research design of the thesis. First, section 3.2 explains the reasons 
for choosing a comparative approach for the analysis of individual disadvantages of atypical 
workers. I will show that a comparative design is necessary to analyse the impact of institutions 
on the experienced divides, as this allows us to investigate how different institutional 
configurations impact on the workers’ experience. This is followed by a presentation of the 
two countries selected as comparative case studies: Italy and the UK.  
Section 3.3 is devoted to the explanation of the focus on TAW as a valid example of atypical 
employment. I show that in both countries a number of atypical employment contracts are in 
use, but most of them are not directly comparable, because their characteristics are 
idiosyncratic to the country regulations. Instead, TAW present similar characteristics in both 
countries, allowing for an accurate comparison.  Besides, it has been one of the fastest growing 
forms of atypical employment and it has been at the centre of many employment flexibility 
debates, making it a representative form of atypical employment in these and in other European 
countries. Section 3.4 summarises the main employment-related dimensions in which the 
literature has identified an institutional divide and how they are operationalised in this 
research. Section 3.5 and 3.6 explain the methodology used in the selection of the interviewees 
and in the data collection and analysis. I will argue that semi-structured interviews are the most 
suitable empirical method to investigate individually experienced disadvantage and I will 
provide adequate justification for this choice, also highlighting the main limitations. Section 
3.7 discusses the ethical concerns of this research strategy and the measures adopted to deal 
with the ethical issues considered. 
 
3.2 Comparative Framework 
Despite a wide interest in the social sciences in the emergence and spread of atypical 
employment in post-industrial economies, there have been surprisingly few qualitative studies 
which used a comparative approach to investigate the disadvantages experienced by atypical 
workers. This is unfortunate, as the strengths of qualitative comparative research have long 
been highlighted in the social science literature (e.g. Prezworski and Teune, 1970; Skocpol 
and Somers 1980, Ragin, 1987; Rose, 1991; Lim 2010).  
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The qualitative studies which have adopted a comparative perspective come mostly from the 
dualism literature (e.g. Barbieri, 2009; Palier and Thelen, 2010) and, as already explained in 
chapter 2, section 2.4, they have mostly entailed an analysis of the institutional framework, 
refraining from exploring disadvantages at the individual level. Within the precariousness 
literature, qualitative comparative studies have mostly concentrated on finding a suitable 
definition of ‘precariousness’ which could travel different institutional contexts (Vosko et al., 
2003; Laparra et al., 2004; Barbieri, 2011), rather than investigating the experience of 
precariousness among atypical workers in different institutional settings. They have thus 
provided limited insights on the differences and similarities of the disadvantages experienced 
by atypical workers in different countries and how these can be attributed to institutional 
variables.  Therefore, to my knowledge, there is a lack of comparative qualitative studies 
exploring the impact of different institutional arrangements on the experienced disadvantages 
of atypical workers. The studies which have provided an in-depth qualitative account of the 
disadvantages experienced by temporary agency workers (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Altieri et al., 
2009) or, more generally, by atypical workers (e.g. Fullin, 2004, Armano, 2010; Schildrick et 
al., 2012), tend to be single-country studies. Although these studies have the merit of 
highlighting a range of disadvantages experienced by atypical workers, they did not provide 
an adequate explanation of the role institutional arrangements had in shaping them. 
I argue that if we are to understand the impact of institutions on the disadvantages experienced 
by atypical workers, a single-country study cannot disentangle the relative importance of 
institutional configurations on the disadvantages experienced by these workers or the varied 
impact different combinations of institutions produce. Therefore, single-country studies have 
been unable to draw, if only tentative, connections between institutional configurations and 
the individual experience. By contrast, a comparative study allows us to draw a connection 
between institutional factors and experienced disadvantages, by comparing similarities and 
differences in outcomes among countries with different institutional frameworks. Hence, only 
by comparing the disadvantages experienced by TA workers in two different employment, 
work and social protection contexts, are we able to disentangle the role these institutions play 
in shaping those disadvantages.   
Nevertheless, the limitation of a two-country comparison is that the characteristics of the 
institutions and the institutions themselves greatly outnumber the investigated cases (Ragin, 
1987). This is a common limitation of many qualitative comparative studies which investigate 
complex phenomena involving a high number of variables but on a limited sample of cases. 
Nonetheless, the depth of analysis which is possible through the use of qualitative methods 
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can counteract the small-n problem (Bryman, 2004). Hence, although the comparison should 
ideally involve as many combinations of institutional arrangements as possible, the 
opportunity of studying the disadvantages experienced by atypical workers in depth and their 
connection to the institutional setting has reduced the comparison to only two cases.  
The selection of case studies has been done in order to do what Skocpol and Somers (1980) 
defined as comparison as ‘contrast of contexts’ (p.178). This type of comparison is contrasted 
by the authors with comparison as the parallel demonstration of theory and comparison as 
macro-causal analysis. The former is used in order to demonstrate the validity of a theory 
across case studies, while the latter is used to derive macro-causal inferences over a specific 
social structure or process. The comparison by contrast of contexts is instead interested in 
highlighting the unique characteristics of each case and to show how these unique 
characteristics affect the phenomenon of study (ibidem).  
This type of comparison entails cases where a certain social phenomenon is contrasted in 
different contextual settings in order to investigate the impact of different contexts on the 
selected phenomenon. In this study, the phenomenon of interest is the disadvantages 
experienced by TA workers and the context refers to the institutional setting in which TAW is 
embedded in Italy and the UK. The comparison is meant to highlight whether and how the 
specificities of each country’s institutional framework translate into differently experienced 
disadvantages. The importance of comparing different rather than similar cases is that only by 
analysing the outcome in different institutional configurations, within an otherwise similar 
context (see section 3.2.1 and section 3.6, on the opportunities and limitations of establishing 
similarities in other contextual factors in the two cases), are we able to attribute differences in 
disadvantages to institutional factors. Should we consider countries with similar institutional 
settings as regards TAW, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace similarities and 
differences in disadvantages back to the institutional framework. 
As is argued in the following section, these two countries present important contextual 
similarities, but also significant differences as regards the institutional framework when it 
comes to atypical employment. These two different ‘contexts’ have been argued by authors 
from the dualism literature to have produced different types of divides between atypical and 
standard workers and this claim is explored in the empirical analysis. Through this study, 
systematic similarities and differences between the experienced disadvantages of being a TA 
worker in Italy and the UK are uncovered. The study tries to investigate how these patterns of 
similarities and differences can be explained by the different configurations of institutions in 
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place and by the variation in the characteristics of the institutions in the two countries of 
analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Case Selection 
This section explains and justifies the reasons behind the case selection. As I argue, the UK 
and Italy can be regarded as different cases in the European context as regards their 
institutional framework when it comes atypical employment. These characteristics place the 
two countries in two contrasting groups of countries according to the dualism literature, the 
Liberal and the Southern European respectively. 
Firstly, Italy and the UK present many similarities as regards their socio-economic 
characteristics. The two countries have a similar population size, over 60 million, and a 
roughly comparable GDP per capita at PPP3 (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2016). They can both 
be regarded as developed economies and have a long tradition of welfare policies in place.  
Despite these similarities, they also present significant institutional differences in a range of 
institutional realms related to atypical employment. 
As already highlighted in the previous chapter (see section 2.6.1), the two countries have 
followed two distinct paths in labour market liberalisation. The UK has adopted a Liberal 
approach, deregulating the labour market thoroughly for all employment categories (Deakin 
and Reed, 2001; Koslowski and McLean, 2015). This means that both standard and atypical 
workers have comparatively low employment protection. By contrast, Italy started to 
deregulate its labour market late by comparison and, similarly to other Continental European 
countries, it has followed a liberalisation ‘at the margin’ (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007), partially 
deregulating atypical forms of employment, but preserving employment protection for 
standard workers (Barbieri and Sestito, 2012; Checchi and Leonardi, 2016). To illustrate the 
difference, we can consider the EPL index for permanent workers, which can give us an idea 
on where to place the two countries in comparative terms. While the UK is the EU country 
with the lowest EPL for permanent workers (EPL of 1.18), Italy is among the highest (EPL of 
2.55) together with other Continental European countries (see Figure 1). 
                                                            
3 $41459 in the UK and $36030 in Italy (World Bank, 2015). 
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Figure 1. EPL index for individual dismissal of permanent employees for selected4 EU 
countries, 2013 
 
    Source: OECD, 2016 
The two countries also have a different reliance on temporary workers by employers (4.8% of 
all employees are temporary in the UK and 10.2% in Italy, EUROSTAT, 2017c) and a different 
degree of regulation of temporary employment, being deregulated in the UK (EPL5 of 0.54) 
but highly regulated in Italy (2.71) (OECD, 2013c).  
In the UK, hiring and firing procedures for both standard and atypical workers are 
comparatively very loose. The hiring legislation is permissive and there are no limitations in 
place for the use of specific employment contracts and no justification is needed in the choice 
of specific employment arrangements (Deakin and Reed, 2001; Koslowski and McLean 2015). 
These liberal hiring procedures, which might encourage employers to make wide use of 
atypical contracts, are offset by very loose firing procedures for standard employment 
contracts. The qualifying period for unfair dismissal is two years and remedies for unfair 
dismissal are rather weak. Although in principle re-employment might be decided by the 
                                                            
4 EU countries with a population of less than 3 million have been excluded, namely: Luxembourg, 
Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia. The most recent accession members have also 
been excluded: Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia. The inclusion would have only slightly changed the order, 
with Italy moving to the sixth position (after Latvia) and the UK remaining at the bottom.  
5 It should be noted that the EPL for temporary employment does not measure actual employment 
protection but rather regulations applied to temporary forms of employment, including limitations in 











tribunal, in practice this happens rarely, and compensations tend to be quite low (Deakin and 
Reed, 2001). This reduces incentives for employers to use atypical contracts.  
The UK is also characterised by a decentralised wage bargaining system with limited 
coordination and low levels of bargaining coverage. Bargaining coverage is comparatively 
low at 29.5% in 2013 (OECD, 2015b). Bargaining is thus comparatively fragmented and it 
happens mostly at the workplace level (Yoon and Chung, 2016). Furthermore, the tax wedge 
on total labour costs is comparatively low, further reducing wage rigidities (Lodovici, 2001a; 
OECD, 2017). Finally, reforms in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the ability of trade unions to 
organise industrial action in defence of employment conditions and union density is 
comparatively low at 25.4 per cent of the workforce in 2013 (Koslowski and McLean, 2015; 
OECD, 2015a).  
In Italy, employment regulations provide comparatively high protection for standard workers, 
especially for those employed in medium and large firms. Liberalisation of the Italian labour 
market happened only in the late 1990s and it was only partial and meant to facilitate the labour 
market integration of social groups with low labour market attachment, namely women, the 
young and the long-term unemployed (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). Hiring and firing 
procedures for standard employees are very restrictive but hiring procedures are also highly 
regulated for atypical contracts, providing numerous limitations for the use of atypical 
contracts in order to prevent abuse by employers. Reforms in the 2000s partly deregulated the 
use of atypical contracts but they left untouched the employment protection for standard 
employees (Jessoula et al., 2010; Jessoula and Vesan, 2011). Only the most recent labour 
reforms of 2012 and 2015 managed to marginally reduce employment protection for standard 
employees (Fumagalli, 2017). Dismissal regulations for standard workers remain quite 
stringent and sanctions against unfair dismissals are comparatively severe and widely used. 
Moreover, the stringency is further heightened by the complexity and lengthiness of juridical 
procedures and by the uncertainty about the final outcome, given the discretionary power left 
to labour courts (Lodovici, 2001b). Despite this extremely rigid employment protection 
framework, employers have been left with some leeway, given that most legislation does not 
apply to small firms (fewer than 15 employees) and given the important role played by the 
underground economy, especially in the South (Jessoula et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, in Italy, employment legislation is meant to provide only a basic regulatory 
framework, while specific aspects are left to agreements between the social partners. Wage 
floors and other fundamental employment conditions are decided by national sectoral 
collective agreements legally binding for all firms in the country (Johnston et al., 2011; 
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Burroni and Pedaci, 2014). There might be regional and firm-level collective agreements but 
they can only ameliorate conditions established at the national level (Leonardi, 2009). 
Moreover, non-wage labour costs are comparatively high, further increasing wage rigidities 
(Lodovici, 2001a; OECD, 2017). Overall, the social partners play an important role in 
employment regulations and they have also often been involved in reforms of employment 
legislation through concertation or consultation with the government (Burroni and Carrieri, 
2011; Johnston et al., 2011). Italy also has a comparatively high unionisation rate at 36.9% in 
2013, though union membership is concentrated among standard employees in medium and 
large firms (Leonardi, 2009; OECD, 2015a). Also bargaining coverage is comparatively high 
at 80.0% in 2013 (OECD, 2015b). Compared to other Continental European countries, trade 
unions are divided along ideological lines and this has been a defining element of the Italian 
industrial relations system, which has been historically more contestative than that of Central 
and Northern European countries (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 
2001; Leonardi, 2009).  
Hence, the UK can be regarded as a deregulated and flexible labour market, making it a prime 
example of a Liberal regime in the European context, with loose hiring and firing procedures 
and a limited role for social partners in the regulation of employment. Temporary workers 
have limited employment protection but so do standard workers. By contrast, Italy epitomises 
a Southern European country which has followed a deregulation at the margin and which still 
retains high employment protection for standard workers. In common with other Southern and, 
more broadly, Continental European countries, many limitations in the use of atypical 
employment are in place and social partners contribute to the regulation of the employment 
system. The result of these different labour market frameworks has been argued to be a 
relatively small divide between standard and atypical workers in the UK and a very large 
divide in Italy, as already discussed in section 2.6.  
We now turn to the description of another category of institutions relevant for the study of 
institutional divides, namely welfare state institutions. Both Italy and the UK have similar 
levels of social spending per capita, just slightly lower than the EU average (see Figure 2). 






Figure 2. Social spending per capita (PPP) for selected6 EU countries, 2014
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2017d) 
The UK has historically been included among the Liberal welfare states, characterised by a 
mostly Beveridgean welfare system, with a strong reliance on flat-rate means-tested benefits 
mainly aimed at alleviating poverty. The welfare system strongly relies on private provisions 
for social protection and it is meant to provide public support only when the individual is 
unable to achieve adequate protection through private means (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Clasen, 
2003; Taylor-Gooby and Larsen, 2004). By contrast, Italy has been classified as a 
Mediterranean welfare model, with a contribution-based system of social protection7 like most 
Continental European countries, but characterised by a more fragmented system of social 
protection of last resort compared to other Continental European countries, strongly depending 
on family and third-sector organisations for the provision of welfare (Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 
1996; Naldini and Guerrero Jurado, 2009).  
When considering only employment-related social protection, differences are even starker. 
Although both countries may be considered comparatively low spenders in labour market 
policies (OECD, 2013b), they greatly differ in their spending structure. Since New Labour 
                                                            
6 Countries with fewer than 3 million inhabitants and Croatia have been excluded. 
7 A notable exception is the health care system which, similarly other Southern European countries, is 
financed through general taxation. 
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came to power in 1997, the UK has focused on welfare-to-work policies, mostly meant to 
provide sticks and carrots to workless people through a mixture of incentives to ‘make work 
pay’, individualised employment services and benefit conditionality (Clasen, 2007; Clegg, 
2010). These policies have been pushed further by the Conservative Government since 2010, 
with a greater emphasis on workfare and more severe sanctioning in the case of benefit 
recipients’ non-compliance (Deacon and Patrick, 2011; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012).  
Unemployment, disability and sickness benefits are all provided on a flat rate, while a means-
tested social assistance benefit and other income-based based benefits are available for people 
on a low income (GOV.UK, 2015a and 2015b). Only for retirement, is the public flat-rate 
pension complemented by an earnings-related component (Natali, 2012). Benefit generosity 
is comparatively low and activation requirements in cases of unemployment, disability or 
social assistance are tight (OECD, 2013a; Heyes, 2013). Nevertheless, for sickness and 
pension, state benefits can be complemented by occupational and private schemes, which can 
be quite generous. Access to these complementary schemes mostly depends on the employer, 
who might offer more or less generous contractual benefits or none at all (Clasen, 2016). On 
the one hand, the system can be said to provide similar, though ungenerous, public income 
protection to all workers, with a strong emphasis on welfare-to-work policies. On the other 
hand, access to income protection through private schemes is dependent on the employer’s 
provision. 
By contrast, Italy is characterised by an employment-related welfare system mostly based on 
social insurance where benefit generosity is strongly tied to paid contributions. Moreover, 
other generous welfare schemes are available for those in standard employment in medium 
and large firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, where wage guarantee funds often 
replace normal unemployment benefits (Jessoula and Vesan, 2011). This system, traditionally 
aimed at providing social protection for the male breadwinner, is ill-equipped to protect 
atypical workers, who often find themselves unable to meet the necessary contribution 
requirements to access public benefits or they might not legally be entitled to any (Jessoula et 
al., 2010). The situation is worsened by the lack of a safety net of last resort for people on low 
income, given the lack of a means-tested minimum income scheme and patchy and fragmented 
social assistance policies, left mostly under the competence of local public institutions 
(Madama, 2010; Graziano and Jessoula, 2011). In this context, the family is considered to play 
a comparatively important role as a provider of social protection, as it acts mostly as a safety 
net of first resort, sometimes anticipating welfare needs before they materialise, and leaving 
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to the State only a subsidiary role (Naldini and Saraceno, 2008; Naldini and Guerrero Jurado, 
2009). 
Therefore, while the UK can be regarded as a prime example of a Liberal welfare state regime 
in the European context, Italy epitomises a Mediterranean regime. These two welfare systems 
have been argued to create different divides in income protection for atypical workers (for a 
detailed discussion see chapter 2, section 2.6.3). While the UK provides equal access to public 
income protection for all workers, in Italy income protection strongly depends on the 
individual’s contribution history, which has been stated to disproportionally disadvantage 
atypical workers. However, in the British system, private schemes, which are largely 
occupational, play an important role. They may contribute to creating a divide in income 
protection in the UK, although this divide stems from the employer’s provisions rather than 
from the employment status of the worker.  
In conclusion, Italy and the UK can be regarded as polar cases in the European context of 
different types of employment regulations, industrial relations and income protection systems. 
The UK has followed a path of far-reaching labour market liberalisation, and nowadays it 
presents a very flexible labour market with limited employment protection of all workers. Italy 
represents a country where liberalisation happened only at the margin, with partly deregulated 
atypical employment but high protection for permanent workers. These two employment 
frameworks are coupled with two social protection systems which also reflect different income 
protection approaches. The UK follows liberal features, providing limited but equal protection 
to all workers, albeit with a potentially dualising role for private schemes. By contrast, Italy 
features a highly contribution-based social protection system, and only limited protection for 
those on low means. This thus makes the two countries suitable cases in the European context 
for exploring hypotheses on whether and how different disadvantages originating in the 
institutional realm affect the experience of atypical workers in different ways. 
 
3.3 Choice of Employment Contract and Sector 
This section discusses the choice of temporary agency work as the type of atypical contract to 
be investigated empirically in Italy and the UK. The labour law in each country establishes a 
number of employment contracts other than the full-time permanent contract, of which only 
some can be regarded as comparable, while others are relatively idiosyncratic. Among the so-
called atypical employment contracts, there is relative heterogeneity between the countries. 
Self-employment is more prevalent in Italy compared to the UK (21.9% and 14.1% 
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respectively in 2014, EUROSTAT, 2014), as it is in other Mediterranean countries, stemming 
from the relative prevalence of small and micro-businesses (Matsaganis et al., 2003; Ferrera, 
2016).  
Other than self-employment, the most important atypical contracts in the UK are: fixed-term, 
temporary agency work, zero-hour (and guaranteed-hour) (GOV.UK, 2017c). Italy presents a 
larger variety of atypical contracts, which are sometimes tailored for specific groups or 
businesses, which include: fixed-term, temporary agency work, para-subordinato (including 
co.co.co and co.co.pro) and lavoro a chiamata (job on-call). The para-subordinato contracts, 
where a worker is a quasi-self-employed, do not have an equivalent in the UK, while zero-
hour contracts and lavoro a chiamata, though in principle relatively similar, present important 
differences in their limitation of use. Among the most important contracts, the lavoro a 
chiamata is only legal for people younger than 24 and older than 55 and it cannot entail more 
than 400 working days over 3 years8 (INPS, 2017a). These limitations in the use make the two 
contracts different in practice in the characteristics of the workers, limiting opportunities for 
comparison.  
In Italy, further types of atypical employment are tailored to employment arrangements in 
specific businesses, such as cooperatives. The socio di cooperativa (cooperative member) can 
be employed by the cooperative to provide services in other organisations through a specific 
employment contract, becoming a socio lavoratore (working member). Other types of atypical 
employment contracts exist for specific situations, including job-sharing, homeworking 
(lavoro a domicilio), agricultural work, work in seasonal activities, ancillary work (lavoro 
accessorio). These other types of contracts present very peculiar characteristics and are 
predominantly used in specific sectors, making comparison between countries difficult. 
Furthermore, in both countries, there exist a number employment contracts which have a 
strong training component, including apprenticeships (apprendistato), traineeships, 
internships and stages (e.g. tirocini and praticantato in Italy). Nevertheless, the characteristics 
of the types of contracts tend to be bound to the overall education and training framework of 
the two countries, and it goes beyond labour market characteristics, making a comparison 
between countries meaningless for the purposes of this thesis.  
The selection among dependent forms of employment could only be between fixed-term and 
temporary agency work. Temporary agency work is an employment contract which presents 
similar characteristics in the two countries considered, and more generally across Europe. It is 
                                                            
8 Exceptions are present in some sectors. 
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a triangular contractual relationship involving an agency worker, a temporary work agency 
and a hirer. The agency is responsible for providing a worker (candidate) to the hirer (client), 
who is used by the client (or user) to perform work (Arrowsmith, 2006). The agency is the de 
jure employer, while the hirer is the de facto employer (De Cuyper et al., 2007). There are 
generally two contracts: one between the hirer and the agency and one between the agency 
and the worker (BIS, 2011). The temporary agency work contract is the latter. This peculiar 
employment relationship can be argued to epitomise atypical employment, as the legal 
employer ‘lends’ the worker to a third party, which becomes the employer in practice. This 
form of employment has been one of the most rapidly increasing types of atypical employment 
in the past two decades (Arrowsmith, 2006; Voss et al., 2013; Theodore and Peck, 2014). 
Furthermore, it has been at the centre of many flexibility and flexicurity debates at the political 
level across Europe (Storrie, 2002; Wynn, 2014). For all these reasons, it has been preferred 
to fixed-term as the employment contract chosen for this thesis. 
In order to reduce the heterogeneity of working experiences, I have decided to focus only on 
one sector of the economy: the service sector. This decision has been driven by several factors. 
Firstly, the growth of atypical employment has been mainly associated with the phenomenon 
of tertiarisation of the economy, which has entailed an overall shift of the workforce from 
manufacturing and, more generally, from the industrial sector towards services (Gregg and 
Wardsworth, 1999; Pontusson, 2005: Gallie, 2007). In this context, the spread in atypical jobs 
in post-industrial countries has been mainly driven by their increased use in the service sector 
(Kenworthy, 2005; Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). Both in Italy and in the UK, the vast 
majority of the workforce is now employed in the service sector (68% and 79% respectively 
in 2010, World Bank, 2017). Moreover, the majority of TA workers are employed in the 
service sector in each country (CIETT, 2012), making it the most relevant sector on which to 
focus the analysis. 
 
3.4 Operationalisation of Dimensions of Disadvantage 
The empirical analysis is structured around the three employment-related dimensions used in 
the analytical framework to formulate hypotheses about the disadvantages experienced by 
atypical workers in Italy and in the UK: employment, work and income protection. These 
dimensions were chosen based on the relevant dimensions within which the literature on 
dualism has identified institutional divides between standard and atypical workers (see chapter 
2, section 2.6). This section operationalises these three dimensions and justifies the inclusion 
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of specific sub-dimensions of the experience of TA workers which are investigated in the 
empirical analysis and the exclusion of others. 
 
3.4.1 Employment Experience 
The employment experience entails two different aspects: a dynamic (related to employment 
paths) and a static one (related to the current employment situation). Given that the dynamic 
aspect is fundamental to fully understanding the static one, as the analysis will make clear, the 
analysis of the employment experience starts with the dynamic aspect. Firstly, I consider the 
overall employment biographies of TA workers both in Italy and in the UK. Specifically, 
changes of employment status, including movements in and out of unemployment, temporary 
employment and standard employment are illustrated. This allows us to understand the 
working histories of the individuals and in discussing the similarities and differences, both 
within and between countries. Secondly, the analysis discusses the role played by TAW along 
those employment paths, in order to assess the role of TAW in employment transitions and 
allowing the assessment of the experience of TAW from a dynamic perspective. Specifically, 
the roles of ‘stepping stone’ and ‘trap’ are discussed at length, always with a focus on the 
comparison between the countries.  
In the second part of the analysis, attention is paid to the current employment experience. The 
employment disadvantages experienced by TA workers as well as the relevant coping 
strategies are analysed. Particularly, the analysis focuses on the experience of ‘employment 
precariousness’ and it considers how this affects the lives of workers both in and outside of 
their working lives. Reference to the dynamic aspect of the experience is made when necessary 
for a full understanding of the workers’ disadvantages. 
Finally, the analysis considers the use of public employment services as an alternative to TAs 
as a tool to find employment and the experience of interviewees in this regard. Public 
employment services are analysed as they can be regarded the main possible way of looking 
for employment other than TAs and independent job search. 
 
3.4.2 Work Experience 
The work experience considers the disadvantages experienced by TA workers in a number of 
working conditions. Working conditions are a very broad and multifaceted category, involving 
several dimensions (see for instance, Letourneux, 1998; Tucker, 2003). Given this potentially 
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broad empirical operationalisation, in this thesis, I restricted the analysis of working conditions 
to the ones that are deemed most relevant for the workers’ experience, including: pay, working 
time, relations with colleagues and job content. These can be regarded as some of the most 
important sub-dimensions among working conditions (Letourneux, 1998; Peña-Casas, 2009). 
Pay includes any earnings received in a job, including pay rise and bonuses. Working time 
considers any aspect related to the schedule, including working hours, daily and weekly rest 
periods, and annual leave. Relations with colleagues entail any working conditions associated 
with the social environment, such as participation in workplace activities, sociability, 
discrimination and intimidation (Letourneux, 1998). Finally, job content refers to the 
characteristics of the work activities carried out during a TA assignment.  
Nevertheless, a few important aspects of conditions of work have been excluded from the 
analysis. Firstly, given that all interviewees for reasons of case selection (see section 3.5) were 
employed in low and medium-skilled service occupations, I decided not to consider health and 
safety among the focuses of the analysis. This can be justified by the fact that health and safety 
concerns in working conditions are much more relevant in the manufacturing and agricultural 
sector than in the service sector where health and safety related risks tend to be lower. 
Moreover, the majority of service occupations in which the interviewees were employed (e.g. 
clerical jobs, retail) presented limited opportunities to investigate disadvantages within this 
specific aspect of working conditions. A second significant working condition which has not 
been explored in the thesis is training. The reason lies in the fact that the vast majority of low 
and medium-skilled occupations in the service sector in which the interviewees were employed 
required no or very limited formal training. The majority of training activities were informal 
and on-the-job, making it difficult to investigate specific disadvantages associated with them. 
Aside from working conditions, the work experience also investigates the power TA workers 
have in representing their interests at the workplace, which might include the improvement of 
their employment and working conditions, and the possible disadvantages they face in this 
regard. In order to do this, both individual and collective representation are investigated. With 
respect to individual representation, I explore the opportunities workers have to voice their 
interests and, more specifically, to bargain for their employment and working conditions, 
including the disadvantages arising from power relations with hirers and colleagues. Secondly, 
it investigates opportunities and constraints in being collectively represented and the 
disadvantages experienced compared to standard workers. This includes representation 




3.4.3 Income Protection Experience 
The analysis of the income protection experience considers firstly the disadvantages faced by 
TA workers when it comes to income, paying specific attention to the issue of ‘income 
insecurity’ and how it affects the lives of TA workers in the two countries. Following from 
this, the analysis considers the disadvantages experienced by these workers in protecting their 
income against a number of social risks. Several social risks have been identified in the 
literature, for which European welfare states have developed various forms of income 
protection schemes (e.g. Bonoli, 2005; Crouch, 2015). Given that this thesis focuses on 
disadvantages in employment, only a number of employment-related social risks are 
considered in the empirical analysis. The analysis concentrates on three of the main social 
risks in which somebody is not in work: unemployment, sickness and retirement. 
Unemployment entails a situation in which a person is currently not employed but she is 
looking for work. The main income protection scheme against this risk is unemployment 
benefits. Sickness is a situation in which a person is employed but she is currently unable to 
work due to health reasons. Sickness pay is the main income protection scheme to protect a 
worker in case of sickness. Finally, retirement is a situation in which a person has reached a 
certain age at which she is not socially considered suitable for work any longer (Zaccaria, 
2009). Pension schemes are the main forms of income protection for workers who have 
reached retirement. The choice of these social risks has been based on the fact that they are 
among the most common social risks in contemporary post-industrial societies and they may 
be experienced by the majority of workers at some point in their life-time. For each of them, 
both public and private forms of income protection are considered. 
Three other significant employment-related social risks have not been included in the analysis 
of income protection: maternity (and more generally, parenting), disability and in-work 
poverty. The reason is that parenting is a social risk which might affect only a minority of 
people in a given sample, in a given moment, and which tends to be concentrated to a specific 
gender. For this reason, it has been excluded from the analysis. Nevertheless, it has been 
considered in the analysis of the experience of income insecurity, as will become clear in 
chapter 7, section 7.2. Disability is a social risk which might affect only a small minority of 
workers, making it difficult to assess the experience of income protection comparatively, 
unless selecting a specific sample which would nonetheless bias the analysis in other 
dimensions.  Furthermore, income protection in case of in-work poverty has not been 
considered as in-work poverty depends on household income rather than individual income 
(Lohmann, 2006; Fraser et al., 2011). Thus, the number of other active workers in the same 
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household as well as the number of dependants is likely to affect in-work poverty as much as 
the employment status (Allègre, 2008), producing a high heterogeneity of situations among 
workers with the same employment status. This would have made the comparison of income 
protection experience both within and between countries difficult to analyse, given the 
relatively small sample of workers interviewed. Nevertheless, as for parenting, the experience 
of in-work poverty has been taken into consideration in the analysis of income insecurity, to 
have an in-depth view of the disadvantages experienced by the workers. 
Finally, the thesis considers the experience of individual sources of income protection. Two 
sources are included in the analysis: formal credit and the family. They can be regarded as the 
two main sources of income protection in European countries other than employment and the 
welfare state (Crouch, 2015). They represent two different modes of protection, the former 
being relatively informal and relying on individual social networks, while the latter, as the 
name suggests, is formal and it is based on borrowing from the market.  
 
3.5 Selection of Interviewees 
The interviews were carried out with a selected sample of 40 full-time TA workers employed 
in low and medium-skilled service occupations in Bologna and in Edinburgh, as well as with 
other actors involved in TAW. In this section, I will summarise the reasons for this selection, 
highlighting the rationale behind the choices I made and explaining the strengths and 
limitations of alternative choices. For a detailed summary of interviewees’ characteristics see 
the Appendix. 
I have decided to include in the sample only full-time workers in order for the analysis to entail 
a homogenous group of workers who present similar labour market attachment characteristics. 
More precisely, for full-time employees, ‘work’ can be regarded as their main activity and we 
can assume it to be the interviewee’s main source of sustainment. On the one hand, we may 
expect that, for individuals who work a limited number of hours, ‘work’ is not their main 
activity in that they may be still in education or they may be performing caring activities. 
People in part-time jobs may not rely on their income as the main source of sustainment, in 
that they may only complement other family members’ earnings or they might be working on 
the side while already retired. This contributes to making the sample more homogenous. 
Should we consider people with very different labour attachments, a very heterogeneous group 
would be analysed, reducing the possibility of comparison across experiences both within and 
between countries. Moreover, being a full-time temporary worker makes the employment 
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situation as similar as possible to those in standard employment. This makes the comparison 
with standard workers more accurate, as the only difference between the two groups is the 
employment status. Furthermore, including only full-time workers avoids the problem of 
disentangling disadvantages related to the employment status with those related to the lower 
number of hours worked.  
Another issue in the selection of interviewees was to decide whether to include only people 
who worked all year or people who just worked for certain spells. Including people working 
throughout the year would have made the sample as similar as possible to that of standard 
workers, who are likely to remain in the same job across the year. Nevertheless, had I excluded 
people working less than a full year, the issue of unemployment among TA workers would 
have been neglected. This would have meant to exclude what has been argued to be one of the 
main characteristics of temporary employment, that is the recurrent experience of 
unemployment (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Kalleberg, 2013). The experience of 
unemployment may explain in part the sense of insecurity and instability among TA workers, 
and thus play an important role in moulding their individual experience of disadvantage. 
Furthermore, this would have meant excluding a high number of TA workers in both countries, 
though data could not be found on the percentage of time these workers spend on average in 
unemployment each year. However, for individuals who have been employed in TA jobs for 
a short period of time, being in TAW cannot be considered their main activity during the year, 
in that they may have been unemployed or inactive for most of the year (Feldman et al., 1994). 
A similar argument may hold with respect to their source of sustainment, in that wages may 
not have been the main source of income for most of the year, but they might have relied 
mostly on personal savings, welfare benefits or their partner’s income. Thus, the disadvantages 
experienced by those workers with relatively low labour market attachment might be partly 
due to the prolonged period of unemployment or inactivity, rather than to the temporary 
employment status. Therefore, I have considered workers who have been employed for more 
than six months in a year, meaning that they have been in employment for the majority of time 
in the year. This definition allows us to consider individuals that have worked most of the year 
but at the same time may have experienced spells of unemployment. Following this definition, 
work can be considered the main activity performed during the year and we can assume wages 
from employment to be one of the main sources of income. This makes the sample of 
interviewees comparable to standard workers in terms of labour attachment. 
As regards the selection of occupations, I have only selected workers in low and medium-
skilled occupations, in order to avoid people holding specific skills or employed in specific 
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assignments requiring highly-skilled qualifications. As already highlighted in the literature, 
these workers might be pursuing ‘boundaryless’ careers and might possess specific skills, 
which makes them highly employable and not convenient to be working only for one employer 
(Van Dyne and Ang, 1998; Marler et al., 2002). However, this is unlikely to reflect the average 
situation in the two countries, where the vast majority of workers are employed in medium 
and low-skilled jobs (CIETT, 2012).  Hence, all workers were employed in occupations which 
did not require tertiary education, but only a high-school diploma (medium-skilled) or lower 
(low-skilled). Some occupations might have required specific training (e.g. nursing), but not a 
university degree. 
Only workers between 30 and 60 years old were considered in the interviews. This rather broad 
age span was meant to capture people who are in the middle of their working life. The 
minimum age threshold was meant to exclude individuals who might still be living with their 
parents and who might rely on their parents’ income. This is particularly true for Italy, where 
the majority of individuals below 30 still live with their parents (Iacovou, 2010). This 
difference between the countries could have also biased the results, especially when it comes 
to income security. The upper threshold was meant to avoid individuals who, especially in the 
Italian case, might be in early retirement schemes and therefore they might not be fully relying 
on income from employment, biasing the results when it comes to income protection and 
hampering comparison between countries.  
No selection has been made depending on the family structure, meaning that single, partnered 
and childless people and people with children have been included. The reason for this was that 
I wanted to include a range of possible experiences in the analysis that might be partly shaped 
by the family structure, without confining the investigation to individuals with a specific 
family status.  
Finally, only citizens of each country have been included in the analysis, excluding from the 
sample any immigrant, either EU or non-EU. On the one hand, immigrants might experience 
additional problems related to the immigrant status, both in terms of access to the labour 
market and to income protection, which might interact with their temporary employment status 
and might make it difficult to distinguish between the two (Fudge and Strauss, 2014). On the 
other hand, immigrants might present specific characteristics related to culture and language 
which can also interact with their employment status in shaping disadvantages (McDowell et 
al., 2008), making it difficult to disentangle the two, for instance when it comes to forms of 
discrimination at the workplace and relations with colleagues.  
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In order to complement data from interviews with TA workers, a number of interviews were 
carried out with actors who are involved in TAW. In each country, two interviews were 
conducted with trade union staff members who specifically work on atypical employment 
while one interview was carried out with a representative of a third-sector organisation dealing 
with issues related to atypical employment. In the UK, one interview was also carried out with 
a member of staff at a TA agency, while in Italy I did not manage to access TA agency staff. 
These interviewees helped triangulate findings from workers’ interviews and to provide 
additional information on aspects where they might have specific insights including, for 
instance, employers’ use of TAW for temporary agency staff or collective representation for 
trade unions. 
With respect to the geographical locations in which to do fieldwork, the main concern was to 
find two areas which were as similar as possible in terms of socio-economic characteristics. 
This is in order to attribute, at least in principle, all differences to the institutional setting, 
rather than to other contextual characteristics. Certainly, a perfect matching is difficult to find 
in the real world and some contextual influences cannot be ruled out in principle, for example 
when it comes to the different stage of the business cycle in the two locations, which reflect 
broader contextual differences at the national level. Furthermore, the two locations needed to 
have an institutional setting which reflects the country-level differences rather than local 
idiosyncrasies. In that respect, the institutional characteristics and the policies considered to 
potentially influence TA workers’ experiences (i.e. employment regulations, public social 
protection system, industrial relations) depended in both countries at the national level on the 
government9, with the exception of social assistance policies in the Italian case (managed at 
the municipal level within a regional regulatory framework, Madama, 2010) making 
institutional settings relatively homogeneous within each country. I opted for two locations 
which, although being above their national average in most economic indicators, were rather 
similar in a series of relevant socio-economic characteristics. The similarity in local 
characteristics allows us to assume that differences in the data can be attributed either to 
national-level institutions and policies or to individual idiosyncrasies, rather than to local 
socio-economic differences. 
The specific geographical locations in which the data collection took place were Edinburgh 
for the British case and Bologna for the Italian case. These two cities are of broadly similar 
population size both as city proper and as a metropolitan area, with Bologna being slightly 
smaller (ONS, 2015a; ISTAT, 2015a). They are the second richest cities in their respective 
                                                            
9 With the partial exclusion of Northern Ireland. 
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country in terms of GDP per capita and they have relatively similar GDP per capita at the 
NUTS II level. They also had similar unemployment levels in the year before the fieldwork 
was carried out, with unemployment rate of 6.7% and 6.8% respectively in 2012, although 
with a diverging trend given that different stages in the business cycle in which the two 
countries have been in the past three years (ONS, 2015b; ISTAT, 2015b). Both cities have a 
well-developed and diversified service sector, including education, public services, third-
sector organisations and, in the case of Edinburgh, financial services.  
 
3.6 Data Collection and Analysis 
This section describes the methodology used for data collection, its rationale and weaknesses 
and it describes also how data have been analysed and the limitations of the approaches used. 
The preliminary analysis of institutional characteristics in which TAW is embedded in the two 
cases (see chapter 4) was meant to constitute the background to the qualitative analysis, which 
was carried out through fieldwork in the two countries selected.  The analysis of the 
institutional configurations allowed me to identify and assess institutional divides. 
The decision to carry out qualitative interviews was dictated by several reasons. Firstly, the 
aim was to assess how institutional divides translated into experienced disadvantages. Neither 
a quantitative analysis or the use of a structured questionnaire with closed-ended questions 
would have allowed for an in-depth exploration of the interplay between institutions and 
dualisation processes as well as the flexibility necessary to grasp individual perspectives and 
points of view. The use of semi-structured rather than structured or unstructured interviews 
was meant, on the one hand, to provide flexibility to adapt to the interviewees’ narration and 
to allow for breadth in responses, on the other hand, to make sure to cover all aspects relevant 
for subsequent analysis. The advantages of using qualitative methods in this type of study are 
well known in the methodology literature (see, for instance, Bryman, 2004; Blaikie 2010). In 
particular, qualitative methods allow us to understand the respondents’ point of view, enable 
an in-depth analysis of specific situations/issues/processes and are more flexible in adapting 
to respondents’ needs. As regards this research, a qualitative methodology allows us to grasp 
the TA workers’ points of view and their perception of their situations and more specifically, 
of their disadvantages, enabling an exploration of their individual experience. Furthermore, 
qualitative methods allow an in-depth analysis of the issue to be investigated, providing a 




However, qualitative studies suffer from some systematic weaknesses, including difficulty in 
replicability and small sample size (Bryman, 2004: Blaikie, 2010). Thus, I am aware that the 
qualitative methods I have used will not necessarily be representative of the overall population 
of TA workers in the two countries considered, given the limitation of time and space which 
are typical of any qualitative study. This is a common weakness of qualitative analysis which 
cannot be easily solved. 
The fieldwork entailed interviews with a selected group of full-time TA workers in low and 
medium-skilled service occupations in one location in each country. 23 interviews were 
conducted in Italy and 24 in the UK, of which 20 in each country were with TA workers. The 
remaining ones were with actors involved in TAW. The number of interviews constituted a 
good compromise between time constraints and the necessity of in-depth analysis. More 
specifically, it made it possible to reach saturation (Bryman, 2004), meaning that similar data 
kept emerging after a number of interviews, supposedly because all variability in experienced 
disadvantaged had been covered.  
Access to interviewees was gained through several sources in both countries. In the UK, the 
first interviewees were accessed through the help of a temporary agency staff who acted as a 
gatekeeper. The same role was played in Italy by two representatives of two trade unions 
specialised in atypical workers, namely NIdiL-CGIL and FelSA-CISL10. The role of 
gatekeepers from trade union representatives in the UK was less relevant than in the Italian 
case, but still important, mostly through Edinburgh TUC.  Other interviewees were accessed 
through two associations dealing with problems related to access to welfare and casualization 
of work, the Edinburgh Coalition Against Poverty (ECAP) and eQual in Bologna. Finally, in 
both countries, a few interviewees were accessed through personal connections. The partly 
different types of gatekeeper in the two countries might cause concern of selection bias. For 
instance, one might argue that the TA workers a trade union is in contact with might 
systematically differ from TA workers a temporary agency is in contact with. Nevertheless, 
the majority of interviewees were found through a snowballing strategy, mostly through 
colleagues and former colleagues of previous interviewees. Thus, while the initial gatekeepers 
quite differed between the two countries and this could have caused selection bias in the 
results, the fact that most interviewees were found through word of mouth mitigates these 
concerns.   
                                                            
10 As will be explained in chapter 4, section 4.6, these are the two most important trade unions for TA 
workers in the Italian context. 
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The questionnaire was constructed in order to give the interviewees the maximum possible 
freedom to discuss their experience and the problems faced, and at the same time to guide the 
discussion taking into account the time limit. Sub-questions were asked only in case that the 
interviewee failed to specify relevant details, or she was too vague or she did not mention a 
specific aspect of her experience in her answer. Otherwise, the interviewee was free to talk 
once the main question had been asked. The questionnaire was formulated in the two languages 
in which the interviews were carried out (Italian and English), taking into account the possible 
slight shifts that are necessary to make the questions fully comparable from one linguistic and 
cultural context to the other. After the questionnaire had been formulated, 2-3 pilot interviews 
were carried out in each country in order to refine the questions and to eventually amend them. 
The interviews were conducted in Italian and English and they were then translated into 
English for the qualitative analysis. Fieldwork took place between June 2013 and May 2014 
in the UK, and between December 2013 and October 2014 in Italy. 
The qualitative analysis of the interviews was carried out by using a qualitative analysis 
software (i.e. NVivo). Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) is 
increasingly used in qualitative research in the social sciences, and its advantages are well 
documented in the literature (see, for instance, Gibbs et al., 2002; Silver and Lewis, 2014). 
The main advantages compared to a non-computer assisted analysis include data management, 
facilitation of data search and retrieval, exploration of data according to content or topic, easier 
coding and re-coding, a more meaningful organisation of data and the creation of connections 
between data (Silver and Lewis, 2014). In order to carry out the qualitative analysis, I made 
use of mainly topic coding for the identification of the main themes and topics in the interviews 
and analytic coding at a later stage, in order to establish connections across interviews, to 
identify dominant narratives and for data interpretation (Richards, 2005; Richards and Morse, 
2007). 
 
3.7 Ethical Issues 
The project has been classified as Level 2 according to the University of Edinburgh School of 
Social and Political Sciences Research Ethics Procedure. The ethical concerns were 
thoroughly discussed with supervisors and the measures suggested to minimise ethical risks 
were approved by both supervisors and the Director of the Graduate School, as established by 
the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Edinburgh. 
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The main ethical concerns as regards this research project mainly entailed a breach of 
confidentiality of sensitive information and possible negative consequences for interviewees 
in their current workplace. With respect to confidentiality, I asked all my interviewees to sign 
an informed consent form, explaining the purpose of my research and asking them whether 
the interview could be recorded, assuring them of confidentiality of the information provided. 
The files were stored on my PC and they have not been given to anyone but to two transcribers 
(one for the British and one for the Italian interviewees), who both signed a confidentiality 
agreement. The transcriptions were all properly anonymised and I did not grant access to them 
to anyone but myself. As regards the possible consequences in the workplace for the 
interviewees, they were minimised by the strategy of gaining access to interviewees and by 
the way the interviews were conducted. Possible interviewees were privately contacted by the 
temporary agency, the trade union staff or the association of which they were members. If they 
were interested in being interviewed they contacted me through the email address provided by 
the gatekeepers, thus assuring nobody at their workplace would know. The place where the 
interviews were carried out were not close to the interviewees’ workplace unless the 
interviewee expressed her desire to be interviewed near there for her convenience. Moreover, 
I did not reveal the interviewee’s identity nor the content of the interview to anyone, assuring 
all information was kept confidential. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the research design of the research project. It has highlighted the 
rationale behind a comparative approach and it has justified the choice of Italy and the UK as 
comparative case studies. Italy and the UK have been selected for the analysis as two countries 
with several similarities as regards their socio-economic characteristics but also significant 
differences with respect to their institutional setting, including employment regulations, 
industrial relations and social protection systems. Although a more detailed analysis of the 
institutional characteristics regarding the atypical contract of choice, namely, temporary 
agency work, is illustrated in the next chapter, it suffices to say at this point that these two 
different institutional settings have been argued by authors in the dualism literature to have led 
to different divides between atypical and standard workers.  
This chapter has also shown the reasons for choosing TAW as the type of employment contract 
for the comparative analysis, as well as the selected sector. In this chapter, I have also 
operationalised the employment-related dimensions within which the individual disadvantages 
between temporary agency workers and standard workers will be investigated. The 
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operationalisation of the dimensions of analysis could not entail all aspects of experience of 
TA workers, as a thesis would have not sufficed.  Nevertheless, through the aspects selected, 
this thesis aims to capture the most significant facets of experience and their related 
disadvantages.  
Finally, this chapter has described the selection of interviewees as well as the data collection 
and analysis. The 20 interviewees selected in each country were aged 30-60, non-immigrant, 
working full-time in medium and low-skilled occupations in Bologna and Edinburgh, two 
cities with comparable socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore, seven interviews have 
been carried out with other significant stakeholders involved in TAW at the local level.  
Having briefly sketched here the differences in the countries’ institutional frameworks, the 
next chapter is devoted to the detailed analysis of their institutional setting in which TAW is 
embedded.  This allows for a refinement of the hypotheses formulated in section 2.6, before 


















4. Comparing TAW in Italy and in the UK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the characteristics of TAW in Italy and in the UK. 
However, before illustrating the comparison between the two countries, it considers the use of 
TAW by employers at a more general level. It then describes the main characteristics of the 
TA workforce in the two countries. Furthermore, it provides an analysis of the institutional 
framework which regulates the temporary agency sector. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the institutional framework in which TAW is embedded in the two countries. The 
analysis is meant to highlight the similarities and differences in the institutional characteristics 
TA workers face compared to standard workers in Italy and in the UK. This enables us to set 
the two countries in relation to the hypotheses formulated in the analytical framework (see 
chapter 2, section 2.6). As is shown, the hypotheses broadly hold for the two countries for 
TAW. However, where institutional characteristics are found to partly misalign with initial 
hypotheses, the hypotheses are refined.  
Firstly, I analyse the employment rights associated with TAW and how they differ from those 
for standard employment. The analysis shows a different divide in employment rights between 
standard and TA workers in the two countries which, I argue, can be traced back to the different 
legal employment status of TA workers in the two institutional contexts. Secondly, I discuss 
the collective representation of TA workers. Once again, the characteristics of collective 
representation for these workers can be claimed to reflect the broader features of workers’ 
collective representation in Italy and in the UK, although certain specific features are 
discussed. Finally, I consider income protection schemes to which TA workers have access 
for three major social risks: unemployment, sickness and retirement. As clearly emerges from 
the analysis, institutional divides in income protection tend to mirror the macro-characteristics 
of the social protection systems of the two countries. These reflect the features of the two 
welfare regimes to which the two countries belong, but they are also partly engendered by the 
specific legal status of TA workers and by other features of public income protection schemes.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 synthesises the use employers make of TAW. 
Section 4.3 summarises the main characteristics of TA workers in the two countries. Section 
4.4 compares the regulations of TAW in Italy and the UK. Section 4.5 discusses the divide in 
employment rights between TA and standard workers in comparative perspective. Section 4.6 
contrasts the two collective representation systems of TA workers. Section 4.7 analyses access 
to income protection and related disadvantages in case of unemployment (section 4.7.1), 
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sickness (section 4.7.2) and retirement (section 4.7.3). Finally, section 4.8 draws the 
conclusions. 
 
4.2 Use of TAW by Employers  
 
The literature has identified several uses employers make of TAW. Firstly, it has identified 
TAW as a ‘screening device’ for potential employees (Houseman et al., 2003; Peck and 
Theodore, 2006). Given the asymmetry of information, employers might not be willing to hire 
a worker permanently without knowing her actual skills and productivity. In that respect, TAW 
can be viewed by employers as a tool to provide a probationary period to assess a worker’s 
productivity, skills or commitment (Gash, 2005). Therefore, TAW offers the possibility for 
employers to ‘try out’ a worker without any long-term commitment but it also allows the 
worker to try the job without commitment (Ford and Slater, 2005). In this case, the matching 
between a job and a candidate can be ‘tested’ and later transformed into a standard contract 
should the matching be satisfactory. Thus, TAW can function as a tool to reduce information 
asymmetries before a standard contract is signed.  
A second important TAW use for employers is that of providing a ‘flexible buffer of workers’ 
in the case of volatility of labour demand or supply (Forde and Slater, 2005, p. 252). On the 
one hand, in the case of increased labour demand, employers might need more workers in 
specific periods of time when production temporarily increases, or when a specific project or 
target needs to be achieved. On the other hand, in the event of a decrease in labour supply, 
employers need to counteract temporary labour shortages, which might be due to standard 
workers’ sickness, annual leave or parental leave. TAW can thus provide the temporary 
workforce to fulfill labour supply needs.  
A third relevant use of TWA is as a substitute to permanent employment. Particularly, it has 
been argued it might constitute a less costly alternative than standard contracts, given that they 
result in savings on dismissal procedures (Debels, 2005; Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; Barbieri 
and Scherer, 2009). Employers might want to save on direct labour costs, given that TAW in 
some countries can be paid less, although agency fees might make the option less convenient. 
They might also want to use TAW to cut non-wage labour costs, such as contributions and 
occupational schemes, given that TA workers might not be entitled or they might be entitled 
to less generous benefits (Lodovici, 2001a; Hevenstone, 2010). Finally, they might want save 
on dismissal costs. In the case of the former, temporary agencies might provide easy and fast 
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job replacements, acting as an outsourced HR service. As for the latter, TAW might be 
employed in order not to confront possible litigation costs, or to avoid paying redundancy 
payments and to simplify firing procedures (Mitlacher, 2007). 
As already mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.3, the reasons for using TAW by employers is 
thought to vary depending on the institutional framework, which provides different incentives 
and constraints in the use of different types of contracts. Hence, in countries with a large 
employment protection divide between standard and atypical employment, such as Italy, we 
might expect employers to use TAW as a substitute to standard employment. In contrast, in 
countries with relatively small employment protection divides, such as the UK, we expect 
employers to have less incentive in using TAW as a cost reduction tool and to use TAW either 
as a screening device or as a buffer against labour volatility. 
 
4.3 The TA Workforce in Italy and in the UK 
In 2012, temporary agency workers constituted 3.9% of the total workforce in the UK and 
1.2% in Italy (CIETT, 2015). Although the reasons for this discrepancy could not be identified 
in the literature, it might be due to the greater availability of other atypical employment 
contracts in Italy (such as para-subordinati or work through a cooperative) which might serve 
similar purposes for employers. However, it may also be due to the spread of specialised 
temporary agencies for high skilled jobs in the UK, which are uncommon in Italy. Italy 
experienced a rapid increase in the use of TAW in the decade before the financial crisis, 
(226.1% in the 2000-2008 period, Voss et al., 2013) after its initial legalisation in 1997 and its 
further liberalisation in 2003, as well as a further growth in the years immediately after the 
crisis (CIETT, 2015). The UK, where TAW has been legal for several decades, saw a more 
modest but still significant increase over the same period, both before the crisis (18.8% 
between 2000 and 2008) and after the crisis (Voss et al., 2013; CIETT, 2015). In both 
countries, the majority of temporary agency workers are employed in the service sector, mostly 
in low and medium-skilled occupations11 (CIETT, 2012). When we consider the average 
duration of assignments, the situation is more polarised in the UK than in Italy: in the UK, 
49% of assignments last more than 3 months compared to 30% in Italy, but 31% last less than 
a month in the UK compared to only 20% in Italy (CIETT, 2015). 
                                                            
11 However, in Italy, the manufacturing sector employs a significant minority of TA workers. In the 
UK, TAW is also used in some high-skilled occupations (such as IT and engineering). 
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With respect to socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 1), in 2013, the gender 
composition of TA workers tended to be biased towards men (55%) in Italy and women (55%) 
in the UK (CIETT, 2015), though the gender composition was relatively balanced in both 
countries. If we consider the educational attainment of TA workers in 2010, roughly a third of 
workers (30% in Italy and 37% in the UK) have not completed secondary education, while 
39% of workers in the UK but only 25% of workers in Italy have completed tertiary education, 
reflecting the higher use of TAW in high-skilled occupations in the UK (CIETT, 2012).   
 
Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of TA workers by country, 2013 
                        UK Italy 
Gender   
Men 45% 55% 
Women 55% 45% 
Education   
Below secondary 37% 30% 
Secondary 24% 45% 
Tertiary 39% 25% 
Source: CIETT (2015) 
 
4.4 Temporary Agency Sector Regulations 
The regulation of the TA sector in Italy and in the UK can be argued to broadly reflect the 
overall national orientation in the regulation of employment in each country. In the UK, 
sectoral regulations in the TA sector are loose, in line with an overall deregulation of the labour 
market (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1) with little or no restriction on the use of TAW by 
employers. By contrast, in Italy sectoral regulations are tighter and many limitations in the use 
of TAW as well as other atypical contracts are established by both national legislation and 
collective agreements, limiting the use of atypical employment for each employer and the 
overall duration of temporary contracts.  
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The UK was among the first countries in Europe to introduce temporary agency work. The 
sector was firstly regulated by the Employment Agency Act 1973 while the Conduct of 
Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations Act 1976 provides a further 
regulatory framework. This legislation covers all agencies but the ones hiring nurses and 
health-related occupations for which the Nurses Agency Act 1957 applies. In case an agency 
employs both nurses and other staff both legislations apply (Pedersen et al., 2004). The 
regulatory framework was later amended by the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 
which abolished the licensing system. Since then, the enforcement of regulations depends on 
the Employment Agencies Standards inspectorate (EAS). Although the previous licensing 
system was considered ineffective, the current Inspectorate has a limited amount of resources 
(both human and financial) and this prevents any form of effective control over the sector. 
Agencies employing nurses are instead required to get a license from local authorities who are 
also responsible for enforcement (Pedersen et al., 2004). Following the Morecambe Bay 
cockling disaster, in which 21 cockle pickers drowned, the Gangmasters Act 2004 
reintroduced a licensing system for agencies working in agricultural, fishing and food 
packaging sector (The Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004). A further important amendment 
was the enactment of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses 
Regulations Act 2003 which substituted the one from 1976. The Code of Conduct sets rules in 
temporary agencies business12 and establishes conduct practices in the TA sector13 (The 
Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations Act 2003). 
TAW in the UK can be said to be comparatively loosely regulated also when it comes to the 
limitation in the use of TAW (Coe et al., 2009). No restrictions are present with respect to 
reasons for use, limits of duration and there are no sectoral or occupational limitations for the 
use of TAW. The only restrictions which apply are the impossibility to use TA workers to 
replace employees on strike and the obligation to ensure that TA workers have the necessary 
                                                            
12 Including the following prohibitions: to sell other businesses, to share the workers’ personal details, 
to advertise non-existent jobs, to charge the worker any cost or fee for providing services (with 
exceptions in the entertainment and fashion business) and to hire workers to substitute workers on 
strike. 
13 Among the most important conduct practices, the agency has to: provide all terms and conditions to 
the hirer before the contract starts and provide all relevant information about the job to the worker 
before the actual start of the contract. This includes: pay, employment conditions, type of occupation 
and working time, ensure that TA workers have the legally required qualifications to carry out the 
work. It must not prohibit the worker from being directly hired by the hirer, it has to pay the worker 
even if the hirer has not paid the agency, it must ensure to have all the necessary information about the 
job from the hirer in order to provide a suitable worker and all information relevant to the worker has 
to be provided in written form.  
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equipment for the job (Pedersen et al., 2004).  TA workers are generally hired on a temporary 
basis by the agency, but in a few cases they might be hired in a pay-between-assignment 
contract. In the latter case, the TA worker is formally an employee of the temporary agency 
and she gets paid even when her assignment ends and she is not employed in a new one14 
(CitizenAdvice, 2015; GOV.UK, 2015d). 
In contrast to the UK, Italy was one of the last countries in Western Europe to introduce TAW. 
The so-called ‘Treu package’ (Law No. 196/1997), which legalized TAW in Italy, included an 
overall reshuffle of employment contracts in order to increase flexibility at the margin in the 
Italian labour market and to facilitate access to work to some social categories with low labour 
market attachment, namely women, the young and the long-term unemployed (Barbieri and 
Scherer, 2009). The Treu reform reduced regulation strictness on many temporary contracts 
and legalized TAs for the first time (Graziano and Jessoula, 2011). The delayed introduction 
of TAW in Italy was partly due to the fear of trade unions of possible abuses in specific sectors 
of the Italian economy. This fear translated into the prohibition of the use of TAW in the 
construction and the agricultural sector, where caporalato (illegal recruitment of workers for 
very low wages) was quite spread, especially in the South. However, the prohibition was lifted 
only a few years later, in 2000 (Pedersen et al., 2004).  
The most important legislative regulation for TAW was implemented in 2003. The Biagi Law 
(Legislative Decree No. 276/2003) introduced a series of changes in the Italian labour market 
in order to further increase its flexibility (Jessoula et al., 2010). Since then, TAs have been 
allowed to perform other activities that complement or expand their more traditional 
business15. The licensing system, reformed through successive decrees in 2003 and 2004, is 
centrally managed by the Ministry of Labour and Public Policies. The law also establishes 
rules for agencies’ business and for the conduct of practices, which are similar to those of the 
British Code of Conduct. These include the prohibition against providing TA workers to 
substitute employees on strike, providing TA workers for firms or production units where there 
have been collective dismissals in the previous 6 months and charging the worker any direct 
fee 16. 
                                                            
14 In the waiting period, the person gets paid 50% of previous pay or the minimum wage, whatever is 
higher (GOV.UK, 2015d). 
15 More specifically, besides the traditional activity of providing workers to their clients, agencies 
have been allowed to create workers’ databases, organise training activities for candidates, select 
workers on behalf of the hirer and support outplacement on behalf of a firm (INPS, 2013). 
16 Furthermore, the agency is obliged to: provide all terms and conditions to the hirer; provide all 
relevant information about the job to the candidate; ensure that TA workers have the required 
qualifications for the job; must not prohibit the employer from directly hiring the worker; pay the 
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Until 2000, the employment legislation established a ban on the use of TAW in jobs with little 
skill content. However, since then the ban has been lifted (Pedersen et al., 2004). However, 
quantitative limitations in the use of TAW are established by national collective agreements 
for each sector. For instance, in the commerce sector, the number of TA workers cannot be 
beyond 15% of the permanent workforce in each firm (or up to 2 in firms with fewer than 15 
employees) and the total number of workers employed on a temporary contract cannot be more 
than 28% p.a.17 (Burroni and Carrieri, 2011; Camera, 2014). 
The Biagi Law 2003 establishes that workers can be employed by the TA on a fixed-term or 
on an open-ended18 basis.  In the latter case, which tends to be quite rare in practice, the person 
is entitled to be paid a minimum amount during the waiting period between assignments19 
(INPS, 2014). The Biagi law also states sectoral and occupational restrictions in the use of 
TAW, and it establishes that hirers have to specify the reasons for use (Voss et al., 2013).  
However, the reasons for use are vague in both their formulation and their application, leaving 
enough flexibility to employers in the use of TAW.  Furthermore, the law grants some 
exceptions for specific categories of workers with low employability (including the long-term 
unemployed or people under industrial restructuring benefit schemes) as well as in cases 
specified by collective agreements (Law No. 276/2003). Moreover, the labour reform of 2012, 
the so-called Fornero Reform (Law No. 92/2012) loosened restrictions, by establishing the 
possibility to employ a TA worker for up to 12 months without the necessity to give any reason 
for use. The Fornero Law 2012 also establishes the maximum number of extensions and 
renewals as 6, and the maximum total duration of the employment relationship as 36 months20. 
If the term is not respected, the contract will automatically be converted into a permanent one 
(Law No. 92/2012). The recent employment reform enacted by the Renzi government in 2015, 
the so-called Jobs Act, whose applicability goes beyond the scope of the analysis in this thesis, 
has introduced little change in the regulation of TAW. The most important modification has 
                                                            
worker even though the hirer has not paid the agency; check hirers’ healthy and safety standards; 
ensure to have all the necessary information about the job from the hirer. All the information relevant 
to the worker has to be provided in written form (CPO-UIL, 2006). 
17 Other quantitative limits in the service economy include, for instance, 13% of permanent workers in 
telecommunications, 30% of permanent workers in cleaning, 30% of total workforce in tourism.  
18 Specifically, open-ended TA contracts are possible only for a number of occupations (e.g. cleaning 
services, transport, construction, call-centre operator, social care, porter services and all other 
occupations established by sectoral agreements). For fixed-term contracts, the hirer has to provide 
technical, productive, organisational or substitution reasons for the employment of TA workers 
(Legislative Decree No. 276/2003). 
19 Not less than 700 euros per month, and the time does not accrue annual leave, redundancy pay or 
any other legal provisions. (CCNL, 2012; INPS, 2014). 
20 42 months if during the first 24 months only 2 renewals/extensions have been used. 
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been the elimination of the ‘reasons for use’ in the TA contract (Legislative Decree No. 
81/2015).  
Overall, while the UK can be considered to present a deregulated framework in the temporary 
agency sector and limited sectoral and occupational regulations in the use of TAW. In Italy, 
TAW can be argued to still be highly regulated, with many restrictions and limitations on the 
use of TAW established by both national legislation and collective agreements. This can be 
argued to reflect the broader national orientation in the regulation of the labour market, with 
the UK presenting a deregulated legal framework, typical of a Liberal regime, while Italy has 
opted for a partial deregulation of atypical employment, in line with many other Continental 
and especially Southern European countries. 
 
Table 2. Summary Comparative Table for TAW Regulation in the UK and Italy 
 United Kingdom Italy 
Licensing system None – exception for the 
nursing, agricultural, fishing 
and food packaging sectors 
Yes 
Monitoring authority Employment Agencies 
Standard inspectorate 





None Yes, regulated by law and 
collective agreements 
Reasons for use None Yes 









‐ Biagi Law 2003 
‐ Fornero Law 2012 


















Source: Own elaboration 
 
4.5 TA Workers’ Employment Rights 
The two countries can be said to provide very different employment regulation frameworks as 
regards TAW. Although part of the differences between the two countries can be traced back 
to the differences between Liberal and Southern European countries identified in the dualism 
literature, others are specific to the legal status of TAW as established by labour law.  
In the UK, the definition of the employment status of an individual is relevant in that different 
employment rights are associated with different employment statuses (Böheim and 
Mühlberger, 2006). Historically, British legislation has distinguished between a contract of 
services (i.e. employees), mostly regulated by labour law, and a contract for services (i.e. self-
employed), mostly regulated by commercial law (Davies and Freedland, 2000; Hegewisch, 
2002). This dichotomous distinction had been increasingly criticised for not taking into 
account the increasing use of atypical forms of employment in the British economy which do 
not fall clearly into either category. The Employment Rights Act 1996 was the first to employ 
the new category of ‘worker’ which includes both employees and the so-called dependent self-
employed, i.e. workers who do not have a contract of employment but who are economically 
dependent on an employer, and which would include also TA workers (Burchell et al., 1999). 
This new category has been subsequently used in several employment-related acts, including 
the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, regulations related to the Working Time Directive and 
anti-discrimination laws.  
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Despite these changes, the employment status of many workers in atypical employment 
remains unclear (Burchell et al., 1999; Böheim and Mühlberger, 2006). Court decisions have 
used several criteria to determine the employment status of an individual21, but the discretion 
in applying different weights to these criteria have failed to produce consistent decisions across 
employment fields. This means, for instance, that a worker might be legally regarded as an 
employee for tax and social security purposes but as self-employed with regard to access to 
contractual schemes (Böheim and Mühlberger, 2006). Hence, TA workers, together with other 
atypical workers, including workers on zero-hour contracts and in job-on-call contracts, 
persevere in an ill-defined employment status, granting them certain employment rights of 
standard employees but not others. Nonetheless, an exception applies in the uncommon 
situation in which a person is employed by the agency in a pay-between-assignment contract. 
In the latter case, the worker is regarded as an employee of the agency and not as a TA worker 
(CitizenAdvice, 2015; GOV.UK, 2015d). Therefore, although TA workers experience 
multiple disadvantages in employment rights compared to standard workers, the main divide 
in the UK context can be argued to be not between standard and atypical workers, but rather 
between those legally regarded as employees vis-à-vis non-employees. It is the ill-defined 
employment status of some atypical contracts that prevents entitlement to certain employment 
rights reserved to employees rather than the fixed duration of employment.  
A number of basic employment rights apply to all ‘workers’. These include the minimum 
wage, health and safety, working time regulations and protection against discrimination 
(Burchell et al., 1999). In addition, in the field of tax and national insurance contributions, TA 
workers are legally regarded as if they were employees. As we will see in detail in the next 
section, this enables TA workers to have access to all statutory welfare provisions. 
Furthermore, TA workers are eligible for unfair dismissal. Nevertheless, unfair dismissal 
legislation in the UK is only reserved for employees who have completed 2 years of 
employment for the same employer (GOV.UK, 2016), de facto limiting access to those rights 
only to employees who hold a relatively long employment position. It can thus be argued that 
the divide in this case is based on tenure rather than on the employment status of workers, 
although this disproportionally affects workers in temporary contracts.  
                                                            
21 These include: control (the level of discretion the person has in carrying out an activity), integration 
(how much the activity performed is integrated into the firm organisation), economic reality (how far 
economic risks are shared between the employer and the worker), mutuality of obligation (the 
existence of obligations by the employer to provide work and by the worker to accept the work 
offered) (Burchell et al., 1999). 
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Nevertheless, TA workers are not legally considered employees in a number of other rights, 
most importantly, when it comes to access to occupational benefits. Moreover, the EU Agency 
Workers Directive (2008/104/EC) meant to entitle TA workers with equal treatment compared 
to standard employees in a number of fields.  Following the EU Directive, the UK Government 
issued the Temporary and Agency Workers (Equal Treatment) Bill 2010, granting TA workers 
equal treatment in a number of fields from which they were previously excluded (BIS, 2011). 
However, equal treatment is guaranteed only for access to firm facilities and access to 
information on job vacancies from the first day of work. All the other terms and conditions are 
subjected to equal treatment only after a 12-week qualifying period, including key elements 
of pay22 (including overtime pay, holiday pay) and working time (including night work, rest 
periods, rest breaks, annual leave) (BIS, 2011; CitizenAdvice, 2015).  
The Italian employment legislation distinguishes between employees, self-employed and 
parasubordinati, with the latter regarded as equivalent to dependent self-employed. However, 
unlike in the British case, the Italian legislation clearly states to which category an employment 
contract belongs and, in contrast to the UK case, TA workers are legally regarded as employees 
(INPS, 2013). This means that TA workers in Italy are fully entitled to temporary employees’ 
employment rights. Compared to the UK, TAW employment regulations in Italy are governed 
by both law and sectoral collective agreements between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. National labour law in Italy is meant to provide a general regulatory framework, 
leaving the responsibility to the social partners to define rules and rights concerning 
occupations in each sector. National sectoral agreements, called Contratti Collettivi Nazionali 
di Lavoro (CCNL), establish most rules regulating economic aspects (e.g. pay) and 
employment conditions aspects (e.g. working time) for labour contracts in each sector. Since 
1998, the year after TAW was legalised, the TA sector has had its own CCNL, which is now 
renewed every 3 years23  (Pedersen et al., 2004; CCNL, 2012). 
TA workers are legally considered temporary employees and both legislation and collective 
agreements guarantee equal treatment to comparable workers in the user firm. 
Notwithstanding, the Biagi Law 2003 granted some exceptions for certain categories of 
workers with particularly low employability24, with the aim to facilitate employment among 
these categories. The Legislative Decree No. 24/2012, on transposing the European Directive 
on temporary agency work (2008/104/CE) into national legislation, expanded the categories 
                                                            
22 Equal pay does not apply to people in a pay between assignment contract (CitizenAdvice, 2015). 
23 Before 2009, the regulatory part of the CCNL was renewed separately from the economic part, 
every 4 years and 2 years respectively.  
24 Women, the young and the long-term unemployed. 
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of workers for which derogation from equal treatment is possible. However, the Fornero 
Reform 2012 repealed any derogation from the principle of equal treatment (Voss et al., 2013).  
Overall, while in the UK the entitlement of TA workers to equal treatment is guaranteed only 
after 12 weeks of employment, in Italy TA workers enjoy equal treatment from the first day 
of assignment. These considerations can be used to refine some of the initial hypotheses. We 
can hypothesise TA workers in the UK to experience a disadvantage in working conditions 
compared to standard workers, as they are only entitled to some employment rights from the 
first day of employment (e.g. health and safety, protection against discrimination) but to others 
only after 12 weeks (e.g. equal pay, working time). By contrast, TA workers in Italy and those 
in the UK who have been employed in the same assignment for more than 12 weeks should 
not experience any disadvantage, as stated in the initial hypotheses.  
 
Table 3. Summary Comparative Table for TA Workers’ Employment Rights in the UK 
and Italy 
 United Kingdom Italy 
Employment status Ill-defined* Fixed-term employee** 
Protection against unfair 
dismissal 
Yes, but only after 2 years 
of continuous employment 
Yes 
Equal pay Yes, but only after 12 weeks Yes 
Equal working time Yes, but only after 12 weeks Yes 
*In the case of pay between assignment contracts, the person is legally regarded as an employee of the 
agency; **individuals might be hired by the agency as permanent employees. Source: Own elaboration 
 
4.6 Collective Representation 
As already mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.2.1, collective representation and, more 
specifically, collective bargaining varies greatly between the UK and Italy. As is described 
below, collective representation for TA workers broadly reflects the general characteristics of 
the industrial relations systems in the two countries. 
In the UK, collective bargaining has a limited role in the regulation of TAW. Apart from some 
exceptions in the entertainment industry, there are no agreements involving a plurality of 
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agencies. The Recruitment Employment Confederation (REC), which is the largest temporary 
agencies’ federation, does not negotiate agreements with trade unions on behalf of its 
members, leaving individual agencies the opportunity to negotiate agreements on a voluntary 
basis. However REC and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) collaborate in a number of fields 
involving TA workers’ conditions, such as training, good practices and health and safety 
(Pedersen et al., 2004). Given that REC has no mandate to negotiate inter-sectoral collective 
agreements, the only employers’ organisation which is able to do so is the Confederation of 
Business Industry (CBI) (Voss et al., 2013). The CBI and the TUC have been involved in a 
tripartite agreement with the UK government for the provision of equal treatment to TA 
workers. Nevertheless, inter-sectoral collective agreements of this kind, involving relevant 
social partners for the legislative regulation of TAW, are far from being systematic 
(Arrowsmith, 2009). 
Despite the very limited role of collective agreements at the inter-sectoral and sectoral levels, 
collective agreements exist at the firm level. Individual agencies have traditionally made 
agreements with trade unions in a number of areas, including individual representation, pay 
rates and training (Pedersen et al., 2004). The most important agreements have been signed at 
the national level between large temporary agency companies and national trade unions in 
strongly unionised sectors. For instance, Manpower and Adecco, two of the most active TA 
companies in the country, have signed agreements with some of the most important trade 
unions for the regulation of TAW in specific sectors. Local agencies and agencies recruiting 
in specific sectors have also signed numerous agreements with trade unions (Pedersen et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, these agreements are far from being the rule. Furthermore, dialogue 
between agencies or employers and unions tends to be limited to situations where the interests 
of both coincide, but no agreement is generally reached in other cases (Voss et al., 2013).  
Collective agreements involving user firms also play a role in the regulation of TAW. An 
example is the agreement between ASDA (a supermarket chain) and the trade union Unite to 
grant equal treatment to TA workers before new legislation came into force (Voss et al., 2013). 
Other collective agreements at the firm level involve limitations in the use of TAW, lengths 
of contracts and rules for the conversion of TA contracts into permanent ones (Pedersen et al., 
2004). However, these agreements tend to have a limited scope and all have a voluntary basis. 
With respect to other forms of self-regulation within the sector, the REC, which represents the 
majority of TAs in the country, provides a Code of Professional Practice in the provision of 
the service which all member agencies have to abide. The Code establishes some general rules 
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of good practice including, for instance, transparency, work relationships, ethical recruitment 
and respect for diversity (REC, 2014).  
In Italy, there are three trade unions specifically for atypical workers, including temporary 
agency workers. These trade unions are affiliated with the three main trade union 
confederations, CGIL, CISL and UIL respectively. Nidil-Nuove identità del Lavoro (New 
identity of Work) is affiliated with CGIL, FeLSA – Federazione Italiana Lavoratori 
Somministrati (Italian Federation of Temporary Agency Workers) is associated with CISL, 
and Tem.p@, formerly CpO– Coordinamento per l’Occupazione (Coordination for 
Employment), is affiliated with UIL (Benassi and Vlandas, 2015).  Collective bargaining is 
comparatively more coordinated. The national sectoral collective agreement (CCNL) is the 
most relevant one, as company or territorial agreements can breach the CCNL in part only if 
the changes favour the worker. The CCNL is binding for all workers within a specific sector, 
regardless of their trade union membership. The CCNL for TAW is signed between 
Assolavoro (the National association of temporary agencies) and by the three trade unions 
representing TA workers. The first CCNL for TAW was signed in 1998, right after the 
introduction of TAW, and it is updated every three years (Choi and Mattoni, 2010; Benassi 
and Vlandas, 2015).  The current one was signed in 2012 (CCNL, 2012). For instance, the 
CCNL establishes that TA workers have the right to elect their own representatives at three 
levels: national, local and firm level. With respect to the latter, they are allowed to elect 
representatives in a user company which employs more than 20 TA workers for over 3 months, 
which become part of the Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria or RSU (Workplace Union 
Representation) (Leonardi, 2009; Burroni and Carrieri, 2011).  
Besides the regulatory role played by collective bargaining at the national level, the law allows 
the possibility for bargaining in the TA sector at the local and firm level although this is rarely 
used in practice (Voss et al., 2013). Local and firm-level bargaining, where present, usually 
happens between a given employer and the representatives of the trade union or federation in 
a given employment sector. Nevertheless, these agreements can also regulate the atypical and 
temporary agency workforce. In that respect, representatives of Nidil, FeLSA and 
CpO/Tem.p@ can generally take part in negotiations, although they generally take a more 
marginal position compared to the sectoral union federation (Burroni and Carrieri, 2011). It is 
also worth mentioning that unions representing atypical workers take part in bilateral funds 
called Ebitemp and Formatemp. These funds are jointly managed by unions and employers 
and are meant to provide source of income support (Ebitemp) and training (Formatemp) for 
atypical workers (Durazzi, 2015).  
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In conclusion, collective representation of TA workers in the UK can be argued to be more 
limited and somewhat patchier than in Italy. In the British context, TA workers do not have 
specific trade unions representing them and they have limited chances to have their interests 
represented at different levels of collective bargaining, with a few exceptions. However, these 
narrow opportunities for collective representation partly reflect a more general 
disempowerment of workers’ collective representation in the UK context since the 1980s. In 
Italy, collective representation plays a more prominent role in employment regulation than in 
the UK and TA workers are represented by specific union federations for atypical workers. 
Nevertheless, despite nationally coordinated collective bargaining for the TA sector, most 
regulations of TAW happen through collective bargaining practices between employers and 
the trade union federations representing workers in a specific sector, although the union 
federations for atypical workers can take part in the negotiations.  
Overall, the analysis of the collective representation system does not allow for picking between 
the two alternative hypotheses formulated in the analytical framework, derived from the 
dualism and the revitalisation literature (see chapter 2, section 2.6.2). With respect to 
representation of TA workers, on the one hand, TA workers in the UK might feel more 
disempowered compared to TA workers in Italy, given the more limited power of unions at 
the workplace. On the other hand, the stronger position of unions in Italy, especially in medium 
and large firms, might be offset by the fact that sectoral unions representing standard workers 
are the dominant negotiators of collective agreements. This might create a larger experienced 
divide between TA and standard workers in Italy compared to the UK.  
 
Table 4. Summary Comparative Table for TA Workers’ Collective Representation in 
the UK and Italy 
 United Kingdom Italy 
Temporary Agencies 
Confederations 
 Recruitment and 
Employment Confederation 
(REC) 
               Assolavoro 
Trade unions representing 
specifically TA workers 







                      None    Yes, National Sectoral 
Agreement for TA Workers 
Company Collective 
Agreements 
Yes, but not systematic Possible, but not used in 
practice* 
*Company collective agreements between employers and sectoral unions also regulate TAW. Source: 
Own elaboration 
 
4.7 Income Protection 
This section briefly describes the main forms of income protection available to TA workers in 
Italy and in the UK in relation to the following social risks: unemployment, sickness and 
retirement. Attention is particularly paid to how their income protection differs compared with 
standard workers. Income protection for TA workers in the two countries broadly reflects the 
distinction between Liberal and Mediterranean welfare regimes identified in the dualism 
literature (see chapter 2, section 2.6.3). Nevertheless, there exist specific characteristics of the 
income protection system which deviate from the general characteristics of the welfare system. 
These are discussed and, where necessary, initial hypotheses are refined accordingly. 
 
    4.7.1 Protection in Case of Unemployment 
Protection in the case of unemployment can be argued to epitomise the characteristics of the 
welfare regimes to which the countries belong. The British welfare system provides protection 
mainly through flat-rate means-tested benefits, allowing all TA workers on a low income to 
access public income protection. By contrast, the Italian system is structured to provide high 
protection for workers in permanent employment, especially those in the manufacturing 
industry and employed by medium and large firms, through generous contribution-based 
unemployment benefits (UBs) and other income protection schemes, but limited protection for 
other workers. This leaves TA workers with limited contribution histories with no or very 
limited protection, as there is no national minimum income scheme and means-tested benefits 
for people on a low income are scant and fragmented (Jessoula et al., 2010; Madama, 2010).  
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In the UK, there are two types of UBs, a contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and 
an income-based JSA25. Contribution-based JSA can be claimed depending on how much the 
worker has paid in contributions in the 2 tax years before the benefit claim. The worker can 
receive JSA for up to 182 days and the amount depends on the age (the maximum weekly rates 
are £ 56.80 for workers aged 24 or below and £71.70 for workers aged 25 or above26). 
However, those on a low income27 who are not entitled to contribution-based JSA or who have 
exceeded the period of 182 days can claim income-based JSA, which provides the same 
amount of benefits as contribution-based JSA but it has no limit of duration. Furthermore, if a 
person receives income-based JSA, she is automatically entitled to a range of means-tested 
benefits, including maximum housing benefits, maximum Council Tax benefits, free school 
meals and health benefits28 (Hood and Norris Keiller, 2016). Nonetheless, for both types of 
JSA, the person needs to abide by strict activation requirements, and by any other conditions 
established in the Claimant Commitment29. These include: going to the jobcentre when asked, 
not turning down a job or a training course, taking part in an interview the claimant has been 
invited to, going to a booked training course, being available for work, not leaving a job or 
training without a good reason, actively seeking a job. The fulfillment of conditionality criteria 
has to be proved by coming to the jobcentre every two weeks and in case the person is found 
to have failed to abide any of the conditions, she can be sanctioned from a minimum of 4 
weeks to a maximum of 156 weeks (GOV, 2015a). 
Hence, contributions play a rather minor role in the British UB system, as requirements to 
access income-based UB are quite loose (Clasen and Goerne, 2011). Means-tested UB is 
relatively easy to access for low-income workers, including TA workers, whose household 
financial resources fall short of the threshold. Thus, it is not surprising that 82% of UB 
claimants receive income-based JSA rather than contribution-based JSA (Hood and Norris 
Keiller, 2016). However, the amount of benefit received for both types of UB is not generous, 
                                                            
25 A ‘new style’ JSA is available for those who are entitled to apply for Universal Credit (UC). It 
works in the same way as contribution-based JSA (GOV.UK, 2017b). UC is currently being rolled out 
and it is meant to replace six benefits: income-based JSA, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credits, 
Child Tax Credit, income-based Employment and Support Allowance and Income Support. UC was 
still in the pilot phase at the time of the interviews. 
26 All the amounts presented here refer to 2014, year in which the majority of interviews was carried 
out. There was a small increase over time, but typically not keeping up with inflation. Different rates 
apply to lone parents and couples. 
27 The person has to have less than £16000 pounds worth of savings and their partner should not work 
more than 24 hours per week. If the partner works more hours, other means-tested benefits are 
available. 
28 Including free dental care and sight tests. 
29 The Claimant Commitment is an agreement between the claimant and the jobcentre which states the 
activation requirements which need to be satisfied in order for the claimant to receive JSA.  
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as it is roughly 16% of the median income, and there are strict activation requirements which 
can result in tough sanctioning. However, claimants on a low income have access to a range 
of means-tested benefits, including housing benefits and Council Tax credits, which 
complement the limited amount of money received through JSA. 
In Italy, the ordinary unemployment benefit was reformed by the Fornero Law 2012 (Law No. 
92/2012) and it was named ASpI – Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego (Social Insurance for 
Employment). It was available to all employees30, including TA workers (INPS, 2015a).  In 
order to be entitled, the person had to have paid national insurance contributions for at least 2 
years in her working life and at least for 1 year in the 2 years before the unemployment claim.  
The benefit amounted to 75% of previous earnings up to 1180 euros and 25% of the exceeding 
earnings. The duration of the benefit varied with age (in 2015 it was 10 months for a worker 
below 50 years old31) (INPS, 2015a). A new unemployment benefit, the NASpI – Nuova 
Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego (New Social Insurance for Employment), was introduced 
by the Jobs Act reform in 2015. Although the new benefit presents several changes as regards 
contributions required for access and duration, it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, which 
analyses the experience of workers in 2013 and 2014, before the introduction of the NASpI.  
Another, less generous, ordinary unemployment benefit, the mini-ASpI, was available to 
employees who had not paid sufficient contributions. The person had to have paid 
contributions for at least 13 weeks in the year preceding the unemployment claim. The amount 
of benefit was calculated in the same way as for the ASpI but the benefit lasted for half of the 
weeks worked (and for which contributions had been paid) in the year before the 
unemployment claim (INPS, 2015b). The introduction of the mini-ASpI was meant to provide 
a form of unemployment benefit, albeit less generous, for workers with a limited contribution 
history. The mini-ASpI has also been substituted by the NASpI in the recent employment 
reform of 2015. Although in order to be entitled to unemployment benefits (both ASpI and 
mini-ASpI) a person had to declare her availability to work, conditionality requirements, 
although formally present, were not enforced in practice, as active labour market policies in 
Italy have never been fully rolled out or they have been implemented only patchily (Gualmini 
and Rizza, 2011; Jessoula and Vesan, 2011).  
Furthermore, TA workers are not entitled to the two main types of benefits provided in case 
of unemployment, which go under the name of CIG – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (Wage 
                                                            
30 Only permanent employees in public administration are excluded. 
31 In 2013 and 2014, it was 8 months for workers below 50 years old, while it has been kept constant 
at 12 months for workers 50-55 years old. Longer durations apply for workers above 55 years old. In 
2015, the maximum duration was 16 months. 
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Guarantee Fund). These wage guarantee schemes32 are reserved mostly for permanent workers 
working in medium and large firms mainly in the manufacturing sector, but they are not 
available to most standard employees in the service sector and certainly not to temporary 
workers (Di Nicola, 2011). These are generous benefits both in terms of duration (lasting from 
1 year to up to 4 years in specific cases33) and income replacement (80% of previous earnings). 
A further benefit from which TA workers are excluded is the so-called indennità di mobilità 
(mobility benefit). The mobility benefit is available for the unemployed who have exhausted 
the CIG straordinaria and in other specific cases of firm restructuring and conversion34. Again, 
this benefit is mostly reserved for employees of medium and large firms in the manufacturing 
sector, excluding de facto most employees in the service sector, but also employees working 
in small manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore, there is no benefit available for workers who have not paid sufficient 
contributions, and no nationally provided minimum income scheme (Jessoula et al., 2011; 
Durazzi, 2015). In case their income falls below a certain threshold, the person can claim social 
assistance, but this is not very generous and it involves strict income requirements. 
Furthermore, social assistance is not configured as a right and it is independently administered 
at the municipal level and subjected to local availability of resources35(Madama, 2010).  
                                                            
32 There are two main types of CIG, CIGO – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria and CIGS – 
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (Ordinary and Extraordinary Wage Guarantee Fund). The 
difference between CIGO – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria and CIGS – Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni Straordinaria (Ordinary and Extraordinary Wage Guarantee Fund) is whether the 
redundancy is due to general economic downturns (CIGO) or specific firm necessities (CIGS), such as 
restructuring, reorganization or conversion. It is the employer that requests to use the CIG for a certain 
number of the employees. A third type of CIG, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Deroga 
(Exceptional Wage Guarantee Fund) has been introduced after the beginning of the economic crisis in 
order to face the rapidly increasing unemployment. An employer can request the CIG in deroga if 
excluded from the use of CIGO and CIGS, in case her employees have exhausted CIGO or CIGS, and 
for categories of employees excluded from CIGO and CIGS. The main requirement is to have been 
continuously employed by the same employer for at least 90 days (INPS, 2015d). The CIG in deroga 
is available to TA workers although for them and for other categories of atypical workers, the benefit 
is only 20% of previous earnings compared to 80% of other employees (INPS, 2015e). However, the 
requirements necessary to access CIG in deroga make it a de facto limited option for TA workers. 
33 CIGO can last for up to 52 weeks (104 weeks in economically deprived areas). CIGS lasts up to 2 
years but can be extended for 2 more years in specific cases. The CIGO is reserved for permanent and 
fixed-term employees (excluding managers and apprentices) in commercial, agricultural and industrial 
firms and cooperatives. The CIGS has a more limited application, being reserved to permanent and 
fixed-term employees in industrial firms with at least 15 employees, commercial firms with at least 
200 employees and agricultural firms (INPS, 2015f). 
34 The mobility allowance can last from 12 months to up to 4 years and its amount is 100% of 
previous CIGS for the first 12 months and 80% afterwards (INPS, 2015g). 
35 There is no minimum income scheme but several income-based benefits provided at the regional 
and municipal level. In Bologna these include: public transport discounts, internet and phone 
discounts, electricity, gas and water discounts, income support schemes, family income support if  the 
household includes at least three dependent children, subsidised pre-paid debit card (social card), 
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Overall, the different characteristics of the public unemployment benefit schemes in the two 
countries can be said to engender diverse institutional disadvantages for TA workers. The UK, 
through a mostly means-tested unemployment protection system, allows all unemployed 
people on a low income to access UBs. Having a regular working history and having paid 
contributions is not a relevant requirement, thus allowing TA workers to have access to public 
unemployment protection comparable to that of standard workers, provided they are on a low 
income. This, as we have seen in chapter 2, section 2.6.3, has been argued in the dualism 
literature to limit the divide between standard and atypical workers. Therefore, we expect a 
limited experienced divide in unemployment protection for TA workers in the UK. By 
contrast, the Italian unemployment protection system has been said to create a divide between 
those who have and those who have not accrued enough social insurance contributions, leaving 
those with limited contribution histories mostly unprotected, disproportionally affecting 
people with irregular employment paths.  
Moreover, while in the UK, provided that the person is on a low income, a TA worker has 
access to a range of means-tested benefits and to activation policies, with little or no difference 
compared to a standard worker; in Italy, TA workers have access to generous unemployment 
benefits only if they satisfy contributory requirements, leaving a TA worker with a limited 
contribution history with limited protection and providing limited opportunities to re-enter the 
labour market through unenforced activation policies. These factors can further contribute to 
increasing the perceived divide with standard workers. 
A further protection in case of unemployment can be argued to be redundancy pay, as it is 
provided when an employment relationship is terminated. Redundancy pay regulations differ 
markedly between the two countries. In Italy, redundancy pay is available to all employees 
from the beginning of the employment relationship and thus is also available to all TA workers 
(INPS, 2017d). By contrast, in the UK, redundancy pay is only available to workers who have 
been employed for at least two years by the same employer (GOV.UK, 2017). This means that 
only when TA workers have worked continuously for the same agency for over two years, do 
they become eligible for redundancy pay. It can be argued that here the divide depends on 
tenure rather than on the employment status, similarly to what we have seen for unfair 
dismissal.  
                                                            
family discounts if with at least two dependent children (family card), exemptions from health-care 
out-of-pocket payments, micro-credit schemes, social housing and housing benefits. Despite the long 
list, none of these benefits is generous, they are not integrated and they are strongly dependent on 




Table 5. Income protection in case of unemployment in Italy and the UK, and between 
standard and TA workers 




‐ Contribution-based UBs 
‐ Income-based UBs 
‐ Other means-tested 
benefits 
‐ Redundancy pay (after 2 
years of employment) 
‐ Contribution-based UBs 
‐ Wage guarantee funds (only 
for some*) 
‐ (Limited) means-tested 
benefits 
‐ Redundancy pay 
Benefits available 
to TA workers 
‐ Contribution-based UBs 
‐ Income-based UBs 
‐ Other means-tested 
benefits 
‐ Redundancy pay (after 2 
years of employment) 
‐ Contribution-based UBs 
‐ (Limited) means-tested 
benefits 
‐ Redundancy pay 
*Mostly manufacturing workers in medium and large firms. Source: Own elaboration 
 
        4.7.2 Protection in Case of Sickness 
Income protection in case of sickness differs considerably in the two countries. While in the 
UK the system is characterised by a basic flat-rate benefit which can be topped up by earnings-
related private schemes, in Italy the system is earnings-related and it aims at preserving 
roughly the same income previously earned with a combination of both public and 
occupational benefits.  
In the UK, a TA worker is entitled to receive Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) (£86.70 per week) if 
she has not worked for at least 4 days in a row36. The worker will be entitled to SSP if she has 
earned at least £109 on average a week in the 8 weeks before she got sick. There is no minimum 
time the worker has to have worked for the employer in order to receive SSP.  The employer 
is obliged to pay the SSP for up to 28 weeks37 (GOV, 2015b). However, as already explained, 
                                                            
36 Including non-working days. 
37 Different rules apply to agricultural workers. 
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given that TA workers are not legally employees, they are not entitled to contractual sick pay. 
Contractual sick pay schemes may vary considerably from employer to employer, as their 
provision is discretionary. Furthermore, not all employers provide occupational sickness 
schemes, meaning that being an employee does not necessarily mean having access to 
contractual sick pay. It has been calculated that around 70% of employees receive some form 
of occupational sick pay (Clasen, 2016). 
In Italy, while statutory sick pay is regulated by law, the amount of sickness benefit actually 
received by a worker is also partly regulated by national sectoral collective agreements, which 
stipulate the complementary amount of money the employer (the agency for TA workers) has 
to pay. SSP is covered for all days during which the TA worker is sick (except the first 3, for 
which the worker continues to be paid by the agency38) up to the number of days the person 
has worked in the year before the sick leave (with a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 180). 
Between the 4th and the 20th day, the worker is paid 75% of daily earnings (paid 50% by SSP 
and 50% by the agency), while from the 21st day onwards the person is paid 100% of previous 
daily earnings but 66.67% of the amount is paid from statutory benefit and the rest is paid by 
the agency. The same rates apply to permanent workers, the only difference lies in the duration, 
as the permanent worker is entitled to up to 180 days (INPS, 2015h).  
As regards SSP only, Italy and the UK both provide equal treatment between TA and standard 
workers. Nevertheless, while in Italy SSP is earnings-related in the UK it only provides a 
limited flat-rate amount.  However, the main difference in protection lies in the fact that TA 
workers are legally regarded as employees in the Italian case but not in the British one, leaving 
them with a different entitlement to contractual sick pay. While in Italy the agency must 
complement SSP with a generous occupational payment (keeping the replacement rate at 75-
100% of earnings) which is equivalent to that available to standard employees, in the UK the 
worker is only entitled to the flat-rate SSP, as she is not legally considered an employee. 
Therefore, while in Italy there does not appear to be any institutional divide in protection in 
case of sickness compared to standard employees, in the UK an intersecting divide can be 
argued to exist when it comes to contractual sick pay. There is a divide between employees 
and workers, given that the latter are not legally entitled to contractual sick pay. There is also 
a second divide, dependent on employers. Only employees whose employer provides 
contractual sick pay can be regarded as ‘insiders’, while all other can be regarded as 
                                                            
38 The worker is paid 100% of daily pay for the first two ‘sickness events’ in the year. For the 3rd is 
paid 66.6% and for the 4th only 50% of daily earnings. From the 5th onwards the worker is not paid. 
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‘outsiders’. Thus, in the UK, the group of insiders can be said to comprise only a sub-set of 
employees. 
This enables me to refine the hypotheses from the dualism literature claiming that, when 
considering the high reliance on occupational benefits during sickness in Liberal countries, the 
divide in income protection compared to Southern European countries is larger. By comparing 
the characteristics of sick pay for TA workers in the UK and in Italy, I hypothesise that TA 
workers in the UK experience deeper disadvantages as they are excluded from contractual sick 
pay and only have access to ungenerous flat-rate SSP. Nevertheless, we have to consider that 
not all standard workers in the UK are ‘insiders’ when it comes to protection against sickness 
and that the experienced divide among TA workers might depend on whether or not the 
employer offers contractual sick pay schemes to its employees. 
 
Table 6. Income protection in case of sickness in Italy and the UK, and between standard 
and TA workers 




‐ Flat-rate SSP  
‐ (Often) contractual sick pay 
‐ Earnings-related SSP 
‐ Contractual sick pay 
Benefits available 
to TA workers 
‐ Flat-rate SSP  
‐ Contractual sick pay if the 
employer discretionally 
offers it also to TA workers 
 
‐ Earnings-related SSP 
‐ Contractual sick pay 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
       4.7.3 Protection in Retirement 
Income protection in retirement is differently structured in the two countries. In the UK, the 
system is characterised by a basic public benefit, which is complemented by a more generous 
earnings-related scheme which can be public or occupational and finally by a voluntary private 
scheme. In Italy, the income protection is also organised through a three-pillar system, but the 
contribution-based public pension plays a dominant role, as the take-up rate of occupational 
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and private pensions is comparatively low (Cesari et al., 2007; Natali and Stamati, 2013). TA 
workers in the UK can rely on the basic public pension, the earnings-related public pension 
and they can enroll into private schemes, but they are not entitled to occupational schemes as 
they are not legally regarded as employees. By contrast, TA workers in Italy rely mostly on 
the contribution-based public pension, while this can be topped-up by occupational and private 
pensions.  
In the UK, the first pillar is constituted by the Basic State Pension (BSP). The BSP is a 
contribution-based benefit which provides flat-rate protection for wage earners. In 2015, the 
BSP reaches a maximum of £115.95 per week if the worker has contributed for at least 30 
years39 (GOV, 2015c). The second pillar is the State Second Pension (S2P) or Additional State 
Pension (Natali, 2012). The S2P was introduced in 2002 to substitute the previous State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). The S2P was meant to top up the BSP with an 
earnings-related component, providing additional public pension income in retirement. 
However, workers could decide to contract out of the scheme by either joining an occupational 
scheme provided by their employer or by a private additional pension plan (APP) with a 
stakeholder or a personal pension scheme. The latter option was discontinued in 2012 (Natali, 
2012). Following a further pension reform (Pensions Act 2014), starting from April 2016, the 
two state components will be merged into one flat-rate state pension.  
An occupational contribution-based pension may be provided by the employer. Occupational 
schemes can be either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. TA workers do not 
generally have access to occupational schemes provided by their hirers as they are not legally 
regarded as employees. Nevertheless, it has to be highlighted that not all employers provide 
occupational schemes to their employees. It has been calculated that, in 2010, 59% of all 
employees had access to occupational schemes (Guardiancich, 2010). Nonetheless, a recent 
reform in the pension system has introduced auto-enrolment in occupational pension schemes, 
with which all employers will automatically enrol all their workers into a workplace pension 
schemes (Pensions Act 2008). This will oblige agencies, as legal employers, to provide 
occupational pension schemes to their workers. Nevertheless, the reform is still in a phase-in 
period and it will be fully implemented only in 2018. The third pillar is the private one, to 
which workers can contribute individually on a voluntary basis. Pensioners on a low income 
may apply for a range of means-tested benefits40 to complement their income (Natali, 2012). 
                                                            
39 Lower amounts apply if the maximum amount of contribution has not been paid (GOV, 2015c).   
40 Pension Credit can be regarded the main form of income for pensioners on a low income. The 
benefit is meant to top up both public and private pension income. It has two components: a 
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Compared to the British pension system, the Italian one has been historically a single public 
pillar system, but the situation has started to change in the past few decades (Natali and 
Stamati, 2013). The public pension system is contribution-based and the generosity of the 
pension strictly depends on the amount of contributions paid. Several reforms have been 
implemented to improve the financial sustainability of the public pension system in the past 
two decades, including the switch from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system in 
1995 (the so-called Dini reform). Nevertheless, these reforms will translate into much less 
generous public pension provisions for future pensioners (Jessoula, 2012).  
To compensate for less generous public pension provisions, successive governments have tried 
to incentivise the take-up of contribution-based supplementary schemes, both occupational 
and private, moving the pension system from a single to a multi-pillar one (Cesari et al., 2007).  
Among these, there is the possibility to transfer part of the redundancy pay being accrued into 
funded schemes (Natali and Stamati, 2013). Nonetheless, these reforms have had only limited 
results, especially for temporary workers and workers in the service sector in general, where 
only a minor percentage of workers have opted for supplementary pension schemes (Jessoula, 
2012; Natali and Stamati, 2013). Jessoula (2012) argues that only workers who have regularly 
contributed during all their working life to both public and supplementary schemes, who have 
uninterrupted careers and who have earned at least average wages, can expect to receive in the 
next decades pensions whose amount can guarantee adequate income protection in retirement. 
However, a scheme of means-tested social allowance exists for the needy elderly, meant to 
complement insufficient incomes in order to reach a living minimum of €516 per month for 
those above 7041 (INPS, 2015i) but, as we have already discussed, other means-tested benefits 
for people on a low income are limited. 
When comparing retirement protection for pensioners on a low income in Italy and in the UK, 
although they both provide basic flat-rate income protection in retirement, the availability of 
complementary means-tested benefits in the UK, which are absent in Italy, make low-income 
pensioners in the British context better protected. However, TA workers in the UK do not have 
access to occupational schemes, making them mostly rely on the state basic pension, the state 
second pension or on complementary voluntary private schemes, while in Italy workers are 
entitled to a contributory public pension, whose strong dependence on contributions paid limits 
                                                            
Guarantee Credit, which is an income-based benefit, and a Savings-Credit, which is a form of inverse 
means-tested benefit for those who have invested into private schemes (GOV.UK, 2017d). Other 
means-tested benefits, such as housing benefits and Council Tax benefits are also available for 
pensioners on a low income.  
41 €417 for those between 65 and 70 years old. 
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income protection for those with irregular contributions histories. Nevertheless, TA workers 
have access to both occupational and private schemes, similarly to standard workers. 
This enables the refinement of the initial hypotheses. The hypotheses from the dualism 
literature state that, on the one hand, when considering public schemes only, atypical workers 
in Liberal countries tend to face a smaller institutional divide compared to standard workers 
vis-à-vis those in Southern Europe. However, when considering also private schemes, 
including occupational schemes, the situation is reversed. Following the analysis of the 
pension structure in the two countries, I hypothesise that in both countries TA workers face a 
disadvantage in income protection in retirement compared to standard employees. However, 
while in Italy the disadvantage comes from the likelihood of irregular contribution histories, 
in the UK it comes also from a lack of access to occupational pension schemes, in case the 
hirer provides any. The situation is bound to change in the future with the full implementation 
of the auto-enrolment system, but this will not compensate the disadvantage accrued in pension 
contribution in previous years. 
 
Table 7. Income protection in retirement in Italy and the UK, and between standard and 
TA workers 




‐ Basic State Pension 
‐ State Second Pension 
‐ (Often) occupational 
pension 
‐ (Voluntary) private 
pension 
‐ Contribution-based public 
pension 
‐  Occupational pension 
‐ (Voluntary) private pension 
 
Benefits available 
to TA workers 
‐ Basic State Pension 
‐ State Second Pension 
‐  (Voluntary) private 
pension 
‐ Contribution-based public 
pension 
‐ Occupational pension 
‐ (Voluntary) private pension 







The analysis of the institutional framework in which TAW is embedded in Italy and the UK 
allowed me to identify several institutional divides between TA and standard workers in the 
two countries. These divides can be said to broadly reflect those identified in the dualism 
literature for Liberal and Southern European countries and discussed in the analytical 
framework (see chapter 2, section 2.6). Nevertheless, some specificities of this two-country 
comparison have to be highlighted.  
Firstly, a number of differences between Italy and the UK could be attributed to the different 
legal status of TA workers. In Italy, TA workers are legally defined as fixed-term employees 
and this entitles them to all the same employment rights as other employees. Furthermore, both 
national legislation and collective agreements have long established equal treatment with 
comparable workers, removing any form of discrimination between different categories of 
employees. However, in the UK, these workers have a rather ill-defined employment status, 
which prevents them from being entitled to some of standard workers’ employment rights. 
Thus, it appears that the legal status of TAW can contribute to shaping a divide between 
standard and TA workers, which goes beyond the standard vs. atypical dichotomy discussed 
in the dualism literature. Legislative reforms following European directives have contributed 
to reducing the divide between standard and TA workers’ rights, but important forms of 
discrimination still persist, including a delayed access of 12 weeks to equal pay and equal 
working time. Moreover, a number of rights and entitlements in the UK are dependent on 
tenure. Workers can only claim redundancy pay or unfair dismissal after 2 years of continuous 
employment. This disproportionally affects workers in short-term jobs, including TA workers.  
Furthermore, collective representation for TA workers can be said to be more limited in the 
UK compared to Italy though this partly reflects a more limited role of collective bargaining 
in the British context in general. However, union federations representing TA workers in Italy 
can be argued to have a more limited voice in bargaining practices compared to union 
federations representing workers in a specific sector, possibly allowing for a greater divide in 
collective representation between standard and TA workers in Italy than in the UK. Therefore, 
it is not clear in which of the two countries TA workers might experience a deeper 
disadvantage.  
Finally, when it comes to income protection, the countries broadly reflect the characteristics 
of their respective welfare regimes. In Italy, divides can be said to be predominantly dependent 
on the workers’ contribution history. In the UK, the legal employment status of TAW appears 
to play an important role in shaping the divide with standard workers, as it does not allow TA 
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workers to access occupational schemes. Nevertheless, the status of ‘insider’ also strongly 
depends on the employer’s provision of occupational schemes, as not all standard employees 
have access to them. Therefore, in the UK, there appears to be two intersecting divides, one 

























5. Employment Experience 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This first empirical chapter compares the experience of TA workers in the two countries as 
regards employment. Firstly, I describe their employment experience in terms of the typical 
employment paths these workers follow. As we will see, two main paths have been identified, 
one of which was only present in the Italian context. These two employment paths, which I 
have labelled ‘precariously unstable’ and ‘precariously stable’, present very different 
characteristics and these in turn affect the experience of the workers in radically different ways, 
not just within the employment dimension but also in the work and the income protection 
dimension, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Secondly, I explore the role TAW 
has along those paths, and how this is affected by the opportunities and constraints offered by 
the employment regulation frameworks. Four main roles can be identified but with partly 
different characteristics and prevalence in the two countries: stepping stone into atypical 
employment, stepping stone into standard employment, trap in a cycle of employment-
unemployment, trap in temporary employment. In two of those roles, namely stepping stone 
into standard employment and trap in temporary employment, the different employment 
regulation frameworks appear to shape the possibility of transitions into standard employment, 
with Italian workers finding it more difficult to move into standard employment compared to 
the British workers. Nonetheless, for the other two roles, no systematic difference was found 
between the two countries, with similar stepping stone and trap effects both in Italy and in the 
UK.  
After discussing the role of TAW in the transitions between employment statuses, the analysis 
focuses on the experience of TA workers from a static perspective. Here I discuss the 
disadvantages associated with being a TA worker, in terms of employment precariousness. As 
will become clear, the experience varies depending on the employment path followed by the 
workers, rather than on the country. The ‘precariously unstable’ face similar disadvantages in 
the two countries, while the ‘precariously stable’, only found in Italy, experience partly 
different disadvantages. Finally, I discuss the role of public employment services as an 
alternative to TAs in employment. Workers in both countries made no use of public 
employment services, preferring to look for jobs independently or through TAs. Despite this 
similar experience, the reasons for this lack of use is caused by a very different perception of 
public employment services in Italy and the UK, which can be traced back to the different 
organisation of these services in the two countries. 
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 analyses the workers’ employment paths, the 
‘precariously unstable’ path (section 5.2.1) and the ‘precariously stable’ one (section 5.2.2).  
Section 5.3 considers the role TAW worked played in the workers’ paths. More specifically, 
section 5.3.1 focuses on the role of TAW as a stepping stone into employment, section 5.3.2 
shows the role of TAW as a stepping stone into standard employment and section 5.3.3 
analyses the role of TAW as a trap in a cycle of employment-unemployment. Section 5.3.4 
investigates TAW as a trap in temporary employment. For each of these roles, the experience 
of interviewees is compared across the two countries. Section 5.4 analyses in detail the 
workers’ individual disadvantages in terms of employment precariousness. Section 5.5 
considers the perceived role of public employment services. Finally, section 5.6 draws the 
conclusions. 
 
5.2 Employment Paths 
Being a TA worker did not generally represent the only experience of employment in the life 
of the interviewees. Interviewees had often done several jobs throughout their working life, 
both temporary and open-ended. Even within temporary jobs, TAW was seldom the only type 
of contract workers faced. Therefore, in order to fully grasp their experience as well as the 
disadvantages it entailed, we have to first consider TAW within the interviewees’ wider 
employment history, and the role TAW played along their employment paths. In both the 
Italian and the British case, workers may have experienced several types of temporary 
contracts besides TAW. More specifically, in the British case, they may have been employed 
as directly-hired temporary workers or through zero-hour contracts, while in the Italian case 
they might have worked as directly hired temporary workers, through a cooperative or as 
parasubordinati, as we will see in detail in the following sections. It is worth mentioning that 
informal work was rare in both countries, although it was more common in the Italian case, as 
expected from secondary literature (Matsaganis et al., 2003; Prosser, 2016). However, none of 
the interviewees in either case had ever been employed in an informal job on a full-time basis. 
Informal jobs were generally used in periods of part-time employment or, when in very low-
paid jobs, to top up earnings, but they were never the main source of income aside from one 
case.  
Having more than one job at the same time was not common, especially when already in a 
full-time contract. In this case, complementary jobs for a few hours a week were taken in order 
to supplement income. Instead, more common was the situation in which a worker had been 
doing more than one part-time job at the same time. In these situations, generally two or three 
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different jobs were done weekly, though in one case six jobs were taken, on different 
assignments and on a mostly temporary basis. Thus, working full-time does not have to 
necessarily be equated with having a full-time contract, as several part-time jobs might be done 
in the same week to reach a full-time equivalent.  
Despite these idiosyncratic differences, two main employment paths could be identified within 
the sample. In the first one, which I called the ‘precariously unstable’, workers moved between 
different jobs, mostly temporary, but in some cases also permanent, generally alternating with 
periods of inactivity or, more commonly, unemployment. In the second group, which I called 
the ‘precariously stable’, workers stayed in the same job on a temporary contract for a long 
period of time, but they were never able to secure a permanent position. In the following sub-
sections, I describe in detail these two employment paths as they are important for 
understanding the experience of interviewees and the types of disadvantage they faced. I will 
refer to these two groups of workers throughout the empirical analysis where significant 
differences have been identified in the disadvantages faced. 
 
    5.2.1 The ‘Precariously Unstable’ 
In the first type of employment path, which was found in both countries, workers experienced 
several changes of employment status within their employment history. They might have been 
employed in temporary assignments, a few months or several years apart, experiencing 
unemployment (or inactivity) in between different employment contracts. Some of them might 
have been employed on one or more permanent contracts for up to several years, before 
moving back to temporary employment. These ‘precariously unstable’ workers followed an 
employment path similar to the one illustrated in Figure 1, moving in and out of employment 
on an irregular basis, although not all of them managed to ever experience permanent 
employment. 







The length of employment as well as unemployment and inactivity periods varied greatly both 
between individuals and within the same individual across time. Periods of employment might 
have lasted from a few hours for a one-off assignment to a few decades for a permanent job. 
Even when just considering TAW, a large variation in the duration of employment spells 
applies, as assignments might have lasted from a few hours to several months, or many years, 
as we will see specifically for some interviewees in the Italian case. Also unemployment spells 
varied widely. Sometimes unemployment lasted just a day or two if the individual was able to 
secure another job straight away. At other times, several months or even years passed before 
the individual was able to find another job. Periods of inactivity, which tended to be rarer than 
unemployment, lasted on average longer than periods of unemployment, as sickness, training, 
education, relocation and caring responsibilities took longer periods of time and lasted from a 
few days (in the case of short-term sickness or an intense training course) to many years (e.g. 
long-term sickness or long-term caring responsibilities). These ‘precariously unstable’ 
workers constituted the majority of interviewees in the sample. More interestingly for the 
comparative analysis, all workers in the UK belonged to this group, while in Italy they were 
the majority of interviewees. I will return to this relevant comparative difference later in the 
chapter. 
 
     5.2.2 The ‘Precariously Stable’ 
The second type of employment path could only be identified in the Italian case. Workers 
following this employment path presented a very regular employment history compared to the 
previous group, being employed in the same job for a long time, and they rarely, if ever, 
experienced periods of unemployment (or inactivity) (see Figure 2). However, workers in this 
group were unable to secure a permanent contract even after years of employment in the same 
job, always being employed on temporary contracts. As we will see in more detail later in this 
chapter, within this employment path, TAW generally constituted only one of several types of 













5.3 Role of TAW in the Workers’ Employment Paths 
The role TAW had along workers’ employment paths was dependent on the reasons of clients 
for hiring those workers, in line with what already been argued in the literature (see, for 
instance, Debels, 2005; Mitlacher, 2007). The main uses clients make of TAW have been 
identified in chapter 4 section 4.2. From the empirical analysis, I could identify several roles 
TAW played along the interviewees’ employment paths, depending on the type of use clients 
made of it: stepping stone into atypical employment, stepping stone into standard employment, 
trap in a cycle of employment-unemployment and trap in temporary employment. Given that 
my empirical analysis did not entail interviews with actual clients, I cannot affirm with utter 
certainty the actual reasons behind clients’ use of TAW. However, triangulation between 
workers, temporary agency staff and unions allowed me to identify four roles.  
As is shown below, for two of those roles the different employment regulations were an 
important factor in providing different opportunities for transition into standard employment. 
More specifically, in the Italian case, the fact that TAW was used as a substitute for standard 
employment delayed the possibility of transition to standard employment, in certain cases even 
for several years, while in the UK  it did not appear to be the case. Nevertheless, for the other 
two roles, TAW was experienced similarly in the two countries, regardless of the different 
employment regulation frameworks. The findings only partly confirmed hypotheses from the 
analytical framework, which expected workers to feel more trapped in atypical employment 
in Southern Europe than in Liberal countries. Although this is overall true, given that TA 
workers in Italy found it more difficult to move to standard employment even after years in 
the same job, the empirical analysis provides a more complex picture.  
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Firstly, we need to consider that, no matter the reasons for hiring, TAW had an important 
stepping-stone function: that of moving people from unemployment to employment. If a 
person, who would otherwise be unemployed, was able to find a job through a temporary 
agency, then TAW can be said to have had a stepping stone effect along that person’s 
employment path, regardless of the possibilities of future stabilisation. Nevertheless, the 
movement into employment might be very short-term and the person might experience 
repeated spells of unemployment in between assignments. The experience of these workers 
was similar in both countries, showing that, regardless of the employment regulation 
frameworks, TAW can be argued to reduce the divide with standard workers, helping the 
unemployed re-enter employment, albeit on a temporary basis.  
When clients used TAW as a screening tool, TAW functioned as a stepping stone into standard 
employment, as workers were recruited with the purpose of testing their ability to work, their 
effort, commitment and all other aspects which were relevant for a job but could not be known 
in advance. Within this context, the worker also had the chance to try out a job and assess 
whether it fulfilled her demands, interests and expectations. Should the matching be 
successful, the temporary employment relationship was transformed into a standard one. As 
we will see, a few of these cases were found in the two case studies. However, despite 
similarities, we can trace differences between the two countries, which are mostly related to 
the amount of time needed and the probability that the temporary assignment was turned into 
a more stable position. The experience of these workers is in line with hypotheses from the 
dualisation literature showing that TA workers in Italy experience more difficulties than TA 
workers in the UK in moving from atypical to standard employment (e.g. Alboni et al. 2008; 
Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Leschke, 2009). 
When TAW was used as a buffer against the volatility of labour demand and supply, TAW 
functioned as a trap in a cycle of employment and unemployment. Workers did not have the 
opportunity to reach a more stable employment position, as they were constantly moving from 
one job to another, without opportunities for stabilisation. In those cases, the different 
employment regulation frameworks did not appear to influence their experience in 
systematically different ways, in contrast to the hypothesis that TA workers in Italy feel more 
trapped in temporary employment compared to their British counterparts. In both countries, 
workers felt unable to have any job continuity and to develop any career path. As we will see 
later on (see section 5.4.1), they were also the ones experiencing the worst disadvantages in 
terms of employment precariousness.  
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Finally, where TAW was used by clients as a substitute for standard employment, TAW 
functioned as a trap in atypical employment for the workers. Here, the hirer did not have an 
interest in making the employment relationship permanent, as TAW was used as a more 
convenient alternative to standard employment. Therefore, the workers were kept in temporary 
employment as long as legally possible. These cases were only found in Italy, confirming 
hypotheses from the dualism literature, which expect a situation of ‘trap’ to be more wide-
spread and entrenched in Italy (Alboni et al. 2008; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). These workers 
can be said to epitomise the employment segmentation of Southern European labour markets, 
as workers were unable to reach stable employment even after years in the same job. As we 
will see later on in the chapter (see section 5.4.2), their experience of precariousness was still 
very different from the previous groups, highlighting how the employment regulation 
framework affects their experience by creating specific disadvantages.  
The close connection between the type of clients’ use of TAW, possibilities of transition and 
resulting employment paths may now seem clear. The ‘precariously unstable’ generally 
experienced TAW in many different roles, being sometimes a stepping stone into employment, 
regardless of the reasons for hiring, or a stepping stone into permanent employment when 
clients hired them to screen future employees. At other times, it was a trap in a cycle of 
employment-unemployment when workers hired them as buffer in case of labour shortages. 
Certainly, when hirers are screening for future employees, they might pick from previous TA 
workers used as buffers (Debels, 2005). However, in all cases the workers had to go through 
a new trial period on a temporary contract, limiting the stepping stone effect of previous 
employment experiences with that hirer. By contrast, the ‘precariously stable’ experienced 
TAW only as a trap, as clients used TAW as a substitute for standard employment.  The next 
few sections will analyse in detail the experience of TA workers in each of these cases.  
The different roles TAW played along the interviewees’ employment paths and its close 
association with the clients’ reasons for use of TAW are summarised in Table 8. As is shown, 
just by considering the sheer number of cases, the role played by TAW presents both 
similarities and differences between the two countries. On the one hand, the roles of TAW as 
a stepping stone into employment and stepping stone into unemployment were remarkably 
frequent in both countries, partly due to the fact that individuals might have been employed 
on several short-term TA assignments. On the other hand, the role of TAW as a stepping stone 
into standard employment was more common in the British case, while the role of TAW as a 







































Own elaboration. *The number of cases does not equal the number of interviewees as some 
interviewees might have experienced TAW in multiple roles 
 
    5.3.1 TAW as a Stepping Stone into Employment 
In both countries, regardless of the reasons why the clients hired the worker, TAW played an 
important role in the interviewee’s life, that of a gateway from unemployment to employment. 
In those cases, TAW was perceived as an important tool for entering or re-entering the labour 
market after a period of unemployment or inactivity, and it was experienced similarly in the 
two countries. Temporary agencies were considered the fastest and easiest way to match labour 
demand and supply and many interviewees in both countries thought most clients nowadays 
mostly rely on temporary agencies to find suitable employees rather than searching and 
selecting themselves. This finding is in line with the important gateway role of temporary 
agencies for the unemployed previously identified by some authors, for instance Gray (2002), 
who analysed the perceptions among formerly unemployed TA workers in the UK, or Fidan 
Elciogu (2010), who investigated TAW in the US labour market.   
As Paolo42, 36, claimed, ‘Finding a job by bringing your CV to the firm is simply very difficult, 
I tried, but with no results’ or Marco, 31, who said, ’Trying to find a job on your own is very 
difficult, as most firms nowadays recruit people through temporary agencies’. Employers were 
                                                            




thought to often ignore individual applications and to rely on external agencies for an initial 
selection of workers, at least for temporary positions. Thus, it can be argued that TAW was 
perceived by interviewees as an effective tool in searching for jobs, providing employment 
opportunities that would have been difficult to reach otherwise and a bridge between 
unemployment and employment. 
The ease of finding employment through a TA was interpreted partly based on the fact that the 
TA was acting as a powerful selecting mechanism of suitable candidates. Hence, once the 
agency had found a job match and the person had been invited to a job interview, the likelihood 
of being hired was perceived as higher than it would have been by an independent invitation 
by the employer. As Francesca, 41, clearly explained, ‘The TA is a sort of business card, where 
the hirer, this is my impression, the hirer feels safer and he hires you’. Besides being perceived 
as the preferred initial selection tool by many employers, temporary agencies were perceived 
as having access to relevant information, including job offers and open positions, that would 
not be available otherwise, or they would be difficult to find individually. ‘[TAs] are the 
easiest way to find a job, they have access to offers you would never find on your own’ (Maria, 
30). ‘I sent CVs to more than 30 employers but never heard back! [With the TAs] you get a 
job quicker!’ (Stewart). Thus, a temporary agency was similarly perceived in both countries 
as an important information broker in the labour market, both for clients and candidates, and 
this role facilitated transitions into employment for seven interviewees in each country. In 
those cases, we can see that TAW may serve the purpose of improving job matching within 
the labour market, helping people finding a job, albeit temporary, while providing clients with 
suitable candidates, therefore reducing costs for both clients and candidates. This function was 
also highlighted by Katrina, the manager of a small agency: 
 It’s quick and efficient. They [the clients] do not have to employ on a permanent basis 
to have additional help to cover sickness, holiday vacancy […]. They [the unemployed] 
need their confidence to keep going, to believe in themselves, to have some self-worth. 
They also need money. 
Both in Italy and in the UK, the fact that TAW allowed some workers to exit unemployment 
was experienced as a great advantage. ‘TAW is definitely better than no job. It’s not great, but 
at least it is a job’ (Paolo). ‘TAW brought me out of unemployment, this is not little [help]’ 
(Francesca). ’They helped me find a job. That was great!’ (Chris, 30).’ It gets you a job, that’s 
the important thing!’ (Stewart). For those workers, TAW was experienced as a tool for exiting 
a situation of severe disadvantage, providing at least a source of income and the opportunity 
to work rather than being unemployed. 
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It can be argued that in those situations, TAW was perceived as a way to reduce the divide 
with standard workers, bringing the person from a state of unemployment to a state of 
employment, albeit temporary. This is in line with what has previously been highlighted by 
other authors studying transitions in and out of atypical employment (Gray, 2002; Gash, 2005; 
Scherer, 2005), who have argued that TAW may be seen as a way to reduce the employment 
divide between standard workers and the unemployed, helping the unemployed re-entering the 
labour market. No systematic difference could be identified between workers in Italy and in 
the UK, suggesting that the role of TAW in reducing the divide was the same in both countries. 
The employment regulation framework did not appear to influence the experience of these 
workers. Therefore, it can be said that, when it comes to the transition from unemployment to 
temporary employment, TAW was experienced similarly in the two countries and in both cases 
it was seen as a stepping stone into employment. 
Nevertheless, although TAW was experienced as a tool for getting closer to the labour market, 
it was hardly ever conceived of as the final step. In fact, as we can see from the quotations 
above, this was not generally the employment status of choice but rather the only choice when 
no other option was available. This is in line with quantitative studies both in Italy and in the 
UK, which found the majority of adult temporary workers to be involuntarily employed on a 
temporary contract (Alboni et al., 2008; Di Nicola, 2011; Green and Livanos, 2015). As will 
be explained in more detail in section 5.4, TAW was not enough to make people feel fully 
integrated into the labour market, as almost all of them (with one important exception) were 
looking to become standard employees at some point, when the opportunity would become 
available.  
Despite the important job-matching function of temporary agencies, workers sometimes 
complained about the criteria used for job matching, and the sometimes poor matching outputs 
that it produced. For instance, the selection and matching for jobs were sometimes felt to be 
inaccurate and not well thought out. For instance, Francesca, who also worked as a temporary 
agency staff member, criticised the way in which the matching was sometimes made. 
They are busy, you know, they do not have time to look through all the CVs they have, 
to find the most suitable candidate. If they receive a call [from a client] who needs a 
cashier, the first person that enters the agency, they’ll ask: Do you wanna be a cashier? 
That’s how it goes. It’s not their fault, it’s just the way it works. 
The situation was similar in the British case, as explained by Tom, 31: ’I didn’t even have an 
interview for this temp job, I didn’t have an interview, they didn’t even need to interview me – 
it was like, yeah, take him.’ Although one might argue that job matching was not carefully 
selected in some cases, another interpretation could be that for many jobs provided by agencies 
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almost any candidate would be ‘good enough’ and it was not in the interest of either the client 
or the agency to spend resources on a more careful matching, this being at the expenses of the 
TA workers themselves. Although job offers could potentially be turned down by the 
candidate, the job description provided by the agency was often not detailed enough to 
distinguish between suitable and unsuitable activities.  
Thus, the asymmetry of information between the agency and the candidate was perceived as 
detrimental to the candidate, who felt forced to accept job offers with little knowledge of the 
duties involved. The interest of the agency was perceived as that of filling as many job 
positions as possible in order to receive agency fees, with little care for the preferences of the 
candidate. This contributed to the sense of feeling like a ‘number’, which was often mentioned 
by interviewees. This reflects findings from some authors in the precariousness literature, who 
highlighted that some of these workers felt like a commodity and not valued for the work they 
do (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Magatti and Fullin, 2002; Fidan Elciogu, 2010). As we will see in more 
detail in section 5.3.3, this contributed in certain cases to a perception of exploitation and of 
not being valued as a worker, further enhancing the willingness to find a permanent position. 
To conclude, in both countries TAW was perceived by a number of interviewees as a useful 
stepping stone from unemployment to employment, increasing the opportunities for the 
individual to find a job and providing access to job offers which were perceived as difficult to 
reach otherwise. This job-matching function was recognised and appreciated by many 
interviewees, despite the fact that some, as we have seen, criticised the methods and the criteria 
with which the matching was sometimes made. This brings us back to a consideration made 
by a number of authors (e.g. Gash, 2005; Scherer, 2005), that in analysing disadvantages in 
atypical employment we always have to consider the opportunity atypical employment might 
offer in exiting a situation which may be of even greater disadvantage – that of unemployment. 
Only by including a consideration of their previous experience of unemployment, can we fully 
understand the experience of atypical workers and the perception of their position within the 
labour market. For some of these workers, the alternative perceived experience was that of 
unemployment rather than standard employment.  
Thus, TAW was perceived as a tool for reducing the employment divide with standard 
employment, moving from a state of unemployment to a state of temporary employment. 
Within this context, the different institutional configurations in the two countries did not seem 
to shape the experience in systematically different ways, showing that, in both countries, TAW 
was experienced as a way to reduce the divide with standard workers. In that respect, it can be 
argued that, regardless of the employment regulation frameworks, TAW was experienced by 
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interviewees as the most effective tool in re-entering the labour market given that, as we have 
seen, the individual job search was considered a less attractive option and, as we will see in 
section 5.5, public employment services were not regarded as a suitable alternative. 
Nevertheless, TAW was not perceived as the final step into employment. All but one 
interviewee looked to become a standard employee sooner or later. 
 
    5.3.2 TAW as a Stepping Stone into Standard Employment 
For seven interviewees in the UK and four in Italy, TAW was experienced as a gateway into 
standard employment. People were employed as temporary workers from a few months to a 
few years before being employed on a permanent basis. A positive advantage recognised by 
these interviewees in both countries was the possibility to try a job without the commitment 
associated with a permanent contract. As Marco said, ’You are constrained only temporarily 
so if you do not like the job, or when the assignment is finished you’d rather not continue, 
because it is not your cup of tea, you can!’. Or Susanne, 38, who explained: ‘I thought, well, 
I’ll try it out, because I wouldn’t want to do something, commit myself to something unless it 
was right, so then that’s why I went to the temp agency’. In these situations, TAW was 
perceived as a tool for smoothening job matching, facilitating job trials. This is in line with an 
argument brought forward by some scholars (see for instance, Feldman et al., 1995; Marler et 
al., 2002) who have argued that flexibility might also be an advantage for some workers, as 
they can try different jobs, without committing to any. 
Furthermore, several interviewees, even those who had not experienced TAW as a stepping 
stone, recognised the right of the firm to see what workers are like, to test their degree of 
commitment, skills and effort, and thus to screen them before eventually making them 
permanent. ‘At the beginning, you know, the firm tries to test you, you have the first 3 months 
as a trial period…they see how you do, they have an idea of how you work’ (Fabio, 44). ‘A lot 
of places now will be like, your contract’s for 6 months and if we don’t like what you’ve done 
after 6 months, that’s you gone, type of thing’ (Andrew, 30). Therefore, interviewees perceived 
the role of TAW as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetries between the parts and as 
an effective way to promote job matching for future permanent hiring. As we will see later in 
chapter 6, section 6.2.1, the idea of being ‘on a trial’ also played an important role in the British 




However, despite similarities in the case studies in the perception of the role of TAW, the 
transition from TAW to standard employment was experienced as easier and faster in the UK. 
More interviewees in the British case compared to the Italian case managed to secure a more 
stable contract with the same client after a few months of temping, either through a permanent 
or through a (directly hired) temporary contract. In the latter case, the new contract duration 
was generally much longer than it would have been under a TA assignment, therefore 
providing a form of more stable employment compared to TAW. As Bryan, 35, who 
experienced stabilisation after some of his assignments, said: 
After 2 weeks of me being there on a temporary contract, they asked if I would change 
from being on a temporary contract with [the agency] to being on a short-term working 
contract with [the client]. So that meant that they would have to pay off [the agency], 
as a finder’s fee, but then they would be paying me directly and they would be able to 
pay me more. 
Or Lucy, 46: 
Yeah, I was temping for here nearly a year before I got it made into [a job]. It was like 
I got the job permanently. And then I had temped with [an agency] for 6 weeks at the 
[client] and the [client] did not like paying [the agency] the amount of money that they 
did. 
It was not possible to provide a systematic comparison of the agency fees in the two countries, 
both in terms of mark ups on hourly pay and as regards finder’s fees, as these are negotiated 
privately between agencies and hirers and they vary greatly among agencies, types of workers, 
occupations and clients. Nevertheless, from the interviews to both workers and other relevant 
stakeholders, no systematic difference could be identified between Italy and the UK. 
In the UK, clients did not find it convenient to have to pay agency fees and, after having ‘tried 
out’ a worker by renewing a few assignments, would they find the worker suitable, they tended 
to employ the person directly either through a permanent or through a (longer) temporary 
contract. This was confirmed by Katrina, the manager of a TA: ‘it is an expense for the client. 
It’s more expensive’. Therefore, the employment regulation framework in the British context 
did not create any institutional barrier to hiring workers directly and for permanent positions, 
while the costs associated with TAW appeared to encourage hirers to quickly hire the worker 
directly, should the match be successful.  
By contrast, in the Italian case, it seemed to be a common practice for a hirer to delay the 
hiring of workers on a permanent basis for as long as possible. Therefore, TA workers might 
have spent even a few years as temporary workers before being made permanent, sometimes 
changing several contracts before being able to get a permanent one. As Marco stated: 
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My colleagues kept asking me: are you still not permanent? You have been here for so 
long! […] I had to be one year, actually one year and a half, with a temporary agency, 
then another year [directly hired] temporary, then another six months [directly hired] 
temporary, before they made me permanent! 
Marco’s story was not an exception. Two other workers saw their opportunity to achieve 
permanent employment constantly delayed.. Firms seemed to avoid hiring workers on a 
permanent basis as long as legal constraints allowed for this, keeping the worker in temporary 
employment as long as legally possible. Therefore, in the Italian context, it appears that 
employers use TAW also a substitute for standard employment. This contributed to 
lengthening the experience of temporary employment even when hirers subsequently decided 
to hire the worker permanently, lengthening and making more uncertain the stepping stone 
effect of TAW. 
Overall, when comparing Italy and the UK, in both cases TAW was perceived by some 
interviewees as a stepping stone into standard employment. Interviewees in both countries 
recognised the role of TAW, on the one hand, as a tool for them to assess how the job would 
fit them before making a longer-term employment commitment while, on the other hand, a 
tool for hirers to evaluate suitable candidates for long-term positions. In that respect, it can be 
argued that TAW contributed to reducing the divide with standard workers in the long run, 
helping a number of interviewees access permanent employment. However, important 
differences were present in the two countries, which are in line with expectations from the 
dualism literature, that see transitions from atypical to standard employment as more difficult 
in Southern European labour markets compared with Liberal labour markets (Booth et al., 
2002; Güell and Petrongolo, 2005; Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; 
Leschke, 2009). In the UK, hirers tended not to find TAW a convenient option, reducing the 
time of use of TAW as much as possible. However, in the Italian case, hirers tended to delay 
direct hiring and especially permanent hiring. The role played by the employment regulations 
meant for TA workers that transitions to more stable employment were experienced as easier 
and faster in the British context compared to the Italian one, providing a better stepping stone 
in the former. Thus, even in the minority of cases where the stepping stone effect was present, 
workers in Italy experienced delayed and more uncertain prospects of stabilisation.  
A complementary explanation might be found in the fact that the British and the Italian 
economies were at different points in the economic cycle at the time of the interviews, with 
Italy still facing recession, while the UK was already recovering from the economic crisis. 
This might have affected the willingness of employers to hire workers permanently given the 
dire economic situation. Nevertheless, this cannot be the main explanation. In fact, some of 
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these situations refer to either the years before the crisis or those immediately after, when the 
strain on employment demand was still not high and roughly comparable between the two 
countries. Thus, the economic crisis may have aggravated a situation which was already 
present in the Italian context, rather than causing it.  
 
5.3.3 TAW and the Employment-Unemployment Trap 
For the majority of interviewees in both countries, TAW did not represent a first step towards 
more stable employment but rather a trap in a cycle of temporary employment and 
unemployment. People experiencing this employment-unemployment cycle moved in and out 
of work quite frequently. TAW was thus intertwined with periods of unemployment and other 
temporary, generally short-term, employment experiences. Here, I quote the examples of 
Francesca and Bryan, which illustrate these very irregular employment paths. As Francesca 
described her employment experience: 
With the [agency 1] I was under [client 1] and then the employer wanted to reduce the 
staff and they couldn’t hire me, but I spent there almost a year. And then with [agency 
2] I was at [client 2] for about a year and then with [agency 3] at [client 3] but only 
for a few months […] Then I was in the summer period employed with [agency 4] at 
[client 4] as a holiday substitution for 3 months… And after that in October I was at 
[client 5] with [agency 5] but there I left the job very soon as they were soon firing all 
TA workers and by that time I had found a job with [agency] for the client where I am 
right now. 
Or Bryan who said: 
So December 2012 to January 2013 I worked at [client 1] - that was covering for 
someone who was off work ill, so he came back to work, and so they didn’t need me 
anymore, so I found a job at a different agency for [client 2]. That was for 2 weeks 
because I got a phone call from the previous agency saying that they wanted me back 
at [client 1]. The guy was off ill again – would I come back? – And I spoke to the Chief 
Executive at [client 2] and he said that there would not be any permanent opportunities 
for me at [client 2]. […] Then I went back to [client 1] and that was for a month, a 
month and a half […] and then the guy came back again, so they didn’t need me 
anymore, but what they did say was that if the guy left [client 1] then they would not be 
looking to employ someone full-time to replace him – the job wouldn’t be there for me 
permanently. 
These continuous changes of employment were due to the fact many TA jobs in both countries 
were not meant to become permanent but just to provide the clients with more flexibility in 
labour use. The client might not be looking for permanent employees, but it might just need 
workers to cover permanent staff temporarily not available (as in Bryan’s case) or it might 
need workers for a brief period or for a specific activity, lasting from a few hours to several 
months (as in Francesca’s case). This use of TAW is the one welcomed by advocates of labour 
125 
 
flexibilisation (e.g. Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) who argue 
that temporary work arrangements can help employers adapt to fluctuations in labour demand 
and supply. Many TA positions interviewees held were meant to provide short and medium-
term workforce in case, on the one hand, labour supply decreased or as regular employees 
were sick, on parental leave or on annual leave or, on the other hand, when labour demand 
temporarily increased as work was needed for specific irregular activities (such as shop 
assisting during holiday periods), short-term projects (e.g. clearing an archive) or for one-off 
events (such as catering for an event).  
In those cases, the role of TAW was experienced as a trap in a cycle of employment-
unemployment, as workers did not feel able to secure a more stable position, and they felt 
stuck in repeated spells of unemployment in between relatively short-lived temporary jobs. 
Nevertheless, their temporary assignments were not perceived necessarily as unfair, as they 
recognised the employers’ need to cover for temporary labour shortages. However, in the case 
of very short assignments, lasting from a few hours to a few days, sometimes their perception 
was that of being completely disposable, at the clients’ needs’ mercy, without being able to 
experience any job continuity. As Giulia, 41, explained: 
They called me to stand in for a worker for a day […] Then, they kept recalling me each 
time for a day or maybe two. At that point I said that I wouldn’t do it, basta! I said they 
would either call me for longer substitutions but I wouldn’t go just for a day. I don’t 
think it was fair towards me, this is not a job! I was a stopgap, I was not recognised as 
a worker. 
In both countries, although not all workers in that situation felt necessarily ‘used’ or 
‘exploited’ by the client or by the agency, they found it very difficult to cope with continuous 
job changes, sometimes even doing several different jobs on the same week, or even on the 
same day. Moreover, they felt disempowered in their ability to influence their career, although 
most of them, unlike Giulia, were constrained to accept any job offer in order to earn money. 
In these situations, workers complained of a feeling of being treated like ‘numbers’ by 
agencies, without any interest in what they required but purely catering to clients’ needs.  
In conclusion, the majority of interviewees in both countries, TAW was experienced as a trap 
in an employment-unemployment cycle. This cycle appears to be due to the hirers’ necessity 
of having a flexible ‘buffer’ of workers to rapidly adjust the labour force in case of labour 
shortages, without commitment to any long-term employment relationship. In these situations, 
workers had little or no chance of becoming permanent. This is in line with what has been 
highlighted by several authors in the precariousness literature (Pocock et al., 2005; Altieri, 
2009; Schildrick et al., 2012), showing atypical workers often trapped in a cycle of short-term 
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contracts and unemployment, for reasons of flexibility on the side of employers. This 
constituted what can be argued to be a divide between atypical and standard workers, with no 
opportunities of stabilisation for even very long periods. However, they did not perceive this 
divide as necessarily unfair, although for some of those employed in very short-term 
assignments there was a common perception of being disposable. 
The experience of a divide was similar in the two countries. The different employment 
regulation frameworks did not influence the experience of these workers in systematically 
different ways, as the behaviour of hirers was the same. Therefore, we can argue that, in those 
cases, the different employment regulations in the two countries did not affect the possibilities 
of transition from TAW to standard employment, as TAW was similarly experienced as a 
‘trap’ in both countries. This is in contrast to the hypothesis formulated in the analytical 
framework that atypical workers feel more trapped in Southern European countries than in 
Liberal countries. The findings clearly show the existence of a group of workers who feel 
similarly ‘trapped’ in atypical employment and whose situation does not appear to be affected 
by the different employment regulation frameworks. Thus, deregulated labour markets such 
as those in Liberal countries may be said to engender similar trap effects in atypical 
employment to Southern European labour markets, when employers are only using TA 
workers as buffers for labour shortages.  
 
5.3.4 TAW as a Trap in Temporary Employment 
In this category, we can find all the workers with a ‘precariously stable’ employment path, 
identified only in the Italian case. The experience of these six workers can be said to epitomise 
the concept of labour market dualism, where a group of workers is continuously unable to 
reach a more stable form of employment, even after years with the same hirer. However, their 
experience presented quite different characteristics from the ones already analysed. Although 
they had many temporary employment contracts throughout their career, their job position was 
stable, given that sometimes they had worked in the same occupation for several years, 
sometimes for more than a decade. Notwithstanding their long-term employment experience 
in the same job, they had not been able to secure a permanent position and it was unlikely that 
they would be made permanent in the future, at least in the medium term.  
As Rosanna, 44, explained: ‘I have worked here for more than ten years now, with several 
different contracts. In December my contract expires once again, and I know it will probably 
be renewed, but I cannot be sure. It is frustrating’. This situation was particularly severe in 
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the public sector where opportunities of employment stabilisation are highly restricted by 
concorsi pubblici (public competitions through exams to fill a number of permanent positions 
in the public sector). As Elisa, 52, said, ‘Every now and then, they did these [concorsi pubblici] 
to allow some workers to become permanent, but they were simply not enough to absorb us 
all [TA workers]’. Although these exams were organised with the objective of stabilising a 
share of the employees, generally only a minority of temporary workers were promoted. 
Moreover, they were run on an irregular basis and at a long temporal distance from each other, 
thus not allowing the worker any possibility to plan a career.  
Although the most extreme situations were only found in the public sector, where hiring 
procedures are strictly regulated by law, some examples could be found also in the private 
sector, particularly in medium and large firms, where employment protection for regular 
workers are quite strict. Workers may have changed employment contract frequently, without 
changing their actual job. Given the tight regulations and the limitations on the duration of 
most temporary contracts in the Italian labour market, employers kept renewing the same 
temporary contract as long as legally possible, then switching to a different type of 
employment contract, although the person kept working in the same job. This was in order to 
circumvent legislation limiting the overall duration of a temporary contract with the same 
employer. Indeed, both the Biagi law of 2003 and the Fornero law of 2012 set time limitations 
on the use of TAW, as TA contracts cannot last for more than 36 months including renewals43 
which is the same legal maximum duration of any temporary contract, after which the contract 
has to become permanent. Nonetheless, flaws in the legislation allow the possibility to let a 
temporary contract expire and afterwards to re-hire a worker on a different type of temporary 
contract, and to consequently restart the countdown of the time limit, de facto circumventing 
time limitations for temporary employment. As explained by Pietro, 59:  
I was working with a co.co.pro., then I became a cooperative worker but the job was 
the same, yes the job was exactly the same […] That lasted a year or so. Then I turned 
again into a co.co.pro. worker and finally into a TA worker […] but I continued to work 
for the same service, from 1999 until now. 
Or Dante, 48, who stated: 
I think I signed more than 20 renewals overall, including the cooperatives […] With 
[the cooperative] they were renewals of 3 months each, I had also one renewal that was 
2 months, the longest one was 8 months […] And then [the agency] came and even there 
it happened that we had to sign several renewals. 
                                                            
43 42 months in case the contract is not renewed more than twice in the first 24 months. 
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Both in the private and in the public sector, the most frequently used contract in alternation 
with TAW was the cooperative contract. The cooperative contract establishes that the worker 
becomes a member of a cooperative which provides a service for a firm or the public 
administration. As a member, the person can provide work for the cooperative (INPS, 2017c). 
Although the worker is legally an employee, and she is therefore entitled to all employees’ 
rights, the firing regulations are very loose compared to standard workers. Also the co.co.pro. 
(a parasubordinato contract) was often used, especially in occupations that required more 
specific tasks. The law limits the use of this type of contract where a specific project needs to 
be carried out temporarily or in order to achieve a specific objective (INPS, 2017b). 
Nevertheless, the general characteristics with which a ‘project’ is defined in the law has 
fostered an abuse in the use of this type of contract, as workers are sometimes hired for 
prolonged periods of time to carry out general tasks (Costantini, 2006). The worker hired on 
this contract is not formally an employee, but she is regarded as a quasi-self-employed worker, 
and she consequently has access to more limited employment and social protection than an 
employee (Fullin, 2004; Costantini, 2006).  
Compared to these two other types of contract, the TA contract was the one preferred by the 
workers, as it guaranteed at least equal treatment to permanent employees. For instance, Dante, 
who had been employed first with a cooperative and then with the agency, explained: ‘The 
situation has changed, the money has improved, now at least we get the same money as other 
workers’. Indeed, workers with a para-subordinato contract are regarded as self-employed in 
pay matters and are therefore not entitled to treatment equal to other workers, while workers 
with a cooperative contract are entitled to equal treatment with other cooperative workers but 
not with other workers in the public or private firm where they provide their service. This 
preference for TAW over other atypical contracts, which will be reiterated in the analysis of 
the work experience (see chapter 6, section 6.2), reminds us of the risk of compressing all 
atypical employment into one category, while in reality different atypical contracts provide 
different divides with standard employment (Zucchetti, 2006; Allmendinger et al., 2013; Hipp 
et al., 2015). This is an aspect often overlooked in the dualism literature, which tends to 
theorise a clear-cut distinction between non-standard and standard employment. Nevertheless, 
the differences between atypical contracts have been long recognised by many authors, mostly 
from the precariousness literature (e.g. Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Nienhüser, 2005; Di 
Nicola, 2011). 
Compared to the ‘precariously unstable’, the ‘precariously stable’ workers rarely experienced 
unemployment. Most of them never experienced unemployment although they often 
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experienced unpaid work breaks between employment contracts. These unpaid work breaks 
were due to legal limitations which establish a break of 10 days if the initial contract was of 
less than 6 months44. During these work breaks, workers had the security of restarting the same 
job, given that they were left home waiting to formally change their employment contract and 
to return to the same job they were doing before. ‘In order not to hire us permanently what 
did they do? They interrupted our contract, we were left home for 12 days and then we started 
with a new contract’ (Elisa). ‘The only break I have had in these years was for 10 days, a 
contractual break I mean, between one contract and another there were 10 days’ (Dante).  
Therefore, employers let the contract expire and started another contract after a certain period, 
in order not to hire the worker permanently. This practice was experienced by interviewees as 
an involuntary unpaid work break45, and they complained about what it was perceived as an 
unfair treatment by the hiring clients and a form of abuse allowed by employment regulations. 
‘Everything only in their favour, not in ours! We were not paid!’ (Elisa). Furthermore, it also 
meant that all the rights accrued with the previous contract were reset, which was also 
experienced as a form of abuse by the hirer. As explained by Claudia, 44,  
You went from one agency to the other. [The hirer] told you, from day 1 of next month, 
you will be with agency A, B or Z, and they arrived and they made us sign the new 
contract en bloc and we started again with those [contracts]! The only problem with 
this is that every time you start with a new contract, the clock is reset, you are paid off 
pay increases are reset, holidays are reset. Every time we start over from 0! 
Sometimes, however, when the temporary contract could not be renewed or changed anymore, 
or when the client did not need the worker any longer, the contract was simply left to expire 
and the worker became unemployed. This is the case of Elisa, who had worked as an employee 
in the public sector for 15 years before becoming unemployed. 
 I felt used. I worked there for such a long time and then it’s over. […] They said it is 
because I do not know enough French and English for what the job requires. But we 
don’t need French and English for what we do, this is just an excuse […] And how can 
they say I was not suitable for that job after so many years? 
Giada, 31, who had been working as an office clerk, saw her TA contract renewed every few 
months for more than 3 years before being left unemployed: ‘They renewed my contract 
several times until it was no longer legally possible to do so, that is for 42 months. […] Then 
I was left without work. 
Thus, on the one hand, hirers saw the expiration of a TA contract (or at times, of cooperative 
or a co.co.pro. contract) as the easiest way of reducing the workforce. Even when the worker 
                                                            
44 20 days in case the initial contract was of 6 months or more (CLICLAVORO.GOV.IT, 201). 
45 Workers can claim UBs, should they be entitled. 
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was needed, as in the case of Giada, the unwillingness to hire a worker on a permanent basis 
more than offset the actual benefits of keeping an experienced worker, who had worked in that 
job for some years. Thus, in those cases the ‘trap’ in atypical employment was due to the fact 
that hirers used TAW and other atypical contracts as alternative contracts to the standard one. 
In those cases, TAW did not function as a job-matching mechanism nor as a ‘buffer’ to gain 
labour flexibility, but it was used exclusively as a contractual tool to avoid hiring people on a 
permanent contract. This confirms a substitution effect between standard and atypical 
employment, where atypical employment is used instead of the standard one (Barbieri and 
Scherer, 2009). Arguably, the gap in employment protection between standard and atypical 
workers can help explain this employers’ behaviour, given that employers might be unwilling 
to hire workers on a permanent basis due to high dismissal costs and long and uncertain 
litigation procedures (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009).  
In that respect, the situation of these workers who were left unemployed after a long period in 
the same employment, mirrors the situation of Italian workers analysed in section 5.3.2, who 
were hired permanently only after years of temporary employment. They both reflected the 
employers use of TAW as a substitute for standard employment, by postponing as long as 
possible the hiring on a permanent basis as long as they were legally allowed to do so. Only 
when it was not legally possible anymore, did the hirer assess whether it was more convenient 
to hire the worker permanently or whether to hire another worker temporarily and discard the 
current one. Hence, regulations which establish limits on the duration of temporary contracts 
seem to have fostered behaviours among employers which go against their initial goal of 
encouraging the stabilisation of temporary workers, by making it compulsory to transform a 
temporary contract into a permanent one after 36 months.  
The experience of being in a ‘trap’ among these TA workers can be argued to foster a divide 
with standard workers, given that these workers were kept as long as possible in temporary 
employment and possibilities of transition were constantly delayed. This is in line with the 
hypothesis derived from the dualism literature (Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Barbieri and 
Scherer, 2009; Leschke, 2009), which expected atypical workers in Southern Europe to be 
more ‘trapped’ in atypical employment compared with their counterparts in Liberal countries, 
given the limited opportunities of transition into permanent employment even after years into 
the same job. Furthermore, the analysis revealed how this disadvantage was perceived as 
unfair by the workers, who felt employers were exploiting flaws in legislation for their own 
interest and at the expense of the workers. 
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This use of TAW as a cost-reduction tool was further emphasised by the fact that the majority 
of the ‘precariously stable’ workers, employed both in the short and long term, did not find 
the job through the temporary agency but they were instead asked by their future or current 
hirer to contact a given agency which would deal with contractual matters. As Giada argued: 
 I did the job interview with this person, and he decided to hire me and a few other 
colleagues, but only through an agency contract because from [the headquarters] they 
didn’t want to hire anyone, anymore. So the agency didn’t offer me any service, it was 
just for the red tape, it didn’t help me find the job or anything. 
Or Dante who, after several years after being employed on a cooperative contract, became a 
TA worker.  He explained: 
It was our hirer, the manager at [client], that asked the agency to pay us through a 
contract that was signed between the client and the agency, but for us nothing has 
changed job wise, only that now we are employed by the agency. 
In these cases, the agency served only as a provider of convenient contracts, without providing 
any other service to either clients or workers. Therefore, instead of functioning as an ex-ante 
intermediary in job matching, TAs functioned as an ex-post labour cost reduction tool once a 
match had already been found between the client and the worker. A shared perception which 
emerged from this group of workers was that of being at the mercy of opportunistic clients’ 
behaviour which exploited the cracks in employment regulations and which they felt they have 
little power to counteract, further highlighting the perceived unfairness of their situation. 
Compared to the Italian case, in the British case, I found no evidence of TA workers employed 
for years by the same client without being made permanent. As already mentioned, TAW in 
the UK case seemed to be perceived by clients as a quite expensive contract and clients tended 
to switch to direct hiring relatively quickly. Thus, although the regulations in the use and 
duration of TA contracts are looser in the UK than in Italy (Voss et al., 2013), the situation 
where workers were kept in the same job for several years without being made permanent was 
not found. In comparison with Italy, in the UK, the firing and possible litigation costs did not 
seem to play a significant role in clients’ choice to use TAW. However, this might not mean 
that hiring permanently was always convenient for British clients for long-term positions, but 
that UK employers might use different contracts as a substitute for standard employment rather 
than TAW, such as, among others, zero-hour contracts. Nonetheless, there is no evidence 
within my sample of workers ‘stuck’ in the same job over a long period of time without being 
able to stabilise their position. Therefore, the role of ‘trap’ in atypical employment seemed to 
be less relevant in the UK than in Italy. 
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To conclude, the ‘precariously stable’ workers, which were found only in Italy, experienced 
TAW as a trap, as they were kept in temporary employment despite having worked for the 
same client for several years. These findings confirm expectations from the dualism literature 
(e.g. Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Leschke, 2009) showing that a substitution effect between 
TAW and standard employment contribute to shaping a ‘trap’ effect. Therefore, for these 
workers, this employers’ use of TAW translated into an experience of trap in atypical 
employment, a situation which was not found in the UK context, where there was no evidence 
of a substitution effect. The situation was perceived as unfair by the majority of interviewees 
whose feeling was that of being subjected to a form of abuse by their employers. 
 
5.4 TAW and Employment Precariousness 
Having shown the different roles TAW played within workers’ employment paths and how it 
was individually perceived, it is important to analyse the major disadvantages TA workers 
experienced compared to standard workers both in Italy and in the UK, and why most 
interviewees employed through a TA contract were aiming to get into a permanent position in 
the long run. As we will see, among the ‘precariously unstable’ group, the disadvantages 
described by the interviewees were similar across the two cases, as were the reasons why they 
would have preferred a permanent contract. Despite the several differences in labour market 
structures and regulations between the two countries, no significant difference was found 
either in the willingness to secure a more stable, possibly permanent, employment contract or 
the reasons for this preference. What was highlighted in both countries was the sense of 
precariousness related to the changes of employment and continuous switching between 
employment and unemployment, which engendered a sense of employment instability. By 
contrast, the experience of precariousness among the ‘precariously stable’ workers, present 
only in the Italian case, was different. As already mentioned, these workers hardly ever 
experienced unemployment, and they had considerable job continuity over time. For them, the 
major disadvantage was the uncertainty related to contract renewals, which prevented them 
from ever feeling ‘secure’, as they claimed they would have been in standard employment.   
These findings do not confirm the hypothesis developed in the analytical framework, which 
argues a higher experienced divide with standard workers in Southern European compared to 
Liberal countries. The ‘precariously unstable’ were the ones experiencing the highest degree 
of precariousness compared to standard workers and their experience was very similar in the 
two countries, regardless of the different employment regulation frameworks. By contrast, the 
‘precariously stable’, who, as we have seen in the previous section, were the ones experiencing 
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the deepest ‘trap’ effect, enjoyed a more limited divide in their employment experience 
compared to standard workers, having similar job continuity, though lacking employment 
security. 
In both countries, having a standard job was seen as the way out of precariousness and 
employment insecurity. This was due to the fact that, in both countries, standard employment 
afforded a sense of having ‘arrived’, of not having to look for other jobs nor having to worry 
about contract renewals, regardless of the actual employment protection it granted. This gave 
workers a sense of stability, as explained by the following quotations. ‘I like to stay in the 
same place, I like to grow within a company, and so having a permanent contract sort of gives 
you the stability, you know, I’m going to come here tomorrow, and the next day and the next 
day’ (Stewart). ‘Psychologically you feel more stable, that’s it’ (Rita, 36). Hence, the different 
level of protection granted to standard employment in the two countries did not appear to 
influence the desire of workers to become permanent, as this was perceived as a safe 
employment status, which would give them a sense of security and stability. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the greater divide in employment protection in the Italian context did not 
translate into an individually experienced greater divide, as no systematic difference was found 
in the two countries among the ‘precariously unstable’.  
Furthermore, in both Italy and the UK, the reasons for wanting a permanent job went beyond 
a pure employment perspective.  In fact, standard employment was tied to specific legal rights 
beyond employment. A good example is that of Bryan. Bryan wanted to marry his partner who 
was a non-EU citizen. The British immigration law establishes that in order to grant a visa to 
a British citizen’s partner, the citizen has to be earning a minimum of £18.600 per year and be 
in a permanent job. However, Bryan was not able to secure a permanent job and this made 
impossible for his partner to apply for a visa. So they had to marry abroad and live in a different 
European country for several months in order to be able to apply to different procedure granted 
to European (non-British) citizens. As Bryan narrated, 
So I’d been trying to get that [permanent job], and trying and trying, and I couldn’t! So 
we couldn’t get the visa – the fiancé visa – and we couldn’t get a marriage visa. If we 
got married somewhere, we couldn’t get a marriage visa either for him… as a married 
couple to live together in the UK, because I still would have to earn £18,600. So we 
found that there is a European immigration where if you live in mainland Europe and 
you have a husband or wife who is not European, with the European immigration you 
can go and live in the UK, so we went and got married. 
Although Bryan’s situation can be regarded as extreme, it clearly shows how lack of a 
permanent job might present consequences in a worker’s life that go beyond a pure 
employment concern, producing a range of disadvantages in many other life aspects including, 
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as in Bryan’s case, the possibility to get a visa for his partner. This was especially the case in 
situations where having a permanent job was tied to access to certain rights or resources. Thus, 
in the eyes of interviewees, standard employment appeared to be key to be fully included into 
society, as many rights and entitlements beyond employment were associated to a standard 
employment status. In that respect, their employment instability translated into a sense of being 
an ‘outsider’ which went beyond the labour market and encompassed other important aspects 
of their life. We will see more examples of these when discussing income insecurity in chapter 
7, section 7.2. 
 
    5.4.1 Employment Precariousness among the ‘Precariously Unstable’ 
Words like ‘precariousness’, ‘insecurity’, ‘instability’ were the most frequently mentioned by 
interviewees in both countries as the main reasons why they did not want to remain TA 
workers in the long run, and why they were always looking to become permanent. For those 
who managed to become permanent after a period of TAW, achieving a permanent position 
was always felt as a relief, as an acquired form of security. For instance, Susanne and 
Alessandro, who both were made permanent a few months before the interview, after a long 
period as temporary workers, recalled the situation: 
I did have no sense of stability. I remember feeling that I was having to learn to just live 
in the here and now and not worry about the future, because I had no idea what was 
going to happen […] And now I felt, phew, I’ve got a permanent job, I can relax. 
(Susanne) 
 [When temping] I felt it as a form of instability, you really feel precarious. I always felt 
a bit hanging in the balance, I don’t know, even for minor things. (Alessandro, 33) 
These workers felt very anxious about their employment prospects as they could never know 
for how long they would be working in a certain job, and whether their contract would be 
renewed after the end of the assignment. ‘I knew I was gonna be working there for 6 months 
or maybe a year, and then? Who protects me?’ (Marco). ‘It’s a lack of security, you don’t 
know what’s going to happen. When I started this role, I knew I had it for 2 weeks – I didn’t 
know what was coming when those 2 weeks were over’ (Claire, 32). Employment insecurity 
translated into the impossibility of career planning but, more simply, in the inability to foresee 
their employment future farther than a few days or weeks, especially when employed for short-
term assignments, an experience which appeared remarkably similar in the two countries. 
Specifically, workers felt very nervous about not knowing about their possible contract 
renewal until a few days before, or at times even the day the current contract expired. This was 
experienced as a deep source of anxiety, a recurrent worry every time a TA contract was about 
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to expire. ‘I was always anxious, because they never told you in advance, they sent you an 
SMS 2-3 days before the contract expired’ (Giulia). ‘It was being renewed week on week – I 
didn’t fully know until the last day’ (Mandy, 35).  
A lack of continuity in their job experience was also remarked by the majority of these 
workers. They felt unable to develop the skills in the work they were doing and they felt 
continuously bumped between different duties, which at times had little in common. ‘A 
permanent job is a utopia, but I need at least some continuity’ (Chiara). ‘It’s just like being 
very precarious, very unstable’ (Andrew). These findings are in line with what had already 
been highlighted in the precariousness literature, showing atypical workers experiencing little 
job continuity, limited opportunities for career planning and having a sense of instability (see, 
for instance, Rogers, 1995; Altieri, 2009; Armano, 2010).  
But how did employment insecurity affect the workers’ lives? In both countries, it primarily 
translated into a continuous search for more stable jobs, or simply for another temporary job 
in case the current contract was not going to be renewed. A number of TA workers in both 
countries were constantly looking for jobs, a situation which workers found particularly 
stressful, as it was perceived as a ‘job besides having a job’. The majority of these 
‘precariously unstable’ workers continued to look for other job opportunities while employed, 
as they did not know how long their current employment would last. 
I really liked that job, but I was not sure I could stay. I was walking on eggshells. The 
[client] was very vague [about me staying] but I imagined that once [the permanent 
worker] was back I would have had to go. So I didn’t stop searching. (Marco) 
You keep looking, you always keep looking, ‘cause you’re never safe. (Mandy) 
Both in Italy and in the UK, many interviewees, especially those on short-term assignments, 
kept looking for jobs, handed out CVs, sent applications, went to job interviews or simply 
constantly browsed temporary agency websites or more generally job search websites for 
suitable job offers. Sometimes, they spent significant shares of their non-working time looking 
for possible jobs. Even when registered with one or more temporary agencies, they felt they 
constantly had to make their presence ‘felt’ by regularly passing by the agency office or 
making phone calls to the agency to chase them for job offers.  
I think you have to kind of be a little bit annoying with them, any agency, to kind of keep 
you on their minds so…I didn’t do anything for about a week and a half because I felt I 
didn’t want to bother them and my partner said: are you emailing them every day, are 
you calling them every day? […] And he says: no, you need to call them and bother 
them! So I ended up emailing them that afternoon and then like 20 mins later they called 
me if I wanted to do this job. (Stewart) 
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 I knew them [agency staff] all, Silvia, Clara, more or less I knew them after so many 
calls, and so many questions. (Marco) 
Only when workers were able to secure a job for a longer period, generally for more than a 
few months, did they feel that they could ‘relax a bit’, although only temporarily, as they re-
started the job search a few weeks before their contract expiry.  
Overall, employment insecurity deeply affected the lives of the ‘precariously unstable’ in a 
similar way in both countries. Both in Italy and in the UK, it can be said that they faced a 
divide in their employment experience compared to standard workers. They complained about 
the impossibility to have clear employment prospects and the sense of precariousness 
stemming from not knowing the duration of their current job and future employment 
opportunities, which is in line with what has previously been found by several authors 
exploring the disadvantages of atypical workers (e.g. Fullin, 2004; Altieri, 2009; Murgia and 
Poggio, 2011).  This affected their life in several ways, but primarily it translated into a 
continuous job search, while still employed.  
What is relevant to highlight is that, despite very different employment systems and labour 
market regulations in the two countries, the types of disadvantages underlined by the 
interviewees did not present systematic differences between the two cases. Unlike what we 
might have expected from the dualism literature, for the ‘precariously unstable’ the experience 
of precariousness was similar, showing that at least for some TA workers, the different 
employment regulation frameworks did not affect their disadvantages in systematically 
different ways. In that respect, standard employment was perceived in both countries as a 
secure state, which granted employment continuity and career prospects and allowed for long-
term life planning. Besides, as will be further detailed in later chapters, the divide with standard 
workers spilled over into divides in other aspects of life not directly related to employment, as 
the permanent employment status granted access to a number of rights and entitlements outside 
employment from which workers were otherwise excluded. 
 
    5.4.2 Employment Precariousness among the ‘Precariously Stable’ 
This experience of precariousness among the ‘precariously stable’ was rather different from 
the previous group. They faced little employment security, but they experienced continuity in 
their job and thus had a sense of job stability. However, these workers had been employed by 
the same client for several years but at the end of each assignment they did not know whether 
their contract would be renewed once again, causing them a sense of persistent employment 
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insecurity. For instance, Elisa, who was employed in the same job for 13 years through 
different contracts and several renewals, explained, ‘Me and my colleagues always 
experienced this very badly, with every time the distress of not knowing whether your contract 
will be renewed for another two months, it has always been distressful, because you never 
know…’. Or Fabio, who had been employed for almost 3 years by the same client through 
repeated contract renewals, ‘There is the problem of not knowing – but that is, I think, a 
problem which happens everywhere – until the last day, until the last week, whether your 
contract will be renewed or not’.  
Thus, even after having been employed for several years in the same job, workers never had 
any employment security and they might be left unemployed after the expiration of the last 
contract, without notice. This was perceived as a form of abuse by some interviewees, as the 
client was using them until they were no longer needed. As Marco complained, ‘The [client] 
can take advantage of it, keeping you in this limbo of temporary contracts for a long time, and 
as it could have happened to me after three years, they could have just said ‘Goodbye’!’. For 
these ‘precariously stable’ workers, the main disadvantage was of not knowing whether their 
employment contract was going to be renewed or not. This confirms findings from authors 
investigating precariousness among atypical workers in Italy (e.g. Altieri, 2009; Morelli et al., 
2012), showing atypical workers in a precarious employment condition even after years in the 
same job. 
Similarly to the previous group, this also affected long-term life decisions, as the workers were 
not able to access rights and resources granted to standard workers (see chapter 7, section 7.2). 
No gender effect could be identified. Nevertheless, their situation tended to be more long-
lasting than for most of the ‘precariously unstable’, four of these people had been in this 
situation for more than a decade, given the trap effect previously discussed (see section 5.3.4). 
Given that they had seen their contract renewed for several years, they did not look for a 
different job, hoping to see their employment contract renewed also in the future. However, 
they continued to look for standard positions, either with the same client or elsewhere. Overall, 
the ‘precariously stable’ enjoyed much more job continuity compared to the ‘precariously 
unstable’. However, similarly to the latter, they had limited employment security, not knowing 
whether their contract was going to be renewed or not in the future. This meant for them a 
prolonged experience of employment insecurity which reflected in life constraints and a sense 
of precariousness which extended for long periods, in some cases more than a decade, with a 
limited prospect of stabilisation in the near future.  
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In conclusion, the analysis of the ‘precariously stable’ employment experience reveals a 
different type of precariousness compared to the ‘precariously unstable’. The former had an 
employment experience which was similar to that of standard workers, with one important 
difference: a lack of employment security. This shows that the disadvantages they faced did 
not only differ from TA workers in the UK, but also from other TA workers in Italy, 
challenging the idea that disadvantages among atypical workers can be mostly interpreted 
along country lines. Furthermore, it can be argued that when employment regulations are 
involved in creating a ‘trap’ effect for TA workers, they also engender a specific type of 
precarious employment experience, which has different features compared to the employment 
experience of the ‘precariously unstable’ and can be argued to be somewhat less insecure. 
 
5.5 Public Employment Services: An Alternative to Private Employment Agencies? 
TAW was perceived by interviewees in both countries as the only alternative way to find 
employment compared to an independent job search, as TA workers in neither country relied 
on public employment services. However, as shown in this section, this was due to two 
different reasons.  
In the Italian case, none of the interviewees relied on public employment services to find them 
a job or to look for one. The role of the Centri per l’Impiego (public employment centres) in 
helping people finding employment was seen by all interviewees as irrelevant or inexistent. 
The Centri per l’Impiego were perceived to function mainly as an administrative bureau where 
the worker had to register in order to be able to claim unemployment benefits, but they did not 
provide an effective tool for job search and placement. Elisa, who went to the employment 
centre in August 2014 after being left unemployed, said: ’I was given an appointment but it is 
very far away in time, it is for the month of December’. Giada, who went to the employment 
centre immediately after finishing a TA assignment, stated: ‘They called me after three 
months, asking whether I wanted to go [to the employment centre] to be interviewed…  I mean, 
after three months! I went, but I never heard anything after that.’ Hence, public employment 
centres were only used to register for passive benefits but they did not provide any help in job 
search or placement (see chapter 7, section 7.3.1 for a detailed perception of activation 
requirements to receive UB benefits).  
Most interviewees who registered with the employment centre found the lack of any form of 
help in job search and other employment services as a serious disadvantage, in that they were 
left with the individual burden of looking for employment, without any form of public support. 
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As Chiara complained: ‘I felt abandoned. Yes, I got the [unemployment benefit] money, and 
then they finished, and then what? They really didn’t help me with anything, I had to do 
everything on my own’.  Although many attempts have been made to implement effective 
active labour market policies in the Italian context (see, for instance, Jessoula and Vesan, 
2011), a person who is unemployed cannot be said to be able to rely on public employment 
services to search for a job or to be helped trough placement services. The lack of effective 
active labour market policies was experienced as a serious issue which tended to 
disproportionally affect temporary workers, especially the ‘precariously unstable’, who 
experienced recurrent spells of unemployment.  The de facto inexistence of public 
employment services obliged the interviewees who lost their job to rely on private agencies or 
on their own means to find employment.  
In the UK, the use of public employment services was also limited, albeit for different reasons. 
The UK has strongly promoted welfare-to-work policies since the late 1990s, when the first 
Blair Government and has fostered active labour market policies to move people back to work 
as soon as possible (Clasen, 2011; Heyes, 2013). The reforms have attached strong 
conditionality to unemployment benefits. Rigorous sanctioning in case of non-abidance was 
implemented already during the Labour governments and was further reinforced in the 2010s, 
during the first Cameron Government (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012; Heyes, 2013). Within the 
sample, the vast majority of interviewees preferred not to register with the job centres and not 
to claim unemployment benefits in order not to be tied to conditionality requirements, and 
being constrained in their job choices. Furthermore, interviewees preferred to look for a job 
independently without relying on public employment services, as they were perceived more 
as watchdogs to prevent benefit abuse rather than an actual help for people who were looking 
for work.  
As we will see in see chapter 7, section 7.3.1, benefit claiming in the UK was also associated 
with a social stigma. This stigma was also partly reflected in the use of public employment 
services for job search and placement purposes, as workers did not want to rely on them to 
find employment, as they did not want to appear unable to secure a job without public help. ‘I 
found jobs on my own, I don’t like… I can get my own jobs!’ (Rachel, 43). Moreover, given 
the stigma attached to using public employment services to find a job, the majority of 
interviewees did not think the employment centres could provide suitable jobs for them, as the 
jobs they thought they offered tended to be perceived as low-quality and targeted to people 
most in need. ‘No, they are not for me. I’m not the kind of person they could find a job for… 
You know, I mean, I don’t think they have jobs for people like me.’ (Sarah, 47). Hence, there 
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was a wide-spread perception among interviewees that employment centres did not provide 
job search and placement services for ‘normal’ people, but that they are focused on people 
who would not be able to find a job otherwise, a hypothetical ‘them’ which was not clearly 
defined, but which can be interpreted as the needy, those who would have difficulties finding 
work individually, and those trying to abuse the benefit system, from which they wanted to 
distance themselves.  
We can argue that employment centres were perceived as meant for ‘outsiders’ with whom the 
interviewees did not want to identify or be identified with. Hence, TA workers in the UK did 
not want to rely on public employment services because they were perceived as targeting 
specific segments of the labour force who would have serious problems finding employment 
independently. To be precise, I cannot generalise these attitudes to other potential users of 
public employment services in the UK, but it allows me to explain why private employment 
agencies were perceived by those who rely on them as the only alternative to an independent 
job search.  
In conclusion, public employment services in both countries were of limited use to the TA 
workers interviewed. In Italy this was due to their focus on administration procedures and 
ineffective active labour market policies implementation. In the UK, they were perceived as 
targeted to certain social groups with which the interviewees did not want to be identified, as 
well as mostly tied to welfare-to-work policies aimed at reducing welfare dependency. 
Therefore, in both countries TAs were perceived as the only alternative to an independent job 
search in order to find employment. Hence, we can argue that, despite their very different 
organisation, active labour market policies in both countries play a role, if not in increasing, 
at least in preventing the reduction of the divide with standard workers, given that they do not 
provide suitable support in the job search in the eyes of all interviewees. The lack of suitable 
employment services in both countries, though in principle affecting both standard and TA 
workers in the same way, in practice it disproportionally affected the ‘precariously unstable’, 
who found themselves often looking for jobs, both during the recurrent spells of 
unemployment, as well as while employed in short-term TA assignments, as discussed in 
section 5.4.1 of this chapter.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted important similarities and differences in the employment 
experience of TA workers in the two countries and it has shown the role played by institutional 
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configurations in shaping those experiences. Firstly, in contrast to what we might have 
expected from the institutional divides identified in the analytical framework, the different 
level of employment protection granted to standard workers in the two employment 
regulations settings did not appear to play a role in the perception of standard employment as 
stable and all but one interviewee were aiming to reach standard employment in the future. 
TAW was experienced as a source of employment insecurity, which had major consequences 
for the majority of interviewees’ lives. Hence, TAW was mostly perceived as a second best 
choice, while waiting for a permanent position. In both countries, it can be argued that TAW 
did not allow the interviewees to perceive themselves as fully integrated into the labour market 
and that there was a perceived divide between their status and that of standard workers.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of becoming permanent was experienced partly differently in the 
two countries, but not always in the way previously hypothesised. In line with previous 
hypotheses, the substitution of TAW for standard employment in Italy appeared to play an 
important role in shaping a ‘trap’ effect for those employed on a probationary period before 
being hired permanently. This can be argued to be due to the unwillingness of Italian 
employers to hire workers on a permanent basis. As has been discussed by several dualist 
authors, this might be at least partly explained by the gap in employment protection between 
standard and atypical workers, which makes employers unwilling to hire workers on a 
permanent contract due to difficulty in firing them and in potentially high dismissal costs (e.g. 
Mitlacher, 2007; Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Muffels, 2015). The situation was brought to an 
extreme for one group of workers, the ‘precariously stable’, who had been employed in the 
same job for several years, at times for more than a decade, through atypical contracts, without 
ever being offered a standard position. In those situations, TAW was used in alternation with 
other atypical contracts to prolong their employment relationship, but with limited 
opportunities for being hired permanently. This situation was generally perceived as an abuse 
on the side of the employers, and many workers considered themselves to be treated unfairly. 
It can be argued that the employment regulation framework in the Italian context has buttressed 
a divide between standard and TA workers, while this did not appear to be the case in the UK, 
confirming hypotheses from the analytical framework, which expected atypical workers to 
feel more trapped in atypical employment in Southern Europe compared to Liberal countries.  
However, for certain groups of workers, the situation was similar in the two countries, going 
against the initial hypotheses. On the one hand, those employed as a ‘buffer’ experienced 
continuous cycles of employment-unemployment without being able to become permanent, a 
situation which did not appear to be affected by the different employment regulation 
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frameworks in the two countries. Workers in those situations did not necessarily consider 
themselves to be treated unfairly by the employers or the agencies, although some of those in 
very short-term assignments complained about feeling at disposal. On the other hand, TAW 
was also experienced in the two countries as a way to move out of unemployment. No 
systematic difference between Italy and the UK could be identified, showing that for some 
workers in both countries, TAW might also contribute to reducing the divide with standard 
employment, helping individuals re-entering the labour market. These findings highlight that, 
although a trap effect in atypical employment was only present in Italy and it was due to the 
larger employment divide in employment protection granted to standard workers, the trap 
effect in a cycle of employment-unemployment was remarkably similar in both countries, and 
it was not affected by the employment regulations of either country. This shows that, even in 
countries with different employment regulation frameworks, similar traps can emerge out of 
hirers’ use of TAW. 
When it comes to the experience of precariousness and the related disadvantages, a further 
important finding emerged. Not only the employment regulation framework played a role in 
shaping the transition into standard employment, but it also contributed to shaping the types 
of disadvantages experienced by interviewees. Those employed as a buffer, whose status did 
not appear to be affected by the employment regulation framework, can be argued to 
experience the highest degree of employment precariousness, experiencing similar 
disadvantages in the two countries as regards the lack of job continuity, limited career 
prospects and the lack of job security. By contrast, those trapped in temporary agency work 
employed because they were used by hirers as a substitute for standard workers, faced a lack 
of job security, but they enjoyed a more stable employment experience, with a lower degree 
of precariousness compared to the previous group. Therefore, it can be said that the 
employment regulations in Italy and in the UK contributed to influencing the experience of 
precariousness of TA workers both statically and dynamically, but it did not necessarily 
engender a deeper sense of precariousness from a static perspective. 
Finally, public employment services in both countries could be said to contribute to shaping a 
divide with standard workers, despite their different organisation in the two countries. In both 
countries, TA workers felt they could not rely on those services for their job search and 
placement, limiting their opportunities to find employment. In Italy, this was due to the fact 
that they were perceived as slow and ineffective, providing limited practical support. By 
contrast, in the UK, public employment services were associated with strict activation 
requirements for accessing unemployment benefits and their use was perceived as 
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stigmatising, discouraging workers from relying on them for their search for employment. 
Therefore, an individual job search and the use of private agencies were considered in both 

























6. Work Experience 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the work experience of the interviewees in order to highlight the types 
of disadvantages they experienced at the workplace and how these were perceived in relation 
to those of standard workers. The first part of the chapter discusses the broad category of 
working conditions. As we will see, the individual experience only partly mirrors the equality 
formally guaranteed by the institutional framework in the two countries. Internal social 
dynamics at the workplace draw a complex picture of the insider-outsider divide, which could 
not be simply traced back to an institutional divide notwithstanding its close relation to the 
differences in the employment status. It is shown that, on the one hand, in both countries, the 
intrinsic characteristics of TAW present inherent disadvantages in working conditions 
compared to standard employment. These disadvantages were generally perceived as fair by 
the interviewees. On the other hand, discriminatory practices based on the employment status 
contributed to shaping a divide between standard and atypical workers with similar 
disadvantages being shaped both in Italy and in the UK. Contrary to the previous category, 
these disadvantages were regarded as a source of unfairness. 
The latter part of the chapter focuses on individual and collective representation at the 
workplace. This allows us to assess the bargaining power workers have in improving their 
employment and working conditions in comparative perspective. I argue that, as regards 
individual representation, in the majority of cases in both countries, the interviewees’ 
employment status was perceived to present a weak bargaining position, which translated into 
actual disadvantages in working conditions and in the impossibility to claim rights to which 
these workers were formally entitled. When it came to collective representation, workers 
generally refrained from joining unions for several different reasons, some of which could be 
directly attributed to their employment status. Notwithstanding the different organisation of 
collective representation in the UK and in Italy, TA workers in both countries faced similar 
disadvantages and presented similar reasons for not being part of a union, leaving them in a 
much weaker bargaining position compared to their standard colleagues. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 considers aspects of the working experience, 
including: pay and complementary earnings (section 6.2.1), working time (section 6.2.2), 
relations with colleagues (section 6.2.3) and job content (section 6.2.4). The second part of the 
chapter analyses individual representation (section 6.3), to end with collective representation 
(section 6.4). Section 6.5 draws the relevant conclusions. 
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6.2 Working Conditions 
This section discusses four aspects of working conditions which can be regarded as among the 
most relevant in a job (see chapter 3, section 3.4.2): pay, working time, relations with 
colleagues and job content. As I discuss below, although legislation both in Italy and in the 
UK formally guarantees equal treatment in most working conditions with other workers in the 
same job position, the actual workplace practices in certain cases produced a divide between 
TA workers and standard employees. Several divides based on the employment status were 
present in the workplace, of which only a minority could be attributed to regulations of 
working conditions in the two countries.  Therefore, it can be argued that even where no 
institutional divide with standard workers was present, being a TA worker was experienced as 
a condition of ‘outsider’ in several aspects of the working experience. These findings go partly 
against hypotheses developed in the analysis of institutional divides, given that the TA workers 
have the right to equal treatment in most working conditions (see chapter 2, section 2.6.2). 
Nevertheless, as we will see, they are in line with findings from the precariousness literature, 
which showed atypical workers to be at a disadvantage in several working conditions. To be 
precise, these divides were not present in all interviewees’ experiences, as many workplace 
environments actively promoted inclusion and equal treatment, but, in 17 cases (evenly spread 
between the two countries), the employment status constituted a barrier to full integration and 
discrimination of TA workers was common practice.  
 
6.2.1 Pay  
In Italy, both national law and collective agreements grant equal pay treatment between TA 
workers and regular workers in equivalent job positions from the first day of the assignment, 
while in the UK equal pay is only guaranteed after 12 weeks in the same assignment (BIS, 
2011; Wynn, 2014). However, in both countries, equal pay is only granted as regards basic 
elements of pay, including performance-related bonuses, but it does not apply to other 
elements of pay, including seniority-based pay rises and occupational bonuses. The analysis 
of the individual experience broadly reflects these institutional divides provided by the 
legislative framework on pay matters. 
Firstly, the analysis highlighted that in both countries timing and transparency of pay were 
generally praised by interviewees. Payments by the agency were usually on time and little 
concern was given to the degree of transparency of payment methods and no systematic 
difference emerged either between the two countries or between different categories of 
workers. In 12 cases (seven in Italy and five in the UK), the actual amount of pay was stated 
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to be quite low. However, this was due to the position in which they were employed rather 
than the actual employment contract, an issue which is unrelated to their employment status 
and concerns pay levels in each country. The fact that TA workers and atypical workers more 
generally tend to be employed in low-paid jobs has been discussed at length in the literature 
(see for instance, Tucker, 2003; Pedersini, 2010) but this goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the fact that the majority of employees were satisfied with their pay might be 
partly explained by the selection criteria used. It must be noted that the sample included only 
individuals working full-time and it excluded workers with lower amounts of hours worked.  
The general perception of fairness of pay in relation to the employment contract could be 
argued to reflect equal pay rules in the two countries. Legislation on equal pay in both countries 
has eliminated the pay divide between different categories of workers, although in the UK this 
applies only after 12 weeks, provided that hourly pay does not fall below the legally set 
minimum wage (BIS, 2011). Although the 12-week delay in the application of equal pay was 
perceived by two interviewees as unfair, it was mostly considered as a probationary period 
which did not last long, after which the worker would get full pay rights. As Cathy, 33, 
commented, ‘They pay you a bit less at the beginning, you know, just to see how you work’. 
This reflects the idea of being on a ‘trial’ period, which we have already encountered when 
discussing their employment experience (see chapter 5, section 5.3.2). Hence, the majority of 
workers in the UK perceived this disadvantage as legitimate and of limited duration. 
Therefore, the delay in equal treatment was perceived by the majority of interviewees in the 
British case as an initial ‘purgatory’, but not as a long-lasting disadvantage.  
 
Furthermore, a number of hirers in the UK have introduced equal pay policies from the first 
day of assignment, eliminating any pay gap between different employment contracts. This is 
the case, for instance, of higher education institutions, which in Edinburgh are important 
hirers. As Mhairi, 58, who started working as an administrative assistant at a university, 
explained, ‘a couple of years ago it was established that all universities across the whole of 
the UK would pay everyone at standard rates […] and because of that, I’m being paid what I 
should be paid for what I’m doing’. Hence, private initiatives from employers have contributed 
to further reducing the remaining pay divide between employment contracts in the UK context, 
although no data could be found on how widespread these initiatives are.  
 
In Italy, the right to equal pay established for TAW contrasted with the generally lower pay 
level provided by the most common other atypical contracts used in alternation with TAW, 
namely para-subordinati and cooperative. Indeed, workers with a para-subordinato contract 
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are regarded as self-employed in pay matters and are therefore not entitled to equal treatment 
with comparable workers, while workers with a cooperative contract are entitled to equal 
treatment with other cooperative workers but not with other workers in the public or private 
firm where they provide their service. Therefore, compared to these two other types of 
contract, the TA contract was the preferred one by the workers, as it guaranteed pay treatment 
equal to that of standard employees. For instance, Dante, 48, who had been employed first 
with a cooperative and then with an agency, said, ‘The situation has changed, the money has 
improved, now at least we get the same money as other workers’. This shows that among 
functionally equivalent contracts, TAW was the preferred one as it was the one that provided 
the most limited divide with standard workers. We have seen similar perceptions when 
discussing the employment experience of the ‘precariously stable’ and where the TAW 
contract was once again the preferred one among other atypical contracts (chapter 5, section 
5.3.4). This highlights that not all atypical contracts are the same in terms of the disadvantages 
they engender, a consideration which has already been highlighted in the precariousness 
literature (see, for instance, Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; De Graaf-Zijl, 2005; Giunchi et al., 
2016) but which has received more limited attention in the dualism literature, with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Berton et al., 2012; Hipp et al., 2015). As already mentioned, dualist theorists 
have been mostly keen on representing the labour market in dichotomous terms, generally 
disregarding differences within the broad category of atypical employment.  
 
In contrast to the common perception of fairness in basic pay, the majority of workers in both 
countries criticised the lack of entitlement to complementary pay and ineligibility for pay rises 
connected to length of service. As previously mentioned, the legislation on equal pay in both 
countries only guarantees equal treatment for the basic elements of pay, but it does not include 
any complementary pay, apart from performance-related bonuses. This was perceived as a 
strong disadvantage in comparison to regular employees. ‘They were getting an increment year 
on year, they got all the benefits of length of service…’ (Mhairi). ‘We do the same job as they 
do, is it right that they get bonuses? Or the length of service pay increase?’ (Stefano, 38). The 
disadvantage was particularly severe for those ‘precariously unstable’ employed for a 
relatively long period of time by the same hirer and it could be regarded as extreme for the 
‘precariously stable’ who, despite having worked in the same job for many years, were not 
entitled to any pay rise related to seniority and had to restart at the same pay scale every time 
their contract got renewed. Therefore, it can be argued that this disadvantage was more 
prominent in the Italian context, given that, as we have seen (chapter 5, section 5.3.2 and 
section 5.3.4), people tend to be ‘trapped’ in TAW for longer periods of time in Italy than in 
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the UK. As Claudia, 44, who worked for the same hirer for 16 years, complained: ‘Our 
disadvantage is that every time you always start from scratch […] Every year it is a fight!’. 
Workers in this situation complained that they did not see any recognition by their hirer of the 
length of service and that every contract renewal erased any seniority rights. Hence, even after 
years of employment in the same job they were still only entitled to basic pay rates, 
experiencing a growing divide in pay matters with comparable standard workers, who were 
instead entitled to a seniority pay rise. This disadvantage was perceived as highly unfair by 
the interviewees, who complained they were being treated differently for the same type and 
amount of work. 
 
In the comparison of the two countries with respect to pay matters, many similarities between 
Italy and the UK emerged. Both countries have granted equal treatment in basic elements of 
pay. This was reflected as a general perception of fairness in pay treatment among workers in 
both countries. Although UK legislation grants equal pay treatment only after 12 weeks of 
assignment, this was not perceived as a serious issue by the large majority of interviewees. 
What was instead strongly criticised was the unfair treatment as regards complementary pay, 
and the main problem which emerged in the interviews was particularly related to ineligibility 
to seniority pay rises. Therefore, it can be argued that, with respect to pay matters, the 
experienced disadvantages at the individual level closely reflect divides in the regulations of 
working conditions. Nevertheless, two important considerations emerged. On the one hand, 
the delayed equal treatment in the UK was interpreted as part of a trial period which ends at 
12 weeks. On the other hand, the prolonged employment experience in TAW of many 
interviewees in Italy meant that the lack of entitlement to pay rises was experienced as a 
growing divide with standard workers over time, sometimes increasing over several years. 
 
 
6.2.2 Working Time 
 
Equal treatment with regard to working time, including annual leave, is formally guaranteed 
by legislation in both countries, though in the UK it again only applies after a 12-week period. 
This was generally reflected in the interviewees’ experience, who had access to the same daily 
and weekly rests as their standard counterparts. A number of workers were doing shift work, 
which included working at night or at weekends, but this appeared to be due to the type of job 
rather than their employment contract, as this applied also to their colleagues on a standard 
contract. The literature has identified that workers in atypical employment are more likely to 
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work unsocial hours (see, for instance, Letourneux, 1998) but this has been attributed to a 
compositional effect of the types of jobs available to atypical workers and it goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
Nevertheless, in both countries, disadvantages were experienced as regards annual leave. In 
many TA assignments, it was common practice to have holiday pay already included in the 
payslip without the possibility of being paid for the days off taken during the year. The 
rationale behind this practice was that workers on relatively short assignments might not need 
holidays and they would prefer to receive holiday pay in every payslip rather than taking time 
off. This meant that workers felt constrained to reducing the days of annual leave to a minimum 
in order not to lose income, as their holidays would have been unpaid. Many workers openly 
complained about this practice, which prevented them the possibility to enjoy annual leave to 
which they would have been legally entitled to. As Alberto, 54, complained: 
 The holidays you accrue, they paid them, but then you don’t have the chance to go on 
holidays… I got information, and they cannot do it. So, when at the end of the year I 
want to go on holiday for a week, they don’t pay me, but they are wrong! 
This practice appeared to be equally spread in both countries and it was particularly common 
in short-term and medium-term employment experiences lasting less than a year, while no 
evidence was found of this practice for people employed for longer periods, such as among 
the ‘precariously stable’, suggesting that this practice is probably confined to relatively short-
term employment experiences. However, when TA workers happened to have their short-term 
contract renewed several times with the same hirer or when they moved continuously from 
one assignment to the other, this practice prevented them from enjoying any annual leave 
unless they were willing to lose income. This was clearly pointed out by Tom, 31: 
I don’t really need holiday pay, because I’m probably not gonna take any holiday if I’m 
only gonna be here for a few weeks, but there’s a guy there who’s been there for 6 
months who’s a temp. Now presumably, within 6 months, you might want to take 
holidays, and you won’t get paid for that week off, you know, you’ll get nothing that 
week. 
 
Both in Italy and in the UK, aside from the impossibility to claim paid annual leave in the 
cases just mentioned, even when TA workers were given the possibility to take annual leave, 
the actual characteristics of their employment status, such as the duration of their contract and 
the possibility of non-renewal made it difficult to plan any holiday. This was the case, for 





Then the holidays, I went to [the line manager] to ask for holidays to [line manager] 
and he said I couldn’t have them because every slot had already been booked in 
January, and I said, how could I have booked in January if I didn’t even know if I was 
going to still be there, if I was gonna get renewed? 
 
Apart from the uncertainty related to contract renewals, the fact that when a contract expired 
the unused accrued annual leave was paid directly into the last payslip, meant for most people 
the inability to enjoy any paid time off sometimes for long periods, even when they had been 
working in the same job for several months. This was perceived as a form of unfairness which 
was beyond their control to change. 
 
Furthermore, in both countries, this issue was further complicated by commonplace practices 
in many workplaces which openly discriminated against TA workers and other atypical 
workers vis-à-vis regular employees. These practices mainly entailed that permanent 
employees were given priority in choosing when to go on annual leave, with the usual 
limitations related to the hirer’s needs, while TA workers could only be allocated the remaining 
available slots. ‘When they decide the holidays, first they let the [regular] employees decide 
the holidays, then there are the TA workers and the others’ (Francesca, 41). ‘They let the 
permanent ones decide first, that’s how it goes’ (Lilian, 45).  This left TA workers and other 
atypical workers with limited choice on when to take time off and having those choices 
subordinated to the ones made by regular employees. This was perceived as a form of outright 
discrimination against atypical workers, whose formal right to equal treatment with regard to 
annual leave was not respected in practice. 
 
In conclusion, initial hypotheses which expected a lack of disadvantage in working time given 
equal treatment rules were confirmed in the workers’ experience for all aspects of working 
time but annual leave. With respect to the latter, in both countries, being a TA worker presented 
profound disadvantages compared to standard workers. Although the legislative framework 
formally guarantees equal treatment in working time after 12 weeks in the UK and from the 
start of the contract in Italy, the experience of TA workers presented a different picture.  On 
the one hand, the intrinsic uncertainty related to job duration and contract renewal contributed 
to more limited possibilities to take time off compared to permanent employees. Although 
these disadvantages were not perceived necessarily as unfair, they contributed in the 
perception of TA workers of being subjected to a different treatment. On the other hand, 
common discrimination practices at the workplace, which went against rules of equal 
treatment, created a divide between TA workers and standard employees, further reducing the 
ability to take time off and restricting the TA workers’ freedom to choose when to take leave. 
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Hence it can be argued that although no divide or a temporary one was identified in the analysis 
of institutional characteristics, the experience of the interviewees showed that practices in the 
workplaces went against the principle of equal treatment established by law, engendering a 
disadvantage for TA workers in the ability to take annual leave.  
 
6.2.3 Relations with Colleagues 
 
Outright forms of discrimination were not limited to annual leave. Although in the majority of 
workplaces in both countries TA workers felt included into social groups at work and they did 
not feel like they were treated any differently by their colleagues, 11 cases (six in the UK and 
five in Italy), the employment status constituted a source of discrimination.  
In both countries, the most commonly mentioned forms of discrimination were verbal 
discriminations, for instance in situations in which the person was addressed as ‘the temp’. As 
Tom explained, ‘even just the word that you’re referred to as like, oh this is Tom, he’s a temp, 
he’s a temp – it’s almost like you’re sort of disposable’. Although this might sound like a 
minor issue, this was considered by interviewees a particularly annoying discriminatory 
practice as it actively contributed to their perception of being an ‘outsider’, of being different 
from other co-workers. Rogers (1995), analysing the experience of TA workers in the US, 
found similar forms of verbal discrimination in the American context.  
Other forms of open discrimination were found frustrating, such as in social relations with 
colleagues, who kept a social distance between regular employees and TA workers and 
avoided including TA workers into social groups. These included social events in and out of 
the workplace. As Elisa, 52, commented, ‘you feel a bit discriminated against […] when they 
did group events and various other stuff that now I don’t remember but there was a division 
between [regular] employees and TA workers’. These forms of discrimination were most 
common in cases where the TA worker was employed only for relatively short assignments, 
although these were not unheard of in workplaces where the worker had been employed for 
more than a year, such as in the just mentioned case of Elisa.  
Furthermore, even in cases where there was no open discrimination, both in Italy and in the 
UK, interviewees sometimes found it difficult to integrate into a generally long-established 
social group, where colleagues had known each other for a relatively long time. Unlike the 
previously mentioned open forms of discrimination, these were not perceived as unfair, but 
rather a ‘natural’ disadvantage due to the nature of their employment status. Moreover, people 
employed for relatively short assignments felt co-workers were not willing to put effort and 
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time to get to know them as they were probably not going to stay long.  As Francesca pointed 
out, ‘They know you are probably not gonna be there for long, so they just don’t try to get to 
know you, it can feel quite isolating sometimes’. Or Tom, who said: 
I think the people who are working there, they don’t feel like there’s any point in 
investing much time or effort into you, cause for all they know you’ll be gone in a week 
or two, so why should they treat you, why should they spend… waste their time on you, 
when for all they know, you’ll disappear. 
 
In both countries, this behaviour was generally considered by interviewees as quite natural, as 
they probably would have done the same in their co-workers’ position. However, they felt 
excluded from the social networks of colleagues, limiting opportunities for social integration 
and contributing to a sense of being an ‘outsider’. These findings are in line with previous 
studies from the precariousness literature (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Letourneux, 1998; Pocock et al., 
2005) which have highlighted the higher difficulties among temporary workers to establish 
personal relations with colleagues and to be integrated into social groups at the workplace 
given the temporary nature of their work experience.  
 
The empirical analysis revealed that disadvantages in relations with colleagues were only 
experienced in a minority of workplaces in the two countries. Nevertheless, especially among 
the ‘precariously unstable’, the numerous changes of workplace meant that the majority of 
workers in this group experienced a disadvantage in the relation with colleagues during one or 
more of their assignments. These situations were most common in workplaces where TA 
workers were employed for short-term assignments and where only a small number of 
temporary workers were present, but they were not confined to those cases, revealing a more 
wide-spread issue of integration at the workplace for TA workers.  
 
Overall, it can be argued that, in several cases in both countries, the characteristics of the 
employment status of the interviewees produced disadvantages in social relations with 
colleagues. On the one hand, this could be attributed to active discriminatory practices by 
standard co-workers, which were regarded as highly unfair. On the other hand, it can be traced 
back to employment instability, and more precisely to the continuous changes of workplace 
common among the ‘precariously unstable’, which made it difficult to integrate into already 
established social networks, but which was regarded as a ‘natural’ disadvantage given the 
short-term nature of the job. These disadvantages tended to be more serious the shorter the 
assignment, making those with more unstable working experiences more exposed to those 
disadvantages. These findings are contrary to the initial hypotheses derived from the dualism 
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literature which supposed no divide in working conditions among TA workers, given the equal 
treatment formally established between standard and TA workers. On the contrary, they are in 
line with several studies in the precariousness literature, showing that even where no formal 
institutional divide is in place, other factors might come into play in shaping the perception of 
being an ‘outsider’ and in moulding a perceived divide between standard and atypical workers.  
 
    6.2.4  Job Content  
 
Legislation in the UK does not specify any regulation as regards job content. By contrast, in 
Italy national legislation establishes that the hirer has to justify the reasons for use. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4, these limitations have been recently 
loosened and they have never been specific to begin with, leaving hirers with much leeway in 
employing TA workers as they wished. As I discuss below, the experience of workers shows 
no systematic difference between the two countries with respect to job content, although 
significant disadvantages were experienced in a minority of workplaces compared to standard 
workers.  Some problems with job content and workloads, similar to basic pay and working 
time, were generally attributed to the job position rather than to the employment status and 
they were generally perceived as fair. Nevertheless, specific disadvantages, could be identified 
which pertain to the employment status, although, once again, they could only be identified 
for a minority of cases. These were generally considered as forms of unfair treatment.  
 
Firstly, the variety of activities TA workers had to do was in five cases (three in Italy and two 
in the UK) much greater than those of standard workers. ‘They move you from one place to 
the other, in my case, for example, they have moved me to different departments, I don’t know 
if it’s good or bad, but the permanent ones are always in the same place’ (Fabio, 44). This 
was generally justified by the nature of TAW itself, which could be used by employers to 
cover for temporary shortages of workforce or, in the case of increased workloads, in certain 
activities. Therefore, it was accepted as an intrinsic component of being a TA worker although 
it upset interviewees as it did not allow them to have job content continuity and contributed to 
their perception of disposability. ‘We are the stopgaps for them, you know that, we all know 
that’ (Alberto). ‘They’re not interested in getting a job for you, they just wanna fill a position.’ 
(Tom). As highlighted in the precariousness literature (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Altieri et al., 2009; 
Murgia and Poggio, 2011), this might produce situations of both over-work and under-work, 
given the fluctuations in workload depending on the hirers’ needs, but in all cases, it provided 
a sense of discontinuity in their working experience. In that respect, Altieri et al. (2009) talk 
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about a ‘fragmentation’ of the working experience among TA workers, who carry out different 
tasks with little connection between each other.  
Secondly, both in Italy and in the UK, besides the lack of continuity in job tasks, a common 
practice already identified by some authors in the precariousness literature (e.g. Murgia and 
Poggio, 2011) was that of letting TA workers do the most menial job tasks among a specific 
set of activities, while standard employees kept for themselves the most pleasant. ‘They make 
you do the lousiest job tasks, ‘cause you are at the bottom of the pile’ (Alessandro, 33). ‘Yeah, 
you know you have to do what the others don’t wanna do’ (Andrew, 31). These discriminatory 
practices were often justified on the grounds of employment hierarchy, where TA workers 
were at the bottom of the hierarchy or where they were simply the ‘last’ arrived. Again, this 
was especially common for people employed in short-term assignments but it was not confined 
to those cases, showing how the internal division of labour was sometimes chosen according 
to the employment status. For instance, Chiara, 40, was explicitly told this by her line manager 
in her current assignment, ‘The line-manager of this firm made it clear that I had to follow a 
certain order, that I was the last one arrived, that I had to follow a hierarchy’.  
Thus, in a minority of cases in both countries, the employment status was a source of 
disadvantage in job content, due to two main workplace practices. These were the continuous 
re-assignment to different job tasks depending on the contingent necessities of the hirer to 
adjust the internal division of labour and the assignment to the least pleasant job tasks based 
on an unwritten hierarchy between different employment statuses. However, while the former 
was due to structural characteristic of the type of employment contract and it was therefore 
somehow perceived as justifiable, the latter, which was based on informal and arbitrary norms 
was perceived as a form of unfair discrimination.  
Once again, no systematic difference could be detected between the two countries, while the 
length of employment in the same workplace was generally associated with lower 
discrimination on this subject, disproportionally affecting the ‘precariously unstable’.  These 
disadvantages in job content confirm hypotheses from the precariousness literature, which 
highlighted an existing divide among atypical workers in job content and which do not depend 
on regulations in working conditions, but rather on the practices of hirers and line-managers. 
These findings further contribute to showing that even where no formal institutional divide is 
in place, the intrinsic characteristics of TAW and discriminatory workplace practices based on 
the employment status fostered a divide between standard and TA workers and these 




6.3  Individual Bargaining Power  
Having discussed the main disadvantages faced by TA workers in their working conditions, it 
is relevant to explore the reasons why the interviewees did not try to fight against those 
disadvantages, especially in trying to counteract discriminatory practices which are formally 
illegal. The main issue which emerged in the interviews was the interviewees’ limited 
bargaining power at the workplace. This limited bargaining power was caused by their 
insecure employment status and by the hirers’ power of not renewing their employment 
contract after its expiry. As I discuss below, in both countries, the threat of non-renewal was 
experienced as an important weapon in the hands of hirers, limiting workers’ voice and even 
hampering the exercise of formal rights. This imbalance of power between temporary workers 
and hirers can be conceptualised by the Italian term ‘ricattabilità’ which can be translated in 
English as ‘liability to be blackmailed’. Nevertheless, the English concept of blackmailing 
entails a narrower and stronger connotation compared to the Italian term, which entails a more 
abstract condition in which one part in a relationship has the power to damage the other, should 
the other not act according to her command. Hence, given that no precisely equivalent term 
could be found in English, I will use the Italian term throughout the section. 
I argue that three different levels of ricattabilità could be identified among the interviewees, 
of which the latter two could be equated with the English concept of blackmailing. The first 
level entails an implicit perception of weakness due to the employment status. The second one 
includes explicit references by hirers and line-managers to the employment status to affect 
workers’ behaviour. Finally, the third level entails outright abuse by hirers and line-managers, 
exploiting the insecure employment status of the interviewee. While the first level was 
regarded as part of the nature of the employment status and it was regarded as somehow 
legitimate, the other two were regarded as forms of discrimination and they were openly 
labelled as unfair. The concept of ricattabilità helps explain why, despite the experience of a 
disadvantage even in areas where equal treatment is established by law, the interviewees 
tended not to react against it.  
In its mildest version, common among the majority of interviewees in both countries, the 
limited bargaining power translated into a continuous psychological pressure to do one’s best 
all the time, in the hope to see their contract renewed. This has already been highlighted by 
several authors in the precariousness literature (see, for instance, Fullin, 2004; Pocock et al., 
2005; McKay and Markova, 2010) and also in the organisational psychology literature (e.g. 
Mauno et al., 2005). Staufenbiel and König (2010) highlighted that when workers see 
possibilities of being hired permanently they will put more effort in their job in order to obtain 
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the permanent contract, while if there is no possibility of being hired permanently, workers 
might engage in behaviour that will try to reduce the perceived disadvantage by, for instance, 
putting less effort or being absent at work. Nonetheless, contrary to what might have been 
expected, the situation was not confined to those employed to be ‘screened’ for permanent 
hiring or the ‘precariously stable’. In fact, even some of those employed as ‘buffers’ were 
hoping to make a good impression on the hirer, so that they could be re-assigned to the same 
hirer should the hirer need a person for a future assignment. Moreover, they wanted to make a 
good impression on the agency, through the positive feedback received from the hirer, which 
was perceived to increase their opportunities to be called by the agency for other assignments 
in the future.  
Although this implicit pressure in doing one’s best cannot be regarded as a negative incentive 
per se, as we might expect all employees to do as best as they can in their jobs, it meant in the 
majority of cases agreeing to over-work and bearing working conditions which would not have 
been accepted had the worker been employed on a permanent contract. These included, for 
instance, doing overtime whenever requested and accepting last-minute shift changes when 
asked for. As Mariangela, 30, who was employed on a 3-month contract in a supermarket, 
explains, ‘You have to be available in the first 3 months, you have to do the ‘bella figura’. To 
me it happened more than once that they called me at 7.30 pm or 8 pm to change my shift for 
the next day, and you had to be willing to do these things’. Even accepting to work more that 
they would have been set by their contract was a common consequence of the felt pressure to 
show to the hirer they were suitable for the job and that they were ‘hard workers’. Similar 
attitudes have been highlighted, for instance, by McKay and Markova (2010), who studied 
TAW in the UK. They found that TA workers have to show they are obedient and that they do 
not create problems in order to be kept or be called in the future.   
In that respect, in both countries, having a permanent contract was seen as a way of gaining 
individual bargaining power and of being able to better negotiate workload and other working 
conditions without the threat of not seeing their contract renewed. This would have enabled a 
re-balancing of power relations between hirer and worker, which was perceived as enabling 
better working conditions. This was clearly stated, for instance, by Steven, 35,‘In terms of 
workloads, if I were permanent, I could think of calling the line-manager or go to the Director 
to mention the issue but…’. Or as Claudia commented on the behaviour of one of her TA co-
workers who finally managed to secure a permanent contract: 
At the beginning he had 2-month contracts, 1-month contracts and so on, and he did 
almost everything. He did work from 7 o’clock in the morning till 7 o’clock in the 
evening, he clocked into a department, he clocked into another one, he went two hours 
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here, three hours there, he did everything to get it [permanent contract]! Now he can 
breathe, he got the permanent contract and now he stands up for himself a little, but 
before he was accepting everything. 
Or, as explained by a trade unionist in the UK, ‘It’s also the fear that if I speak up, will I get 
fired? I have encountered a lot of people who are scared of speaking up, of saying, or 
complaining about things at all’ (Trade Unionist 2, UK). This pressure was particularly felt 
by those who had been employed by the same hirer for a longer time and who were hoping to 
be made permanent in the future, or at least to see their contract renewed. In those cases, the 
pressure was further heightened by peer competition with other TA co-workers, especially 
when it was known that only a limited number of TA workers were going to be renewed or 
when there were only a few permanent positions available at the workplace. This resulted in 
tensions among co-workers and in a spiraling upward trend in workload and a downward trend 
in the quality of working conditions. Thus, this pressure to make a good impression did not 
act only at the individual level but, whenever there were other TA workers competing for the 
same job positions, it resulted in social pressure towards maximisation of individual effort. 
These findings confirm what previously argued by several authors within the precariousness 
literature (e.g. Pocock et al., 2005; Pedaci, 2007) who found an increased sense of competition 
among workers in temporary employment. 
It can be argued that this can be potentially used by employers as a divide and conquer strategy, 
creating competition instead of collaboration among the temporary workforce, but also 
between the standard and temporary workforce, with the former feeling the pressure of not 
being competed out by temporary workers. This possible strategy was also emphasised by a 
trade unionist in the UK who commented, ‘it is a huge weapon in the hands of the hirer!’ 
(Trade Unionist, 1, UK). This argument had already been discussed by radical theorists in the 
1970s as regards labour market segmentation in mature industrial economies within a Marxist 
perspective (see Reich et al., 1973), who claimed that employers voluntarily divide the 
workforce to increase competition. It has however been ignored in more recent dualist 
discourses, who have downplayed the strategies employers might pursue in increasing 
workers’ productivity. Among authors from the organisational literature, Uzzi and Barsness 
(1998) highlight the use of temporary contracts as a possible strategy by employers to reduce 
conflicts at the workplace and to increase workers’ compliance. This situation appeared to be 
more serious in Italy, where the economy was still in recession and employment opportunities 
were scant in a context of rising unemployment. Furthermore, considering that Bologna was a 
relatively well-off city in the Italian context in terms of unemployment rate, we might expect 
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the situation to be much more severe in other areas of the country with higher unemployment 
rates and slacker labour markets. 
The possibility of not being employed in the future did not only affect working time and 
workload. A significant minority of workers in both countries (8 in the UK and 6 in Italy) went 
to work even when sick, in order not to reduce the chances to have their contract renewed, or 
to be re-employed by the same agency. By going to work when sick they could show they 
were ‘hardworking’, increasing the hirer’s incentive to keep them or the agency to re-employ 
them. This was generally perceived as a significant disadvantage, but which could not be 
avoided given their limited bargaining power. ‘I never stayed home sick, I went to work even 
with a slight temperature, I felt, I felt I didn’t want to miss [work], as I feared of being left 
without work’ (Mariangela). ‘Colds and coughs and all those things, you might take a day off 
to recover so that you don’t make everyone else sick, but I just power through’ (Claire). This 
threat was not only due to the workers’ abstract fears but is was often solicited by hirers’ 
practices. As Paolo commented, ‘I was never on sick leave, but a colleague of mine who 
claimed his sick leave in the first month [of assignment], he did not get renewed until 
December’. Thus, having a permanent contract was perceived as the only way to avoid this 
pressure and being able to take sick leave when ill.  
 
Hence, although TA workers are legally entitled to equal treatment with regard to sick leave 
compared to standard employees, in practice this was not always the case. The comparison 
between the possibility to claim sick leave as a TA worker and as a permanent worker was 
ironically commented by an Italian trade unionist, ‘They [the hirers] ask you ‘Now that you 
have been made permanent you got ill immediately, how come before you never got ill?’ This 
is not a joke, I’m being serious!’ (Trade Unionist 2, Italy). It has to be specified that, although 
the perceived impossibility to take sick leave were more common for people who had been 
employed for relatively short periods, this situation was not confined to them. Moreover, in 
the British case, as we will see in chapter 7, section 7.4, the difficulties in taking sick leave 
were further complicated by the limited income protection provided to TA workers during 
sickness, creating a cumulative disadvantage in cases of sickness.  
 
Furthermore, in two cases, one in each country, a chronic health condition and a disability 
were hidden from the hirer for the same reason. These two workers did not want to jeopardise 
their contract renewal and they did not want to mention their problem to the agency to avoid 
not to be called in the future for an assignment. Although anti-discrimination policies are in 
place in both countries, they were not thought to provide adequate protection, as the actual 
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practices of hirers were perceived to easily circumvent those regulations.  For instance, 
Francesca suffers from a relatively rare chronic health issue46 for which she had to receive a 
treatment at the hospital on a monthly basis. However, as the hospital only provided the service 
during working hours, she did not wish to ask the hirer for sick leave for those days, as she 
was worried about the renewal of her contract. Instead, she opted for having the treatment 
administered to her by a friend who is a nurse, which is formally illegal and considered to be 
of high risk. As she pointed out: 
 
It is a big problem! Yes, I could take sick leave, but I am already sick because of this 
health issue, I cannot also ask for that […] And I cannot say I have [the health issue] 
because that would be a good reason to lay me off. 
A partly different example is the one of Andrew, who suffers from a mild disability as he is 
dyspraxic and dyscalculic, and who also decided to hide this from his hirer, to avoid 
jeopardising his employment position. As he commented, 
 I have a mild disability, I have dyspraxia. And also I have dyscalculia, which is a 
disability regarding maths and numeracy, and I’ve not really been able to tell my hirers 
about that. It’s a kind of contradictory situation – if I was to be honest with them, I 
probably wouldn’t be hired, or I might get fired; if I told them after, I’d be hired, but if 
I don’t tell them, it means I have to cover it up and pretend that it doesn’t exist. 
Thus, even where equal treatment policies are present and anti-discrimination legislation 
provides formal protection against discriminatory practices, these workers refrained from 
exercising those rights for fear of hampering their employment prospects. Therefore, their 
condition of ricattabilità can be argued to contribute to worsening their working conditions 
compared with those of standard workers, who enjoyed comparatively higher individual 
bargaining power because of their more secure employment status.  
Furthermore, the limited bargaining power did not manifest itself only implicitly through the 
objective power imbalance created by the insecure employment status of the interviewees. At 
a second level of ricattabilità, hirers and line managers explicitly referred to the possibility of 
stabilisation and to contract renewals in order to exercise control over TA workers. In those 
cases, which were experienced by six interviewees (two in the UK and four in Italy), we can 
talk about explicit blackmailing by hirers and line managers based on the employment status 
of workers. This was perceived as a form of abuse by the interviewees, who considered this 
behaviour very unfair. For instance, Alberto shared the case of a colleague, who was employed 
on a 32-hour weekly contract and who did not go to work on a Friday, as he had already 
                                                            




completed his contractual weekly hours, ‘The line manager said, “Why didn’t you come [on 
Friday]? Do you know that your contract is expiring?” Do you think is this something he 
should say?’. Or Andrew, who claimed, ‘They’ve said to me, you’d better behave or you won’t 
be kept any longer than a year!’. Hence, hirers and line-managers used these threats to obtain 
more from the worker, being it more work effort, longer working time or better compliance. 
In those cases, the workers felt powerless in reacting to those threats, for fear of losing the job.  
It can be said that in those cases, their temporary employment status was explicitly used at the 
workplace to control the workforce, an argument which was initially put forward in the 
segmentation literature, especially by radical theory (see, for instance, Reich et al., 1973), but 
which has been mostly ignored in the contemporary dualism literature. Nevertheless, a number 
of authors in the precariousness literature (e.g. Pedaci, 2010; McKay and Markova, 2010) have 
argued that the risk of being dismissed plays an important role as a disciplinary mechanism in 
the control of the temporary workforce. The way in which explicit references to the TA 
workers’ employment status by line managers or hirers translated into a felt pressure was 
clearly explained by an Italian trade unionist: 
You are much more liable to blackmailing, you can enforce your rights much less 
because, if you are asked to do some overtime and you answer ‘No, sorry, tonight I 
cannot, I have already got something planned’, [the hirer answers] ‘OK, but be 
careful!’. What is triggered in the worker’s head? That if you say no, the hirer will tell 
the temporary agency that you didn’t do overtime or that you aren’t willing to do 
overtime work and then you won’t be working there anymore. These are perverse 
mechanisms which have spread out. (Trade Unionist 2, Italy) 
At the third level of ricattabilità, which was found only in Italy in two cases, this imbalance 
in bargaining power resulted in outright abuses on the part of the hirer. These included the 
refusal to pay overtime or to respect formal working-time rules. These abuses were allowed in 
cases in which the hirer knew the workers were not willing to jeopardise their employment 
situation by claiming their legal rights. Given the limited availability of data, it is difficult to 
explain why cases of abuses were present only in Italy. A first, tentative explanation, could be 
related to the fact that more Italian TA workers were employed temporarily for long periods 
of time, seeing their prospects of being made permanent constantly delayed and hoping to 
become permanent at some point in the future (see chapter 5).  Another explanation might be 
related to the economic cycle of the two countries. While, at the time of the interviews, the 
UK enjoyed moderate economic and employment growth (1.9% real GDP growth rate and -
0.3% unemployment growth rate in 2013, EUROSTAT, 2017a; EUROSTAT, 2017b), Italy 
was experiencing a prolonged economic recession and a deteriorating employment situation (-
1.7% real GDP growth rate and 1.4% unemployment growth rate in 2013, EUROSTAT, 
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2017a; EUROSTAT, 2017b). It can thus be argued that job opportunities in the Italian case 
were much fewer, and this further strengthened the hirers’ power vis-à-vis TA workers, 
allowing for situations of abuse of power. Nevertheless, these are only tentative explanations 
and further research would be needed in order to uncover the reasons between the cross-
country differences. 
Nevertheless, being a TA worker did not translate as perceived lower bargaining power for all 
interviewees. In five cases, (two in Italy and three the UK), TAW was perceived as increasing 
the workers’ bargaining position vis-à-vis the hirer and limited the amount of pressure workers 
experienced in a job. These included all but one case where the interviewees were employed 
as a ‘buffer’, in relatively short assignments and when they knew their contract was not going 
to be renewed. Hence, they knew that no matter the effort put into the job, there were no 
possibility or renewal or stabilisation. In these cases, the workers stated that a TA contract 
gave them more bargaining power, as they were allowed to quit whenever they thought the 
working conditions were not appealing to them, given that the job was of limited duration 
anyway. This experience has already been highlighted by some scholars in the organisational 
psychology literature (see, for instance, Staufenbiel and König, 2010), who claim that reduced 
bargaining power is only perceived when workers are hoping to increase their future 
employment opportunities. Furthermore, the economic support of other family members 
(either the partner or the parents) in the case of unemployment proved to be an important factor 
behind the workers’ perception of strength in bargaining power, as workers did not fear the 
loss of income in case the contract ended. 
In conclusion, both in Italy and in the UK, individual bargaining power appeared to be 
negatively affected by the interviewees’ employment status. In particular, this appeared related 
to the possibilities of future employment. The hirer’s power to decide about the continuation 
of the employment relationship and the agency’s power to re-employ the workers on other 
assignments put TA workers in a weak bargaining position and this was experienced as a 
source of disadvantage compared to standard employees. The consequences of the limited 
bargaining power took many different forms in the experiences of the interviewees, ranging 
from the felt pressure to always do one’s best, to outright abuse of workers’ rights. What is 
relevant in the comparison with institutional divides is that the limited bargaining power 
hampered the ability of many interviewees to claim rights which are guaranteed by law. Thus, 
the analysis of the experience of TA workers revealed how, in both countries, formal equality 
between standard and TA workers or small institutional disadvantages were experienced as a 
serious divide at the workplace, given the weakened position in exercising those rights. 
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Therefore, it can be argued that even where no formal institutional divide is present, the weaker 
bargaining position prevented these workers from achieving full equality in the workplace, 
hampering the possibilities of enforcing those rights in practice. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that disadvantages in their employment experience, particularly 
when it comes to employment security, spilled over into a weaker power position which 
affected their working conditions. Both in Italy and in the UK, becoming permanent was seen 
as the only way to re-balance power relations, as the security of the employment contract 
limited the hirer’s bargaining power and greatly reduced the liability to be blackmailed. In that 
respect, it can be argued that in those cases, TA workers suffered from a cumulative 
disadvantage, as their insecure employment status negatively influenced their ability to 
improve their working conditions, given the lower bargaining power it provided.  
While the disadvantage in bargaining power was found in both countries, TA workers in the 
Italian case appeared to be worse off compared to their British counterparts, as they found 
themselves in a weaker bargaining position and a minority of them was subjected to outright 
abuse of the hirer’s power.  Although a full explanation of this difference would need further 
investigation, a tentative one might be found in the fact that TA workers in Italy tended to be 
employed for longer time periods and experienced many more renewals with the same hirer. 
Furthermore, the contrasting economic situations of the two countries in the period in which 
interviews were carried out may also have played a role. The more limited availability of other 
job opportunities made the workers in Italy more reluctant to go against their hirer as the cost 
opportunity of losing the job was higher.  
 
6.4 Collective Representation  
Individual bargaining was not the only field in which TA workers experienced a weak power 
position. As is argued in this section, in both countries, TA workers presented multiple 
disadvantages compared to standard workers in collective representation and bargaining. As 
has been discussed in chapter 4, section 4.6, the two countries have different employment 
relations system and collective representation of TA workers is organised in different ways. 
In the UK, there is no union specifically representing TA workers or, more generally, atypical 
workers, in a context in which unions have limited power in influencing decisions at the 
workplace. Collective bargaining is decentralised, un-coordinated and it covers only a limited 
share of the workforce (Arrowsmith, 2009; Voss et al., 2013). By contrast, in Italy, each of the 
main trade union confederations has created a union specifically representing atypical workers. 
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Collective bargaining is comparatively coordinated and it covers large part of the workforce. 
At the firm level, unions, at least among medium and large employers, tend to have 
comparatively high bargaining power, but bargaining generally happens between the employer 
and the sectoral union (Burroni and Carrieri, 2011; Benassi and Vlandas, 2015). Nevertheless, 
as we will see, this different organisation of collective representation was not reflected in 
systematically different experiences among the interviewees.  
The overwhelming majority of interviewees in both countries were not members of a trade 
union. This is in accordance with previous empirical findings (e.g. Vandaele and Leschke, 
2010; Pedaci, 2010; Benatti and Vlandas, 2015; Pulignano et al., 2016). What was relevant to 
investigate were the reasons why the interviewees were not part of a trade union. While some 
of the reasons for not being a member of a trade union could be similar to those of standard 
workers, others are clearly linked to the specific employment status of the interviewees. Some 
of the most common reasons mentioned by the interviewees were not different from those we 
might have expected from workers on a standard contract. In both Italy and the UK, three main 
reasons emerged: ideological position against trade unions, indifference towards trade unions 
and perceptions that unions were not helpful. This is again in line with previous findings in 
the literature (e.g. Bryson and Freeman, 2006; Burroni and Carrieri, 2011). Specifically, 12 
interviewees (five in Italy and seven in the UK) were quite skeptical towards trade unions and 
they did not trust their role in the labour market, mostly because of their supposed political 
affiliation. Instead, nine interviewees mentioned their limited knowledge about trade unions 
and their lack of interest for and awareness of trade unions. ‘Never joined. I’ve never… it’s 
never come into my mind. I don’t really know…’ (Tom). ‘I’ve never joined, I don’t know, I’ve 
never thought about it, to be honest.’ (Giada). This lack of interest towards trade unions 
appeared to be more prominent among the younger cohorts, who have more limited experience 
of trade unions as a source of collective representation.  
Furthermore, the distance towards trade unions was partly explained by trade unionists both 
in Italy and in the UK as a general cultural shift towards individualisation, which emphasises 
self-reliance instead of collective solidarity. This was argued to have undermined the sense of 
collective representation, making workers reluctant to rely on trade unions for help. This was 
also in line with what has been previously argued in the literature (e.g. Vandaele and Leschke, 
2010; Hänninen et al., 2013), seeing a more individualistic attitude among workers as a 
contributing reason for the decline in collective representation among all workers. A further 
reason which was mentioned in nine cases (three in Italy and six in the UK), was the perception 
of trade unions as not being useful in the current workplace. This was particularly common 
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for those who had been employed by small hirers, with only a few employees. In those cases, 
union representatives were generally not present and most co-workers were not members of a 
trade union. This is also in accordance with previous studies (see, for example, Vandaele and 
Leschke, 2010), which found a lower unionisation rate in small and medium-sized firms. 
Furthermore, in the UK, the lack of recognition of unions by some hirers, caused union 
membership to be perceived as useless, given the lack of opportunity for negotiation with those 
hirers. All these reasons can be argued to mirror general workers’ attitudes towards trade 
unions, without highlighting any aspect which could be directly attributed to the fact of being 
a TA worker. 
Nevertheless, both in Italy and in the UK, other reasons could be specifically attributed to the 
interviewees’ employment status. Firstly, following the discussion from the previous section, 
‘ricattabilità’ appeared an important reason for why TA workers refrained from joining a 
union in both countries, though this has often been ignored in both the dualism literature and 
in the revitalisation literature, with a few exceptions (e.g. Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). The 
majority of them felt that joining a union could hamper any prospects of stabilisation or simply 
the assignment renewal. This was confirmed by trade unionists in both countries. ‘They will 
never fight their hirers because they can be dismissed anytime which is a huge weapon for a 
hirer’ (Trade Unionist 2, UK). ’Along those very long precarious paths, workers are 
unapproachable, they will never go against their hirer’ (Trade Unionist 1, Italy). Thus, as 
already highlighted in the precariousness literature (see, for instance, Magatti and Fullin, 2002, 
Pedaci, 2007; Hatton, 2014) the insecure employment status translated into an unwillingness 
to join a union in order not to be seen as a ‘troublemaker’ by either the hirer or the agency.  
In both countries, even when it came to meetings organised by unions or other collective 
representation events, TA workers and other temporary workers were much less likely to 
participate than permanent workers, again because of liability to blackmailing. This was 
clearly explained by a trade unionist in Italy, who in vain tried to convince TA workers to 
participate in a trade union meeting: 
 [I asked] “why don’t you come to the meeting?” “Well, if I come to the assembly I am 
seen to go listening to what the trade union says, and what if then they don’t call me 
anymore?” […] So even in this case there’s the impossibility to claim a right. (Trade 
Unionist 2, Italy) 
Hence, the risk of hampering their employment prospects contributed to preventing workers 
from joining trade unions, further weakening their bargaining position. It can be argued that 
employment precariousness translated into the inability to be collectively represented, a 
situation which was also found when it came to individual representation (see section 6.3 of 
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this chapter). Once again, we can see how a disadvantage in the employment experience spills 
over into a disadvantage in the working experience, given the more limited power to represent 
their interests collectively.  
A second reason, already highlighted by other authors (e.g. Vandaele and Leschke, 2010), was 
related to the monetary expenses of trade union membership. As we will see in detail in the 
next chapter (see chapter 7, section 7.2), income insecurity due to the employment status made 
workers in both countries unwilling to incur in extra expenses, in order to save income in case 
of unemployment. This also meant not joining a trade union in order not to pay the union fees. 
As explicitly mentioned by Fabio, ‘I’m not a member because, until I don’t get a stable job, 
in the end, even those few euros that go to the union, they come handy in my pockets’. Many 
unions both in Italy and in the UK have developed discounted fees for atypical workers, 
workers on low income and the unemployed and this, according to the trade unionists 
interviewed, seemed to have proved successful both in terms of recruitment and retention. 
Nevertheless, I did not analyse data of trade union membership among these employment 
categories to provide adequate evidence for this. What could instead be argued is that at times, 
even the lower union membership fees proved a barrier to joining a union for four 
interviewees, or at least contributed to disincentivising membership. Also in this case we can 
see how a disadvantage in one dimension (e.g. income) spills over into disadvantage in another 
(e.g. collective representation).  
Furthermore, as previously underlined by Gumbrell-McCormick (2011), the scarce economic 
resources atypical workers are bringing in compared to the amount of work they require 
created also a disincentive on the union side to recruit these workers. As argued by trade 
unionists both in Italy and in the UK, ‘It isn’t economical for unions to have, so that’s the 
biggest problem unions have is that you don’t like to make a big effort to recruit temp workers, 
cause they require more services’ (Trade Unionist 1, UK). ‘There’s a lot of work to be done 
and with very few resources’ (Trade Unionist 2, Italy). Therefore, the monetary aspect of union 
membership appeared to act as a disincentive both for TA workers and for unions in terms of 
membership and recruitment, acting as a further factor in reducing opportunities for collective 
representation for atypical workers.  
A third reason was related to the instability of their job position affecting the ‘precariously 
unstable’ in both countries. Given the continuous changes of employment in this group of 
interviewees and the awareness that they might only be employed in a job for a limited period 
of time, they refrained from joining a union. This reason has often been highlighted in the 
literature studying unionisation among atypical workers (e.g. Burroni and Carrieri, 2011; 
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Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). This reason appeared to be more common in the UK, where 
there is no union specifically representing TA workers. Workers in the UK felt less 
incentivised to join a union if they were uncertain they would work in the same job in the 
medium or long term. Also, from the unions’ perspective, it is more difficult to both recruit 
and to retain TA workers, as most of them keep changing jobs with relatively high frequency. 
As argued by a British trade unionist, ‘it’s more difficult to organise people in work without a 
career or if not employed in the long, or at least medium term’ (Trade Unionist 2, UK). Hence, 
the frequent job changes among the ‘precariously unstable’ created another disincentive on 
both the workers’ and unions’ side for collective presentation. Moreover, as pointed out by 
Gumbrell-McCormick (2011), this meant that even in case TA workers joined a union, their 
membership might be short-lived as they might change job or even sector in a relatively short 
span of time. This problem appeared to have been partly overcome in the Italian case through 
the creation of union federations representing TA and other atypical workers. Therefore, in 
Italy, the union can represent the worker even when moving between different assignments, 
in a diverse range of occupations. Nevertheless, some workers in Italy still felt disincentivised, 
claiming that unions mostly represented standard workers. This leads us to the fourth reason 
of why TA workers did not join a union.  
The final reason was related to the perception that unions at the workplace were for standard 
workers. In that respect, little difference existed between the two countries, notwithstanding 
the very different organisation of collective representation for TA workers. In the UK, TA 
workers explained that they might change not only job but also occupation quite frequently, 
and they found it difficult to find a union that could represent them. Moreover, within their 
current occupation, they did not find the unions particularly keen on representing their interests 
as TA workers. As Paul, 42, complained, ‘a lot of people like me […] don’t wanna join, hourly 
paid people, hourly paid and casualised, specifically temporary, the union is for permanent 
staff, they don’t care about us!’. The trade unionists I interviewed were perfectly aware of the 
issue and they recognised that unions tended to privilege standard workers’ interests. The main 
reasons for this were, on the one hand, the already mentioned difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining atypical workers and, on the other hand, the fact that, unlike standard workers, they 
were not expected to be working there ‘for long’, and they privileged the long-term interests 
of the standard workforce. Nevertheless, in recent years, many trade unions in the UK have 
started to address the issue of employment casualisation, aware that an increasing share of the 
workforce is employed through atypical contracts (Heery and Abbott, 2000; Heery, 2004). 
Nevertheless, as recognised by the trade unionists interviewed, the initiatives were in most 
cases still embryonal and need to be further developed in the future.  
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By contrast, in Italy, where unions specifically representing atypical workers exist, the issue 
was related to the more limited voice given to these unions compared with their sectoral 
counterparts. As I have already explained in chapter 4, section 4.6, unions are recognised to 
have greater bargaining power at the workplace compared to the UK, especially in medium 
and large firms. Nevertheless, collective bargaining at the workplace happens between the 
employer and the trade union representing the sector, while the trade union representing 
atypical workers can take part in the negotiation but in a more marginal position (Burroni and 
Carrieri, 2011). This represented a weakness in the experience of the interviewed workers, 
who felt in several workplaces as if their voice did not count, especially in those cases where 
the standard workers’ and their interests diverged. In those cases, during company-level 
collective bargaining, it was the interests of standard workers which were privileged. An 
example will help illustrate the case. In a firm on the outskirts of Bologna, the employer had 
to cut costs and offered either to reduce the temporary workforce or to decrease the salary of 
all workers. In this case, during the negotiations with the union, it was decided to cut the 
temporary workforce, in order not to reduce the earnings of the standard workers. This was 
confirmed by both an interviewee and a trade union representative of the firm. Although this 
was the most striking example, several others were mentioned both by workers and by trade 
unionists.  
Some authors have pointed out that unions in Italy have been involved in a process of 
stabilisation in several workplaces, bargaining to have temporary workers moved into standard 
employment (e.g. Burroni and Carrieri, 2011). Nevertheless, in a context of economic crisis 
where employers were keen to reduce their workforce, it appeared that unions tended to 
privilege the interests of their core constituency of standard workers, confirming a strategy 
which has already been highlighted by some scholars in the revitalisation literature (Cerviño, 
2000; Durazzi, 2015). It appears that unions in the Italian context were perceived as pursuing 
what has been described as ‘partial inclusion strategy’ (Cerviño, 2000, p.10) or a strategy of 
‘selective inclusiveness’ (Durazzi, 2015, p.26). Unions in Italy were experienced as unwilling 
to protect the interests of ‘outsiders’ if they clashed with those of ‘insiders’. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the existence of trade unions representing atypical workers could not alter the 
representation divide they have compare to standard employees, given that standard workers 
are better represented in an employment context where unions tend to have generally more 
bargaining power compared to the UK, especially in medium and large firms.  
All these reasons contributed to the low inclination to join a union among the interviewees in 
both countries. Moreover, they produced the paradoxical situation in which workers were 
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waiting to become standard to join a union. This was also confirmed by trade unionists in both 
countries, who further highlighted the issue that many workers who were union members while 
permanent, as soon as they became unemployed or atypical stopped being union members. As 
argued by a trade unionist in the UK, ‘People who were on a permanent basis after they 
become unemployed or become casual workers think of leaving the union’ (Trade Unionist 1, 
UK). Or as claimed by a trade unionist in Italy (Trade Unionist 1, Italy):  
We have seen situations in which workers who have always been members, and because 
the firm was in crisis and left them without work and they start working for agencies, 
they do not become members anymore! Although they were in the past…more than one 
case, more than one!  
Having described the reasons for not joining the unions, it might be important to investigate 
why five interviewees (three in Italy and two in the UK) did actually join a union.  It has to be 
highlighted that the majority of those who were trade union members, became such after 
having incurred in a problem of the workplace, including verbal abuse or a lack of transparency 
in payslips. In those cases, the union was perceived as the only organisation that could help 
them, protecting them from abuses and infringement of rights. This type of behaviour was 
confirmed by the trade unionists interviewed both in Italy and in the UK. This created a serious 
problem for the trade unions, who saw recruitment as closely associated with an immediate 
increase in workload and costs. This aggravated the problem of limited resources for a high 
workload already mentioned, given that TA workers provided little incoming resources to the 
unions but contributed to immediately increasing costs. This was regarded by unions in both 
countries as a further disincentive to recruiting TA workers. 
Given these issues concerning being represented by a union, two workers in the UK and one 
in Italy decided to get in contact with alternative organisations which were seen to better suit 
their needs. The two organisations, one in Bologna and one in Edinburgh, were both linked to 
radical political movements, which addressed several problems beyond casualisation of 
employment, including a fight against poverty and inequality but also, in the Bologna case, 
environmental issues, and in the Edinburgh case, benefit sanctioning. Becoming a member of 
other, less institutionalised groups and organisations, which were felt as representing atypical 
workers’ rights, has been highlighted by some scholars as a workers’ strategy to find a form 
of collective representation failing more established channels (Choi and Mattoni, 2010; Della 
Porta et al., 2013; Vogiatzoglou,2013). Nevertheless, both organisations lack a direct 
legitimation at the workplace to represent those workers, mostly acting to raise public 
awareness on those issues through campaigning and demonstrations. They have no power to 
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bargain at the workplace and thus cannot directly improve the employment and working 
conditions of these workers.  
In conclusion, in both countries, TA workers faced multiple disadvantages in being 
collectively represented compared to standard workers. It can be argued that their employment 
status negatively affected their ability to be represented by a union, further reducing their 
opportunities to improve their employment and working conditions. One of the factors, 
common in both countries, was ‘ricattabilità’ which, as we have already seen, played an 
important role in limiting the workers’ individual bargaining power. The issue of ricattabilità 
has mostly been ignored in the dualism literature, which has focused prevalently on the relative 
stronger bargaining position of ‘insiders’, rather than on the weakened position of ‘outsiders’. 
In that respect, the precariousness literature provides more valuable insights, highlighting that 
even where rights are formally guaranteed, they are not necessarily enforced in practice 
(Magatti and Fullin, 2002; Pedaci, 2010; McKay and Markova, 2010). Therefore, as already 
highlighted, even where no formal institutional divide was present, the employment status of 
TA workers engendered a difficulty in joining an organisation providing collective 
representation, further reducing the workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis standard workers. 
Moreover, other factors connected to either income insecurity (cost of union membership) or 
employment instability (difficulty to be represented in different occupations), show how a 
disadvantage in one employment-related dimension could spill over into a disadvantage in 
another dimension. In that respect, the existence of trade unions representing non-standard 
workers in Italy appears to have partly resolved the latter issue. We can argue that these 
workers faced a cumulative disadvantage, as the insecure employment status spilled over into 
a more limited possibility to be represented by a union, further increasing the divide with 
standard workers, who experienced higher employment security and, because of that, could 
access collective representation. In both countries, this produced the paradoxical situation in 
which workers tended to wait to join a union until they had achieved an employment status 
which already guaranteed higher employment and income security and more individual 
bargaining power.  
A further relevant finding was that, both in Italy and in the UK, unions were perceived to 
privilege the representation of standard workers, and although this was due to the organisation 
of unions in the UK, which tend to be organised along occupational criteria, in Italy, where 
unions specifically representing atypical workers do exist, this was due to the more limited 
bargaining power of TA workers’ unions compared to sectoral unions at the workplace. As 
already mentioned, these findings are in line with what has been previously argued by some 
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authors in the revitalisation literature (Cerviño, 2000; Durazzi, 2015), who have argued that 
unions protect ‘outsiders’ only as long as it does not negatively affect their core constituency 
of ‘insiders’. Nevertheless, it can also be argued to reflect hypotheses from the dualism 
literature (e.g. Rueda, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010), given that unions are perceived to be 
protecting the interests of standard workers at the expense of TA workers. In that respect, 
workers in neither country were experiencing a larger divide in collective representation 
compared to the other, as both presented similar obstacles to joining a union and both 
perceived unions as a bargaining tool for standard workers, which marginalised them, despite 
the different organisation of collective representation in Italy and the UK. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that both in Italy and in the UK TA workers experienced multiple 
disadvantages at the workplace compared to standard workers. These disadvantages, such as 
in pay, working time, job content and relations with colleagues, did not generally stem from 
disadvantages created by the institutional regulations, but from social practices at the 
workplace where TA workers were either openly discriminated against because of their 
employment status or where the fact that they were often the ‘newly arrived’, especially among 
the ‘precariously unstable’, put them at the bottom of an unwritten social hierarchy. It has to 
be again emphasised that only a minority of workplaces presented those forms of 
discrimination, but, given the numerous changes of jobs among the ‘precariously unstable’, 
the majority of interviewees experienced some form of discrimination in one or more 
workplaces. In that respect, no systematic difference could be identified between the two 
countries, as similar discriminatory practices were present. Moreover, the intrinsic 
characteristics of TAW, such as the fact that it was often used as a ‘buffer’ or the fact that the 
workers frequently changed workplaces, also contributed to fostering a divide between them 
and standard workers. It has to be specified that while the open forms of discrimination were 
regarded as unfair, the disadvantages related to their frequent job changes were considered 
part of the nature of their form of employment and they were thus regarded as at least partly 
legitimate. 
It can be argued that despite formal equal treatment guaranteed by the institutional framework 
in the two countries, the employment status was experienced as a source of division between 
TA and standard workers. Other factors played a significant role in shaping this divide, ones 
which have been generally ignored in the dualism literature. In that respect, insights from the 
precariousness literature have allowed for a better informed picture of the actual disadvantages 
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experienced by TA workers at the workplace, also contributing to highlighting differences 
within the sample. In that respect, rather than between countries, differences in the experience 
could be identified based on the length of the work experience, which brings us back to the 
earlier distinction between the ‘precariously unstable’ and the ‘precariously stable’. The 
shorter the work experience, the more likely the disadvantage experienced by the interviewee. 
As we have seen, this applied to annual leave, relations with colleagues and job content. In 
this context, the ‘precariously unstable’ appeared to experience more serious disadvantages 
compared to the ‘precariously stable’. 
Furthermore, these disadvantages at the workplace were complemented in some cases by other 
disadvantages related to the job position rather than the employment contract. We have seen 
this to be the case, for instance, when it came working time and job content, were TA workers 
were more likely to be working unsocial hours or doing more unpleasant tasks. Although this 
does not stem from the employment contract, the literature has found that TA and, more 
generally, atypical workers are disproportionally employed in jobs and occupations where 
working conditions are comparatively poor (see, for instance, Letourneux, 1998; Goudswaard 
and de Nanteuil, 2000; Felstead and Gallie, 2004). Contrary to many of the previous practices, 
these were not perceived as forms of unfair treatment. However, this may foster a cumulative 
disadvantage, where TA workers are employed in jobs with poorer working conditions and 
where their employment status contributes to them worsening further. In that respect, it can be 
argued that TA workers experience a combination of an absolute and a relative disadvantage 
due, respectively, to the types of occupations they are more likely to be employed in and to 
their employment status.  
These disadvantages in working conditions brought us to discuss the bargaining power 
workers had in improving their working and employment conditions. As we have seen, the 
‘ricattabilità’, or liability to be blackmailed as it can be translated, constituted the main factor 
behind the limited individual bargaining power of these workers and it also played a significant 
role in discouraging them from being represented by a trade union. Here, the analysis of their 
individual experience revealed that even where formal equality between standard and TA 
workers exists, the latter have generally much less power to have their rights enforced and this 
translates into an experienced disadvantage in practice. Therefore, the weaker bargaining 
power contributed to shaping the divide in working conditions between them and their 
standard co-workers, a disadvantage which does not stem from an institutional divide but still 
has its source in the different employment status. Once again, it can be argued that these 
workers were presented with a cumulative disadvantage, given that employment 
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precariousness caused not only a divide between TA and standard workers in working 
conditions, but also provided them with less individual and collective power to counteract this 
divide.  
A difference emerged between those who were hoping to secure employment opportunities in 
the future, such as seeing their contract renewed, being called for other assignments from the 
agency, or securing a permanent position, and those who knew their job experience did not 
provide any future employment prospect. In the latter case, the temporary nature of the job 
actually increased the perceived bargaining power. This categorisation has been highlighted 
by a number of authors in both the precariousness and the organisational psychology literature 
(e.g. Marler et al., 2002; Guest, 2004, Fullin, 2004). 
Furthermore, TA workers experienced multiple disadvantages compared to standard workers 
in collective representation, it being more difficult for them to be represented by a trade union. 
Again, the employment status created some specific obstacles which hampered their ability to 
be collectively represented, further reducing their bargaining power vis-à-vis standard 
workers. This was similar both in the UK and in Italy, although the two countries feature 
different collective representation systems. Specifically, TA workers in both countries 
perceived unions to privilege the interests of standard workers. In the UK, this was due to the 
lack of existence of unions representing TA workers and with unions still hardly considering 
atypical workers’ interests at the workplace. In Italy, the bargaining power of unions 
representing atypical workers was perceived as marginal compared to that of sectoral unions 
representing standard workers.  
This is in line with the argument from the dualism literature that atypical workers feel less 
represented than standard workers (e.g. Rueda, 2007) but it can be said to be also in line with 
the argument brought forward by some authors of the revitalisation literature (e.g. Cerviño, 
2000) which states that unions protect the interests of the outsiders only as long as they are not 
in conflict with the interests of insiders.  However, the overall result was that TA workers did 
not feel adequately protected by the unions in either of the two countries and that they felt at 
a disadvantage compared to their standard co-workers, with no systematic difference between 
the two countries. The only significant difference emerging in the comparison between the 
two countries was that the existence of trade unions representing atypical workers in Italy 
facilitated the representation of the workers who frequently changed workplace or occupation, 































7. Income Protection Experience 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the income protection experience of TA workers. I first analyse the 
types of disadvantage experienced by TA workers in the two countries when it comes to 
income from employment. As is shown, the major difference in the experience was between 
the ‘precariously unstable’ and the ‘precariously stable’ rather than between the two countries, 
with the ‘precariously unstable’ experiencing the highest degree of income insecurity, being 
unable to have a secure income both in the short and in the long term. The following sections 
analyse the experience of income protection in order to understand how this contributed to 
shaping income insecurity, either in counteracting or in fostering it.  The experience of income 
protection is discussed for three main social risks: unemployment, sickness and retirement.  
As already mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.4.3, these can be regarded as the main social risks 
which are experienced by the majority of workers at some point in their lifetime.  
The analysis revealed a more complex picture of the disadvantages experienced by TA 
workers vis-à-vis standard workers compared to what we might have expected from 
institutional divides. More precisely, the experience of protection in case of unemployment 
shows that contribution-based benefits in Italy were perceived as inclusive despite a divide 
being present depending on the contribution history. At the same time, means-testing together 
with other features of labour market policies in the UK has fostered a perceived divide between 
benefit claimants and non-claimants. The experience of protection in case of sickness confirms 
the importance of access to contractual schemes in both countries, while at the same time it 
shows how an apparently minor characteristic of the statutory sick benefit in the UK produces 
a significant individual disadvantage. Finally, the experience of protection in retirement shows 
important differences between the two countries, reiterating the importance of access to 
occupational schemes in the UK context, while at the same time revealing common issues 
among TA workers both in Italy and in the UK.  
The last part of the chapter discusses individual sources of protection, namely formal credit 
and the family. The analysis shows how, in both countries, income insecurity also fosters an 
inability to access formal credit as a source of income protection. By contrast, the family acts 
as an important source of income protection in both countries, but it plays a more significant 
role in the Italian rather than in the British context.  
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The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 7.2 analyses the issue of income insecurity and 
how it is reflected in multiple interrelated disadvantages. The second part of the chapter 
considers the individual experience of income protection for a number of social risks. In 
particular, section 7.3 discusses protection in case of unemployment, both with respect to 
unemployment benefits (7.3.1) and redundancy pay (7.3.2). Section 7.4 describes income 
protection in case of sickness.  Finally, section 7.5 discusses protection in the event of 
retirement, including both statutory and occupational schemes (section 7.5.1) and private 
pensions (section 7.5.2). Section 7.6 describes individual forms of income protection and how 
they contribute to the individual experience of integration/exclusion into/from the social 
system. In particular, it focuses on two providers of income protection: formal credit (section 
7.6.1) and the family (section 7.6.2). Section 7.7 discusses the relevant conclusions. 
 
7.2 The Experience of Income Insecurity  
Not having stable income prospects was regarded as a serious problem by all interviewees in 
the two countries. Income insecurity was experienced with great anxiety by the majority of 
interviewees and all but one aimed to reach standard employment, which was seen as the main 
way to achieve a secure income in the long term. As we will see in the following paragraphs, 
this lack of income security took partly different forms depending on the employment path 
followed by the interviewees, rather than between countries. 
Income insecurity affected workers similarly in both countries in many aspects of their life. 
For instance, many individual choices were strongly affected by the impossibility of making 
medium and long-term financial decisions and committing to long-term investments and 
payments, as already highlighted by several scholars in the precariousness literature (Pedaci, 
2007; Bertolini, 2009; Armano, 2010). The major long-term investment from which workers 
felt excluded was the purchase of a house. Not only would it have been extremely difficult to 
get a mortgage from a financial institution because of their employment instability (see section 
7.4.1, this chapter, for a detailed analysis on access to formal credit), but also workers 
themselves did not feel they could commit to such a long-term investment, as they might have 
not been able to pay mortgage instalments in the future, in case they lost their job and they 
were not able to secure another one straight away. Apart from buying a house, even renting a 
flat/house appeared to be difficult, as landlords often asked for a guarantor, as their insecure 
income prospects were considered unreliable. As we will see in section 7.6.2, workers had to 




Income insecurity also affected other important investments, such as buying a car, which was 
also often mentioned as an item interviewees were not able or they did not dare to purchase 
while temping. In Bryan’s, 35, words: 
You cannot get a mortgage as a temporary worker. And even if you could, you would 
have had to pay very high interest rates. And if I wanted a car, I couldn’t get a loan for 
a car. 
Or Rosanna’s, 44: 
I couldn’t buy a car. No, how can you do it? And I wouldn’t ask a loan from a bank, 
‘cause I don’t have job security, I don’t know if I will be able to pay! And then, what 
will I do? 
Furthermore, for those who had been in an unemployment-employment cycle for several years 
and for some of the ‘precariously stable’, income insecurity affected important life choices. 
Three female interviewees (two Italian, one British) lamented the impossibility to raise a child. 
As Claire, 32, said, ‘I’ll tell you what, me and my partner have decided not to have a kid for 
now. It’s simply not possible’. And Francesca, 41, ‘I could not become a mother. That is 
something that affects me deeply’. Hence, a lack of income security influenced life decisions 
which require resources over long periods, as the interviewees did not feel they were able to 
sustain those given their uncertain income prospects. This reflects previous findings from 
authors studying precariousness (e.g. Bertolini, 2009, Modena and Sabatini, 2012), who have 
highlighted how important life decision are continuously postponed without a clear plan, 
waiting to find more stable employment which can guarantee a more secure source of income. 
It can be argued that income insecurity affects important life decisions which go beyond 
employment and which have long-term repercussions in the lives of the interviewees, of 
which, some, including the decision of having a child, cannot be postponed indefinitely. 
Overall, disadvantages in long-term life planning, in housing and in any long-term investment, 
appeared to be extremely similar in both countries as no systematic difference could be 
identified.  
Among the ‘precariously unstable’ workers in the two countries, even more medium and short-
term planning was often affected. For instance, the impossibility to go on holidays or to pursue 
hobbies and leisure activities was frequently mentioned, although its relative importance was 
perceived as lower compared to the above presented long-term investments. When temping, 
most extra money was saved, as people tended to protect themselves in case of unemployment 
(see section 7.3, this chapter, for a detailed analysis of this issue). Most unnecessary expenses 
were cut as the money might be needed in the future, in case their contract was not going to 
be renewed and it would have taken long to get another assignment. This was especially the 
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case for those employed in several short-term assignments. Among the most commonly cited 
forms of consumption given up were holidays and leisure activities (such as going to a 
restaurant or playing sport). As Claire explained:  
So I have this little bit of savings which, at the moment, I can’t even think about going 
anywhere near it, cause I might need it. So at the moment it could be money for my 
holiday, it could be money towards buying a flat, it could be all these exciting things, 
but it’s not any of those things; it’s just-in-case money, what if I don’t have a job and 
need money to pay my share of the rent and my share of the bills. So it just sits there. 
Or as explained by Fabio, 44: 
You always have to cut here and there, in order to make sure that by the end of the 
month you don’t have zero [money] in case your contract is not renewed. 
On the same note, Chris, 30, remembered the things he could do at the time when he was 
permanent: 
I was able to go on holiday, or go to visit things, or go and see things, and you know, 
pursue the hobby of being in plays and doing stuff like that. 
As is discussed in depth in section 7.6.2, this chapter, these disadvantages in consumption 
could be partly compensated by provision of income from other household and family 
members, where this was available, helping workers cope with both regular expenses and long-
term investments.  
A partly different perception of income insecurity was found among the ‘precariously stable’ 
workers in the Italian context, who had been employed for several years by the same hirer, as 
they had regular employment income for several consecutive years. Workers in this group 
enjoyed income stability comparable to that of standard workers, being employed in the same 
job for many years. They did not renounce short-term expenses and they did not alter their 
consumption patterns because of their employment status. Nevertheless, as previously shown, 
they equally did not want to commit to long-term financial investments. As previously 
underlined by Della Ratta-Rinaldi et al. (2014), for these workers, the main disadvantage 
pertains to insecure income prospects in the long-run, given the uncertainty about contract 
renewal. Therefore, for workers in this group, income insecurity was closely related to 
uncertain income prospects for the future rather than to the present income situation. As we 
will see in the next few sections, this stability of income also allowed these workers easier 
access to other sources of income.  Hence, although these workers could be regarded as 
‘trapped’ in atypical employment (see chapter 5, section 5.3.4), exemplifying an employment 
divide between atypical and standard workers, their income situation can be argued to be better 
than that of the ‘precariously unstable’, given their higher income stability. It can be argued 
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that, for these workers, income insecurity presented partly different characteristics compared 
to the ‘precariously unstable’, once again highlighting the existence of two quite different 
experiences of ‘precariousness’, depending on the employment path.   
Given these disadvantages related to income insecurity, it is hardly surprising that all but one 
of the interviewees were temping voluntarily. Apart from one interviewee, all saw standard 
employment as the only way to achieve income security, as this would have given them more 
income stability in the present and more stable income prospects for the future.  The only 
exception was Mary, 44, who, after 22 years in a permanent job, decided to start temping and 
did that for a couple of years before being hired permanently. As she explained below, her 
choice was due to the fact that she could count on the savings accumulated in many years of 
standard employment and on a generous redundancy pay accrued at the end of that period, as 
well as her husband’s high earnings, a situation which can be regarded as exceptional in the 
sample. 
I loved [temping], I loved that. I liked the fact that you were learning new things and 
that you were being taught things that you could take on to another job […] No, I love 
that. I love that, but that’s just me. Because I had the money. If I didn’t land another 
temping job for 3 weeks, 4 weeks, it did not matter to us [her and her husband] at all 
because he was earning money and I had a nest egg, so it didn’t bother us but if you 
were a person who was relying on that money coming in every week, it’s a worry. 
The availability of other sources of income was perceived as fundamental in order to be 
temping in the long term, as otherwise income insecurity obliged the interviewees to look for 
more stable employment. No interviewee without another form of private income support was 
found to be voluntarily temping, as they were all looking to secure a more stable position. This 
finding helps explain the fact that no difference could be found in the two countries as regards 
the willingness to secure permanent employment, which was already highlighted when 
discussing the employment experience (see chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Employment 
precariousness and income insecurity were the two main factors behind the desire to be in 
standard employment, regardless of the different levels of employment protection granted to 
standard employees in the two countries. 
In conclusion, TA workers in both countries experienced income insecurity. This was 
perceived as a severe constraint on a series of choices which are regarded as normal and 
legitimate in their respective societies, but which many interviewees could not make, because 
they felt unable to make medium and especially long-term financial plans. In that respect, it 
can be argued that the income insecurity contributed to a sense of being an ‘outsider’ as they 
were unable to afford forms of consumption and investment but also individual life choices 
which are regarded as mainstream in contemporary societies. Furthermore, it shows that TA 
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workers experienced a disadvantage when it comes to income compared to standard workers 
and this helps explain their desire to secure standard employment (with one exception).  
These findings go against initial hypotheses from the dualism literature, showing that the 
experience of income insecurity was partly similar in both countries and that TA workers in 
Italy do not experience higher insecurity. The only systematic difference in the experience of 
income insecurity could be found between the ‘precariously unstable’ and the ‘precariously 
stable’, who can be said to experience two partly different types of ‘precariousness’. On the 
one hand, both groups felt unable to commit resources over long periods as they did not have 
a stable source of income which can provide those resources. On the other hand, only ‘the 
precariously unstable’ minimised or eliminated most unnecessary and superfluous expenses, 
in order to save for periods of unemployment. They felt excluded from a range of consumption 
activities which were instead generally available to standard workers. To be sure, the situation 
was more severe for those who had been in an employment-unemployment cycle for several 
years, as they experienced a strain on consumption and saving decisions for several years. 
Thus, the ‘precariously unstable’ which were present in both countries, were the ones whose 
income situation was most different from that of standard workers, experiencing income 
disadvantages both in short-term and in the long-term financial decisions. Therefore, they can 
be regarded as the group with the largest income security divide compared to standard workers. 
 
7.3 Income Protection in Case of Unemployment  
 
7.3.1 Public Unemployment Benefits 
Access to public income protection in case of unemployment varies deeply between the two 
countries (see chapter 4, section 4.7.1). While in Italy TA workers could rely on contribution-
based unemployment benefits (UBs), for which tight contribution requirements are necessary, 
in the UK workers have access to both contribution-based UBs and income-based UBs in case 
they are in a low-income household (Clasen and Goerne, 2011; INPS, 2015a). Thus, while the 
British UB system grants access to income protection in principle to all the unemployed on a 
low income, the Italian UB system narrows access to income protection only to the 
unemployed with enough contribution records, which are tightly related to the individuals’ 
degree of labour market attachment in the years preceding unemployment47. Furthermore, 
                                                            
47 A worker has to have paid national insurance contributions for at least 2 years in her working life, 
and at least for 1 year in the 2 years before the unemployment claim (INPS, 2015a). 
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limited means-tested safety nets are provided for those who are not entitled to contributory-
based benefits (Matsaganis et al, 2003; Jessoula et al., 2010).  As we will see below, the 
characteristics of the UB system, and specifically the entitlement criteria, strongly contributed 
to shaping the individual experience of income protection during unemployment. However, 
the interviewees’ experience only partly reflected hypotheses from the dualism literature as 
other factors other than institutional configurations contributed to shaping the perception of 
being at a disadvantage compared to standard workers. In particular, the interviewees’ value 
system and the perceived ‘targeting’ of the UB system interacted with the public UB system’s 
characteristics in shaping their perception of protection. 
In Italy, as already mentioned, contribution requirements limited access to UBs only to 
workers with relatively long contribution records. However, this limitation was generally 
perceived as fair by the interviewees, as they considered reasonable that a person had to have 
worked a certain amount of time in order to be able to claim unemployment support. ‘They 
[employment centre officers] should look at the employment history of a person, if the person 
has never worked, I don’t find it right that she receives unemployment benefits’ (Michele, 39). 
‘When I worked 3 months in a year I didn’t feel I should have been entitled to it’ (Rita, 36). ‘It 
is ethically very good, otherwise we’d end up giving UBs to someone who does a summer job 
and then goes to high school’ (Alessandro, 33). Hence, the contributory requirements were 
perceived as an appropriate way of circumscribing income protection to actual ‘workers’ and 
not to people who never worked or worked only sporadically. This contributory limitation also 
reinforced the idea of entitlement once the person had paid sufficient contributions, as 
interviewees felt they earned the right to UBs. ‘I knew it was my right, why not claim it? (Rita). 
‘I paid my contributions for them […] why shouldn’t I have asked for them?’ (Giulia, 41). 
People felt at ease in claiming those benefits as they felt they ‘paid’ for them, therefore they 
were owed them. Therefore, it can be argued that the contribution requirements for accessing 
UBs fostered an idea of deservingness among claimants, on the one hand circumscribing 
access only to ‘actual workers’ and by creating a direct connection between contribution paid 
and amount of benefit received.  
Furthermore, the fact that UBs are earnings-related and the replacement rate is relatively high 
(75% of previous earnings up to 1180 euros per month and 25% for the exceeding earnings) 
was praised by the interviewees as it allowed a reasonable income while waiting to find another 
job or being employed on a different assignment. Also the duration48 was generally perceived 
                                                            
48 Variable with age, but a minimum of 8 months for workers below 50 years old and a maximum of 
16 months in 2015 for workers above 55 years old. 
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as adequate by all claimants. ‘The set-up and the amount are OK’ (Michele). ‘The amount and 
duration are adequate’ (Alessandro).  Moreover, in contrast to what we will see in the UK 
case, the bureaucratic procedures for claiming benefits were perceived as simple and not 
particularly burdensome. 
Instead, what was strongly lamented was the lack of effective active labour market policies, 
as explained in chapter 5, section 5.5. Many interviewees felt that passive income support 
should be tied to active support, and that employment centres should actively help the 
unemployed seeking a job. As Michele claimed, ‘I think that instead of paying [the worker] 
the benefit, they should give him incentives, helping him find a job’, or Rita, who stated, ‘In 
spite of giving benefits for so long, […] it would be much more helpful to have helped find a 
job’. Thus, according to the interviewees, activation measures tied to UBs, established 
formally by law but applied only patchily in practice (Gualmini and Rizza, 2011; Jessoula and 
Vesan, 2011), would be positively perceived by benefits claimants if fully implemented. The 
obligation to find a job would be offset by the right to use public services in job search and 
placement, which are now not available in practice, albeit formally existent.  
Moreover, interviewees acknowledged that lack of activation requirements for fairly generous 
benefits could produce situations where the unemployed exploit the welfare system, and rely 
opportunistically on benefits without looking for jobs. However, reliance on state support 
could not last for more than the duration of the UBs. Therefore, only people who were certain 
or almost sure of being able to secure employment at least for a certain number of months in 
a year49 were able to use those benefits in an opportunistic way. As Rita claims: 
 There are some people who live on benefits. They work for a few months [in seasonal 
jobs] and the rest of the year they live on benefits, ‘cause they know they will have 
another [seasonal] contract the next year. […] Even I did that when I was younger, at 
the time I enjoyed it, cause I was young and the less commitment the better, but now no. 
Furthermore, the lack of a safety net of last resort for those who have not paid sufficient 
contributions or for those who have exhausted their UBs was strongly deplored. Indeed, Italy 
still lacks a national minimum income scheme and benefits such as social assistance are not 
generous, they are means-tested and they are managed by different institutions at the local 
level (Jessoula et al., 2010; Madama, 2010). These characteristics caused social assistance to 
be perceived as a completely different form of support compared to UBs, and it was thought 
of as reserved to a different kind of people, the very poor, rather than the unemployed. In the 
sample, no worker claimed social assistance after the expiration of UBs and many of them did 
                                                            
49 The number of months depends on unemployment contributions, which should have been paid for 
no less than 12 months in the two years before the unemployment claim. 
182 
 
not know whether they would have been entitled to any income support.  Hence, if on the one 
hand workers perceived a sense of fairness and deservingness in a contribution-based system 
of UBs, also praising the relative generosity of the benefit, they perceived the lack of a safety 
net of last resort as a severe problem, obliging them to rely only on their savings and on other 
family members. 
The perception and use of UBs in the UK case was completely different from the Italian case. 
First of all, workers were discouraged from claiming JSA by the strict activation requirements 
and the bureaucratic processes associated with them. ‘It’s very hard to go back and claim 
unemployed benefit when you’ve been temping. […] Because you have to prove that you 
didn’t... that you’re still actively looking for work’ (Mary, 44). ‘It’s a full-time job trying to 
get your benefits sorted out. Because the paperwork, and constantly having to justify yourself’ 
(Rachel). ‘There was a lot of administration’ (Bryan). A second reason discouraging UB 
claims was the attitude of the Jobcentre Plus staff, which was perceived by the majority of 
people who claimed benefits as unhelpful. ‘They’re rude, they’re not helpful, they’re… I think 
they’re under a lot of pressure from their managers and bosses.’ (Rachel, 43). ‘They would 
kind of be skeptical of you, suspect of you’ (Andrew, 30). Or Catherine, 41, who told of the 
differentiated treatment received at the unemployment centre, depending on what she went 
there for:  
The first floor [where you look for a job], and the ground floor [where you claim for 
benefits] are very different; [on the first floor] they cannot be more helpful, because I’m 
looking for work. […] My last experience of going there was, they couldn’t be nicer, the 
security guards everywhere – please come in, oh that’s wonderful, you’re applying for 
jobs, no hassle at all […] But downstairs there are people looking miserable, you know, 
it was a very different… it’s very interesting, very interesting experience. 
Moreover, people were discouraged by the little amount of money they would get from UBs, 
which was not perceived as enough to live on. ‘£71.70 every week is not a lot of money to live 
off, so there’s a real downside to temping’ (Catherine). ‘I got £70 a week, which was not 
enough to… you know, I owned my house so I paid a mortgage. If I rented, they would pay my 
rent, but they can’t pay for you to own your own home’ (Bryan). People were indeed only 
entitled to a flat-rate £71.70 per week50, which is 16% of the median income (GOV.UK, 
2015a), although they could complement this with means-tested benefits, such as housing 
benefits. Thus, in contrast to what we have seen in the Italian case, the amount was not 
perceived as generally adequate and in many cases not worth the taxing procedure to claim 
UBs. Hence, many interviewees did not want to go through demanding administrative 
                                                            
50 A lower rate applies to workers below 25 years old. 
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procedures and activation requirements for limited income support. This was even more the 
case for those ‘precariously unstable’ workers who experienced many short-term assignments, 
who might have been unemployed for only a few days or weeks in between different 
assignments. ‘It is 2 weeks before you can start claiming, and therefore you have to prove that 
you’ve been out of work for 2 weeks and looking for employment […] And by that point I would 
be working again’ (Mhairi, 58). For these workers, having to go through burdensome claiming 
procedures for every short spell of unemployment was a serious problem, which strongly 
discouraged them from claiming UBs.  
A further reason in the UK was the stigma associated with claiming benefits. Interviewees did 
not feel keen on claiming for benefits, as they were afraid of the possible stigmatisation 
associated with it. And when they did, they felt they needed to justify it, both to themselves 
and to others. As Susanne, 38, who claimed benefits, explained: 
Some of my friends as well, you know, they were a bit ‘hmm,’ but I just kind of thought 
well I’ve paid, you know, I’ve worked since, I’d worked even when I was at school I 
worked part-time, you know, I have got a good work ethic […] I’m still trying to justify 
it, so it’s a very emotional thing. 
Or Andrew: 
I felt the social stigma that was being put out about… this is not something you 
deserve… Well, among friends, family, the media, everything that’s being put out, and 
also yeah your experience at the Jobcentre. 
Eleven other workers felt a form of stigmatisation associated with UBs, as they felt it was a 
form of support for the ‘poor’ or the ‘scroungers’ with which they did not want to be identified. 
As Bryan remembered: 
I felt… I’d never applied for any benefits before, so it was a change for me, it was 
something that I was a little uncomfortable with because I preferred to work […] so I 
claimed the Jobseekers Allowance benefits, and I had to go up to a Jobcentre in an area 
that’s not very… it’s not a very well-off area, so I felt a little bit uncomfortable. 
The stigmatisation the interviewees associated with benefit claiming confirms findings from 
the analysis of the political and media discourse on ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘worklessness’ 
purported in the British context, where the use of means-tested benefits is portrayed as a form 
of dependency on the welfare system by ‘welfare scroungers’ or ‘shirkers’ (see, for instance, 
Wiggan, 2012; Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013; Fletcher et al., 2014). The structure of the benefit 
system, particularly the strong reliance on means-testing, has been argued to be an important 
factor in fostering stigma, as it creates a division between a majority who contribute through 
taxation, and a minority who rely on or are perceived to be abusing the benefit system (Larsen 
and Dejgaard, 2013). The stigma prevented many workers from taking up UBs even in periods 
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in which they would have needed them. Only in extreme situations, when under the pressure 
of limited financial resources and unable to find a job, did they reluctantly decide to claim 
UBs. ‘I didn’t have savings and, you know, my partner doesn’t earn a lot of money anymore, 
so it was a little bit of a struggle. I think I’ve adapted– I think that’s a key word, I’ve adapted’ 
(Catherine). Thus, it can be argued that the structure of UBs in association with a dominant 
political and media narrative on deservingness and on welfare dependency has engendered a 
perceived divide between benefit claimants and non-claimants, where the former are 
negatively portrayed as ‘scroungers’ or ‘shirkers’ and with which interviewees did not want 
to be identified, unless under extreme necessity.  
In conclusion, the picture which emerged from the comparison between the individual 
experience of the Italian and the British unemployment protection system provides important 
insights about the relation between the characteristics of the institutional system and the 
individual experience of UBs. These findings partly refute the hypotheses formulated in the 
analytical framework, which expected contribution-based benefits to be experienced as more 
exclusionary, drawing a more complex picture in which the institutional characteristics of the 
UB system play an important role, which is however moulded by other individual and social 
factors.  
 
Firstly, in analysing the individual experience of disadvantage in income protection, the 
supposed divide created by contribution-based compared to means-tested UBs is partly 
questioned. In the Italian context, contribution requirements were perceived as legitimate, and 
a lack of sufficient contributions as a fair reason for benefit exclusion. By contrast, relatively 
lax criteria for accessing means-tested benefits appeared to have contributed to attaching a 
stigma to UBs, which, in association with demanding activation requirements and bureaucratic 
procedures, reduced the perception of inclusiveness of those benefits, as interviewees did not 
want to be perceived by others or by themselves as dependent on welfare and unable to provide 
for themselves.  
 
Thus, the experience of the interviewees goes against hypotheses from the dualism literature 
which expected a larger divide in a contribution-based than in a means-tested UB system, 
highlighting how the characteristics of the institutional system may shape perceptions in 
unexpected ways. The close connection between contribution paid and benefits received made 
the system perceived as for those ‘deserving’, while the means-tested criteria, the tight 
activation requirements and the attitude of the Jobcentre staff in the UK appeared to weaken 
the idea of ‘deservingness’ in the interviewees’ perceptions. In addition, the characteristics of 
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the British UB system seem to have created a different kind of divide, that between benefit 
claimants and non-claimants. UBs in the UK were experienced as stigmatising, and targeted 
to a category of people interviewees did not want to be identified with, which were perceived 
as ‘outsiders’. This produced a situation in which interviewees were ashamed of claiming UBs 
and they either renounced or felt they had to justify claiming UBs both to themselves and their 
social network of friends and relatives.  
 
Moreover, there appeared to be a perceived connection between benefit duration and 
opportunities for abuse in the use of UBs. While access to UBs in Italy is limited in duration, 
in the UK access to UBs is potentially unlimited in time51. Hence, while in the Italian case the 
unemployed could not rely for long on the social protection system as their benefit would 
expire in a matter of months, de facto providing the incentive to find a job before the benefit 
ends; in the UK, the unlimited duration of UBs might provide a disincentive to go back into 
employment, which has to be compensated through strict activation requirements. These 
different opportunities for abuse in the two countries shaped the interviewees’ perception of 
the legitimacy in the use of UBs, as the two UB systems provided different opportunities and 
constraints for those claimants who try to ‘abuse’ the system, with a perceived different ability 
of the two UB systems in circumscribing income protection only to ‘deserving’ claimants. 
Hence, in the case of UBs, the comparison between Italy and the UK showed how institutional 
divides in access to benefits are not necessarily reflected in the workers’ perceptions, as other 
factors, such as the idea of ‘deservingness’ and the fear of stigmatisation, played an even more 
important role in drawing divides between different categories of benefit recipients. 
 
Finally, in the Italian case, the tight contributory requirements for UB entitlement, the 
earnings-related nature of the benefit and its duration made UBs, for those who met the 
entitlement criteria, the preferred form of income support of first resort. By contrast, in the 
UK, the high costs in terms of activation requirements, demanding bureaucratic procedures 
and stigmatisation, together with the limited flat-rate amount, all contributed to making UBs 
a residual form of income support in the eyes of the interviewees, to be generally used only 
when under significant financial strain and only as a complement to other sources of income. 
However, in accordance with initial hypotheses, what was strongly lamented in the Italian case 
was the inexistence of a safety net of last resort for those who are not entitled to UBs or those 
who have exhausted them together with the lack of effective active labour market policies. In 
fact, one the one hand, social assistance policies are still patchy and comparatively ungenerous 
                                                            
51 Provided that the claimant’s income sources fall below the means-tested threshold. 
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and no national minimum income scheme is present, leaving the long-term unemployed and 
the unemployed who are not entitled to UBs with limited sources of public support. On the 
other hand, the ineffective active labour market policies left the benefit claimant with no 
support in her employment search, but only with passive protection.  
 
7.3.2 Redundancy Pay 
 
Besides UBs, redundancy pay played an important role in providing income when 
unemployed. Redundancy pay represented a form of occupational income support that was 
mentioned surprisingly often by many interviewees as a significant form of protection, 
compared to the attention it has been given in the dualism literature. Access to redundancy pay 
was different in the two countries. TA workers in Italy had equal access to redundancy pay as 
they are legally regarded as employees. Moreover, all employees are entitled to redundancy 
pay, proportionally to the amount of time employed in a specific job (INPS, 2017d). By 
contrast, in the UK, only workers who have been employed for at least two years by the same 
employer are entitled to redundancy pay (GOV.UK, 2017a). 
In Italy, TA workers did not experience any specific disadvantage compared to standard 
employees in accessing redundancy pay.  What needed to be explored was the role of 
redundancy pay in mitigating loss of income due to unemployment. Redundancy pay appeared 
to be useful as an immediate form of income support received once unemployed, in the period 
immediately after finishing the assignment, even before the claim for UBs was processed by 
the employment centre. Redundancy pay was regarded as a quick and automatic protection 
immediately available once a contract was not renewed and it provided a ‘buffer’ income in 
case another assignment was not immediately available. Although the amount of money 
received strongly depended on the length of the assignment, the immediacy and automaticity 
of the payment were perceived as extremely useful, especially when spells of unemployment 
were short. For instance, Alessandro, who had several TA assignments lasting 3 months each, 
but who had not paid sufficient contributions to receive UBs, described the role of redundancy 
pay:  
Every 3 months I had the TFR [redundancy pay], plus the unused holiday allowance 
[…] and of course you are not rich, but at least you can survive for a bit, as I was not 
entitled to unemployment benefits. 
Even for those interviewees who had access to UBs, redundancy pay was experienced as a 
useful and complementary source of income in case of unemployment. For the ‘precariously 
stable’, who rarely if ever experienced unemployment, redundancy pay was used as a source 
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of income in the involuntary work breaks they experienced during changes of employment 
contract. Therefore, redundancy pay could either complement income from UBs or, for those 
who were not entitled to UBs, function as a partial substitute for them, providing in either case 
an important and immediate source of income protection in case of unemployment. However, 
Jessoula (2012) argues that Italian workers with irregular work histories, such as many TA 
workers, are not able to cumulate redundancy pay as most permanent workers do. Most 
permanent workers use redundancy pay as a saving device given that they will only access 
their redundancy pay after several years of work or only at the time of retirement, meaning 
that they can complement their pension with a generous lump-sum amount. By contrast, TA 
workers and other atypical workers with irregular working histories will, by the time of 
retirement, have used most of their redundancy pay and will therefore be presented with a 
cumulative disadvantage, both in pension and accumulated savings (see section 7.5 of this 
chapter, for a discussion on the use of redundancy pay for income protection in retirement).  
In the UK, interviewees did not have access to redundancy pay. To be sure, here the divide 
appeared to be between workers who have relatively long tenure (over 2 years) and those who 
did not, rather than between individuals with different employment statuses. Nevertheless, the 
fact that all interviewees in the British case belonged to the ‘precariously unstable’ and none 
of them managed to be employed by the same agency continuously for two years, meant that 
these workers were disproportionally more disadvantaged than what we would expect to be 
the case for the majority of standard workers.  Indeed, we might expect the latter to experience 
fewer unemployment spells and they might be able to accrue redundancy pay after two years 
of tenure. Lack of access to redundancy pay was experienced as a disadvantage especially in 
situations in which redundancy pay would have allowed a smoother transition from one 
assignment to the other (as the worker would be paid only in the week after her first week of 
assignment) or before the worker was able to receive unemployment benefits (generally after 
2 weeks of becoming unemployed).   
 
However, the interviews revealed that the strictness of redundancy rules was in line with the 
perception of redundancy pay by the TA workers. None of the workers in the UK felt they 
were excluded from the right to redundancy pay, as they felt they did not work for long enough 
to have ‘earned’ it. ‘I think redundancy is known as an official thing, where you had to be 
working there for a certain length of time, and I’d only been there 9 months’ (Tom, 31). Thus, 
it seems that the rule had been internalised into the TA workers’ mind-set, as they did not 
perceive the lack of access to redundancy pay as a form of exclusion, but a ‘deserved’ right 




Overall, redundancy pay appeared to be perceived as an important source of income during 
unemployment for TA workers in the Italian case. Nevertheless, in the UK case, in which none 
of the interviewees were entitled to redundancy pay, the interviewees did not feel excluded, as 
they seemed to have internalised the norm that redundancy pay is reserved for long-term 
employment relations. Thus, although in the UK the lack of access to redundancy pay was 
experienced as an absolute disadvantage in that it would have provided a source of income 
protection in the short-term, it was not perceived as a form of exclusion from income 
protection, meaning that it was not perceived as a relative disadvantage compared to standard 
workers. Finally, it has to be highlighted that these findings show the importance of this form 
of occupational support for the income protection in case of unemployment. These findings 
question the predominant lack of interest given in the dualism literature to this form of 
protection, with a few exceptions (see, for instance, Seleeib-Kaiser, 2011). The lack of general 
interest does not appear to be justified in the light of the importance given to it by the 
interviewees. Hence, these findings show that more research should be carried out on this 




7.4 Income Protection in Case of Sickness 
As already mentioned in chapter 4, section 4.5, while in Italy a TA worker is legally defined 
as an employee, in the UK context a TA worker is only defined as a worker, hence she has 
access only to statutory sick pay (SSP) but not to occupational sick pay, which is often 
provided by employers (Burchell et al., 1999; Böheim and Mühlberger, 2006; Voss et al., 
2013). Therefore, a TA worker in Italy receives sick pay equivalent to that of a standard 
employee52, which is paid partly by the employer and partly by the public national insurance 
system53. By contrast, in the UK, a TA worker is only entitled to flat-rate SSP54, unless the 
hirer decides to discretionally provide contractual sick pay also to TA workers. Nevertheless, 
not all employees in the UK are entitled to contractual sick pay, as provision depends of the 
employer (Clasen, 2016). The experience of the workers confirmed hypotheses elaborated in 
                                                            
52 100% of daily earnings for sick days 1-3 and after day 21, and 75% from day 4 to 20 (INPS, 
2015h). 
53 SSP covers 50% of total sick pay from day 4; 66.7% from day 21, whilst occupational sick pay 
covers the rest. 
54 £86.70 per week, and only if she has earned at least £109 on average per week in the 8 weeks before 
she got sick. 
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the comparison of the institutional characteristics in the two countries (see chapter 4, section 
4.7.2), showing no perceived disadvantage in Italy but a strong disadvantage in the UK. 
In Italy, workers did not feel discriminated or experience any particular disadvantage in 
income protection against sickness compared to regular employees. ‘I felt safeguarded, 
absolutely! Sheer protection’ (Rita). ‘Never had any problem, really’ (Giulia). However, 
although workers were guaranteed full income protection in case of sickness, the limited 
employment protection made those at risk of not seeing their contract renewed feel obliged to 
go to work even when sick, as explained in chapter 6, section 6.3.  
By contrast, in the UK, many interviewees complained about the fact that they were only 
entitled to SSP and about the way this benefit was designed. As expected from the hypothesis 
elaborated in the analysis of the protection in case of sickness in the UK, they felt excluded 
from contractual sick schemes, as this had negative consequences on their income protection. 
In fact, SSP kicks in only on the 4th day of consecutive illness, meaning that for diseases that 
are not serious (e.g. fever, cold, stomach ache, headache etc.), which were by far the most 
common among the interviewees, the TA worker is not covered by SSP55. Not being covered 
by SSP in the first 3 days was perceived as a serious disadvantage, as they felt obliged to go 
to work even when sick, in order not to lose income. This was a very common issue, and seven 
interviewees openly complained about it, perceiving it as unfair. As Catherine remarked: 
You only get statutory sick pay if you’re off for four days or more, I think, which seems 
incredibly unfair – it’s like, how can I plan how long I’m gonna be sick for? So you’re 
not paid – if you don’t go in, you don’t get paid. So I’ve struggled myself into jobs before 
with a cold, because I wouldn’t get paid. 
 
Or Claire, who would have generally used holiday leave when sick not to lose income, but 
who was unable to do so recently: 
 
I did actually slip and fall last week, on Tuesday, on the ice, and I landed flat on my 
back, and then I had to leave and I hadn’t accrued enough annual leave, and I had a 
wedding to go to on the Friday, so last week I didn’t work for about 12 and a half hours 
– I won’t be paid for that 12 and a half hours, and normally if you have a slip and fall 
when you start work, you do get paid, and I could work from home or something, but 
no, I just couldn’t get paid, cause I just wasn’t here. 
 
                                                            
55 To be precise, the worker could claim Employment Support Allowance (ESA) but none of the 
interviewees were aware of the possibility as ESA was perceived as a benefit for people with 
disabilities or long-term health issues, not for those in employment with short-term sicknesses.  
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Many other interviewees in the UK experienced the same problem and saw other colleagues 
employed through TAs struggle in a similar way. As Mary stated, talking about herself and 
Janet, a colleague of hers (also a TA worker): 
You know you’re not gonna get paid, so, you are a temp – unless you can afford to not 
get paid, you’ll come in come death, you’re on your deathbed. That happens too many 
times, because, you know, you don’t get paid. […] Janet’s really, really ill and she’s 
come in and we’ve had to send her home. And she’s worried because she’s not getting 
paid. So, when she’s not here, she’s not paid. So that’s a worry because you don’t get 
any financial support when you’re temping. 
It has to be highlighted that a few hirers voluntarily provided contractual sick pay also to TA 
workers, but this was not common in the sample. Nevertheless, no data could be found on 
whether this is representative of what happens throughout the country. Moreover, none of the 
interviewees in the sample had medium or long-term illnesses, so it has been difficult to 
properly assess whether the amount of money received with SSP (£86.70 per week) was 
enough to live on, or which kind of financial strain it caused. In addition, as in the Italian case, 
many TA workers, especially those on short-term assignments, felt obliged to go to work in 
order not to make a bad impression on hirers and to increase the chance of a contract renewal 
as explained in chapter 6, section 6.3. 
These findings broadly support the hypotheses formulated in the analysis of institutional 
characteristics in Italy and the UK (see chapter 4, section 4.7.2). More specifically, they 
confirm that no divide in income protection in case of sickness was experienced in Italy while 
two interacting divides were experienced in the UK. Firstly, the divide in the UK stemmed not 
from the distinction between atypical and standard workers, but from between worker and 
employee, in that, as we have seen, directly-hired temporary employees in the UK may enjoy 
income protection equivalent to standard employees. By contrast, TA workers, as they are 
legally defined as workers but not as employees, only have access to SSP but not to contractual 
schemes, thus experiencing a relative disadvantage. This disadvantage was perceived as unfair 
by the interviewees, who felt they were being neglected take time off work although they had 
legitimate reasons. However, a second divide is also present, that between employers who 
provide contractual sick pay and those who do not. In that respect, TA workers in workplaces 
where no contractual sick scheme is provided to any worker did not experience a relative 
disadvantage compared to standard workers. However, they can both be regarded as 
‘outsiders’ compared to workers whose employer provides contractual sick pay. On the 
contrary, the four interviewees whose employer was discretionally providing contractual sick 
pay also to TA workers, can be regarded as ‘insiders’, suggesting that the divide in income 
protection in case of sickness in the UK is not clear-cut, but it depends on both the employment 
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status and the employers’ provisions. Therefore, it can be argued that in the UK two different 
divides interact with each other, providing differentiated forms of ‘outsiderness’ both among 
both atypical and standard workers.  
A further important finding emerged from the interviews, that the disadvantage in income 
protection in the UK was due mostly to the specific design of the benefit, rather than to its 
overall structure. More precisely, the disadvantage stemmed from the fact the SSP is only 
available after the first 3 days of sickness, which implies that the TA worker has access to 
income protection only in case of medium or long-term sickness. This was often mentioned as 
a major disadvantage, as, on the one hand, the SSP design obliged some TA workers to struggle 
to work even when sick in order not to lose income, and on the other hand, they felt less 
protected than other employees, who were instead generally covered by occupational sick pay 
in case of short-term sickness. Certainly, SSP has the same timing structure in Italy, but the 
first three days in the Italian context are covered by contractual sick pay. This finding shows 
that rather than the overall structure of the benefit, it is a specific characteristic of the benefit 
which engenders a significant disadvantage for workers. This reminds us that more attention 
should be paid in the dualism literature to what can be regarded as micro-characteristics of a 
specific benefit instead of predominantly focusing on the macro-characteristics of the income 
protection system, as important divides might lie behind those features.  
 
7.5 Income Protection in Retirement 
TA workers’ access to income protection in retirement tended to be limited in both countries 
and this was reflected in the interviewees’ individual experience. Nevertheless, the problems 
workers experienced in the two countries were caused by different underlying institutional 
configurations. As shown in chapter 4, section 4.7.3, in Italy, protection against retirement has 
moved from a single-pillar to a multi-pillar system in recent decades, but the first pillar still 
plays a comparatively dominant role (Cesari et al., 2007; Natali and Stamati, 2013). TA 
workers pay contributions equal to those of standard employees in order to receive a (public) 
pension in retirement. Workers can also access occupational schemes, though the overall take-
up rate is still comparatively low (Natali and Stamati, 2013). Thus, the risk of not receiving a 
decent pension in the Italian context stems from the irregular contributory history a worker 
might have, because of an intermittent employment career. In the UK, income protection in 
retirement is instead structured through a three-pillar pension system, composed of a flat-rate 
basic state pension, an earnings-related pension or an occupational one and a voluntary private 
pension (Natali, 2012). Although access to statutory pensions can be regarded as relatively 
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easy, given that limited contributions are required, the same does not hold for the occupational 
and the private schemes (Böheim and Mühlberger, 2006). In particular, TA workers, as they 
are not legally regarded as employees, are not entitled to the occupational pillar, although the 
situation will be changing in the future (see Pensions Act 2014). Thus, disadvantages in the 
UK context did not only stem from periods of unemployment throughout the working history, 
but also from lack of access to occupational pension schemes when employed.  
As we will see below, the workers’ experience strongly reflected those institutional divides.  
While in Italy the disadvantages came mostly from the irregular working history of the 
‘precariously unstable’, in the UK the disadvantages stemmed both from an irregular working 
history but also, and more prominently, from a lack of access to occupational schemes, in case 
the hirer was providing any. On the contrary, the ‘precariously stable’ in Italy experienced a 
limited disadvantage in income protection in retirement, given their regular contribution 
history. These findings produce a tripartite picture of disadvantages in income protection in 
retirement. On the one hand, the ‘precariously stable’ had limited disadvantages compared to 
standard workers. On the other hand, the ‘precariously unstable’ experienced a disadvantage 
only when not in employment in Italy, but both in employment and when unemployed in the 
UK.  
 
    7.5.1  Statutory and Occupational Pension Schemes 
In both countries, among the ‘precariously unstable’, income protection in retirement was 
perceived as an issue, whose solution would be, however, dealt with in the not well defined 
future. ‘Retirement? [laughs], What are we talking about? […] I will never have a pension if 
I continue like this’ (Alessandro) or ‘I don’t really think about it […] I know it’s a problem, 
but I have other problems right now’ (Giada, 31). ‘People forget that you need a pension, 
cause there’s not gonna be a government pension – one day it’s gonna just stop’ (Mary). ‘Well, 
I simply do not think about it, not that I don’t care, but it is not my main problem right now!’ 
(Kirsty, 32). Hence, interviewees were all aware of the limited income protection they would 
have access to in retirement, but they did not perceive it as an urgent issue. However, issue 
postponement was not only due by a myopic strategy, but also the current inability to solve, 
or at least improve, their future retirement issues. ‘Retirement? I will never retire, I will 
probably have to work until I can. Not that I haven’t thought about it, but what can I do?’ 
(Francesca). ‘I do know it is an issue, but there’s not much I can do right now’ (Tom). Workers 
in both countries felt powerless in their ability to influence their future retirement protection, 
as they did not feel they had financial means to improve their situation.  
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Aside from a common perception in the two countries of retirement as a ‘delayed’ issue which 
they could not deal with in the current situation, their experience presented significant 
differences. In the Italian context, the major worry was the spells of unemployment 
accumulated through the years. Legally, a person pays ‘figurative’ pension contributions while 
receiving UBs (INPS, 2016). However, as we have seen, not all workers were entitled to UBs 
and UBs are available only for the first few months of unemployment, as their duration is 
limited. Nevertheless, interviewees recognised that a TA contract at least granted them the 
same pension rights while in work as regular employees, a situation which was seen as a big 
advantage vis-à-vis other atypical contracts (such as co.co.pro.) which paid much less 
contributions than regular employment contracts. We can see here what we have already seen 
in the case of pay (chapter 6, section 6.2.1), that different atypical contracts provide different 
degrees of ‘inclusiveness’ and that grouping all atypical contracts together means 
oversimplifying a more complex situation in reality. The TA contract was perceived as a 
‘better’ contract compared to other atypical contracts. Hence, while in employment, TA 
workers in Italy felt adequately protected, with the major preoccupations stemming from the 
periods of unemployment during which the worker did not pay full contributions to the public 
pension.  
A different situation was that of the ‘precariously stable’ workers. These workers regularly 
paid pension contributions, given that their job continuity was roughly comparable to that of 
standard workers (see chapter 5, section 5.4.2) and that they did not perceive their retirement 
situation as problematic, having rarely if ever experienced unemployment. Only if they lost 
their job after many years with the same hirer, were they worried about the lack of 
contributions in case of long-term unemployment periods. In neither group, was access to an 
occupational pension scheme deemed essential to have adequate income protection in 
retirement and only one interviewee had joined an occupational scheme. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that some scholars, such as Jessoula (2012), have argued that only 
workers who have also contributed to supplementary schemes will, in the future, have access 
to a pension with an adequate replacement rate. Thus, the divide in income protection in 
retirement was only experienced by the ‘precariously unstable’ but not by the ‘precariously 
stable’, confirming hypotheses from the analysis of the institutional characteristics in Italy, 
which expected disadvantages in Italy to depend mostly on the contribution history. 
In the UK, TA workers experienced partly different disadvantages compared to the Italian 
workers. The irregularity of the public pension contributions was also felt as a problem among 
British TA workers, but the fact that they did not have access to occupational pension schemes 
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was even more worrisome and it was generally perceived as unfair. Statutory pension is indeed 
low even for people who have contributed for more than 30 years (maximum £115.95 per 
week) and it is less than 26% of median income (GOV.UK, 2015c). Therefore, irregular and 
small contributions towards basic state pension made while working as TA worker were not 
seen as relevant to provide an adequate pension in retirement. As Mary ironically commented: 
I think it was like £1.20 I was paying a week, I mean, what good is that gonna do me? I 
was like, please just give it to charity! I don’t even want the lump sum when I leave you, 
because it’s only like, I’m sure it was like £6.50 I’d made in the time, so I was like, no, 
don’t bother. Don’t embarrass yourself by telling me how much I didn’t get. 
 
In addition, the earnings-related state pension (S2P) was not perceived as generous enough to 
provide adequate income support in retirement. All interviewees in the UK were aware that 
the two public pensions they would receive would not be enough to live on and those who had 
an open-ended contract in the past tended to rely on the occupational scheme they had had 
when they were previously hired permanently, or they immediately enrolled into one once they 
secured a permanent contract. Like Edward, 54, who has now been hired permanently by the 
same hirer, explained: 
 No, there was no pension available to temporary staff, no. And then, as soon as I started 
here, again, well, as part of the package when I joined, was a letter detailing the pension 
plan, if you want to sign up, here we are, so…, which I immediately did. 
Furthermore, even in the few situations where the hirer offered occupational schemes also to 
TA workers, the lack of security about how long they would be in that job, kept the 
interviewees from joining an occupational pension scheme, as they might have had to change 
employer after a few weeks or months. ‘Because you’re temping, you know that you’re not 
gonna be in it for very long, so is it really worth it?’ (Susanne). Therefore, if on the one hand 
there were institutional barriers to accessing occupational schemes, on the other hand, the 
precarious employment situation discouraged workers from joining occupational schemes 
even when available, given their irregular employment experience, a situation that we will see 
also when discussing access to formal credit (see section 7.6.1 of this chapter).  
However, a recent reform to the British pension system (Pensions Act 2014) has introduced 
an auto-enrolment system for occupational pension schemes which is meant to expand access 
to occupational schemes to previously excluded workers. This reform, which has a phase-in 
period lasting until February 2018, extends occupational pension coverage to all TA workers. 
According to these new regulations, it is the agency, as the legal employer, which has to 
provide the occupational scheme to its workers. Therefore, the higher inclusivity provided by 
these new pension regulations is likely to improve the situation of TA workers within the next 
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few years, although it will not cover the periods before the implementation of the reform, for 
which the workers will still be at a disadvantage compared to standard workers.  
In conclusion, in both countries the ‘precariously unstable’ workers did not feel adequately 
protected, nor were they trying to find a solution for the issue, partly because it was felt as a 
distant problem but partly also because people did not have the means to insure themselves 
against that risk. Despite this similarity, the problems experienced were only partly coinciding, 
as expected from the analysis of the institutional framework of protection in retirement. In 
accordance with the hypotheses, in both countries the irregular working history was perceived 
as a disadvantage. However, in Italy, the experienced disadvantage was confined to that, as 
TAW granted access to full pension rights, unlike other atypical contracts such as 
parasubordinati. By contrast, in the UK, besides the irregular contribution history, another 
problem was present. The exclusion from occupational schemes was experienced as a major 
disadvantage, again confirming the hypotheses from the analysis of the institutional 
characteristics of income protection in retirement. Consequently, interviewees in the UK felt 
they were not able to fully secure themselves against low income in retirement even when 
working full-time and they perceived this as unfair. Once again, the divide in the UK does not 
lie between atypical and standard workers, but between workers and employees. Thus, in the 
British context, TA workers experienced a cumulative disadvantage, both because they tended 
to have an irregular contribution history and because they are not legally considered 
employees.  
To be sure, the cumulative disadvantage only applies to TA workers who are in a user firm 
which provides an occupational pension to its employees. In that respect, it can be argued that 
TA workers might share a lack of access to occupational schemes with standard workers in 
workplaces where no occupational scheme is made available. Similarly to what we have seen 
for contractual sick pay, the divide in the UK appears to depend both on the employment status 
and on the employers’ provisions, confirming the hypotheses from the analysis of the 
institutional framework of income protection in retirement. Thus, two different divides interact 
in the UK context, one based on the employment path, and the other based on the employer’s 
provision of occupational pension schemes, creating a complex picture of the insider-outsider 
divide in income protection in retirement. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the situation is 
currently changing, with the introduction of an occupational scheme provided by agencies to 
all TA workers, which will nonetheless improve those disadvantages in the years to come, but 
not for the years of employment already accumulated. 
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A different situation was that of the ‘precariously stable’. Given their regular contribution 
records, they did not perceive themselves at a disadvantage compared to standard workers, 
having accrued pension rights comparable to those of standard workers. For them, the divide 
might have emerged only if they did not have their contract renewed, but they otherwise 
enjoyed income protection comparable to standard workers. Overall, three different groups 
could be identified as regards the disadvantages experienced, the ‘precariously stable’ in Italy, 
the ‘precariously unstable’ in Italy and the ‘precariously unstable’ in the UK, showing that the 
disadvantages in income protection in retirement are shaped both by country-level institutional 
configurations of the pension system and by the employment path followed by atypical 
workers.  
 
7.5.2  Private Pension Schemes  
When it comes to private pensions, only three interviewees (one in Italy and two in the UK) 
were paying contributions to a private pension scheme or had any form of individual 
supplementary pension. This is partly due, in the Italian case, to the limited development of 
private pension funds and the comparatively minor importance of private pensions in the 
overall pension mix (Cesari et al., 2007; Mandrone e Marocco, 2012; Natali and Stamati, 
2013). However, both in Italy and in the UK, it was also mostly due to the individual inability 
to save enough money to contribute regularly to a private pension fund. This goes back to the 
inability to commit financially over long periods, which is part of the income insecurity 
discussed in section 7.2 of this chapter.  
In both countries, even those who enrolled into a private scheme tended to have quite irregular 
contribution histories, being able to contribute only in certain working periods as savings 
tended to be allocated to different purposes, which were regarded as more urgent. As Giulia 
explained: 
I have thought of joining a supplementary pension [scheme], you know. I even went to 
the bank and to the insurance company. They explained everything and, of course, it 
was a wise idea, but I couldn’t afford it…I mean, what if I lose my job? What if they 
don’t renew my contract next year? How am I gonna be able to pay [in the fund]? So I 
decided to leave it. 
Below is instead the experience of Catherine, who joined a private pension scheme many years 




I have a private pension that is untouched because I can’t contribute, so that’s another 
thing that I can’t do, you know. I don’t have savings, I don’t contribute, this is a 
frozen…this will be there when I’m 65, you know, whatever it is. I don’t even know what 
it is, but I paid into that for years, and I don’t have that now, you know. 
Furthermore, in comparison to standard workers, TA workers did not or had only limited 
access to an important source of income in retirement, redundancy pay. As already mentioned 
in section 7.3.2 of this chapter, workers with long-term, permanent employment relationships 
generally receive their redundancy pay at the moment of retirement, when ending their long-
term employment relationship. TA workers in the UK are unlikely to have accumulated any 
redundancy pay at the moment of retirement given that they have access to it after 2 years of 
continuous employment for the same agency, unless they are able to secure a permanent 
employment relationship for several years of their working life before retirement. By contrast, 
in Italy, where TA workers have access from the first day of employment, the disadvantage 
comes from the fact that they do not accumulate it or receive it in a lump-sum at the end of 
their career, but they are entitled to little amounts at the end of each assignment. By retirement, 
they will only have access to a limited amount when compared to standard workers, who are 
instead expected to have accumulated their redundancy pay for several years before retirement 
(Jessoula, 2012).  
Although interviewees were little aware of the disadvantage they were experiencing compared 
to permanent workers, they acknowledged how important redundancy pay was in retirement. 
For instance, Mary, who had the chance to accrue a generous severance payment after more 
than 20 years as a permanent employee, said, 
What if the temping runs out? If it dries up, I’m gonna have to start using my nest egg 
and we [her and her husband] didn’t want me to do that. That was our money and we 
were trying to keep it. 
So, in Mary’s case, the acknowledgment that the irregularity of income in TAW would lead 
her to use the redundancy pay accumulated in previous years, was a serious worry. As we have 
seen in section 7.3.2 of this chapter, the irregularity of their employment experience led many 
TA workers to use at least part of the redundancy pay accumulated in previous years of 
employment as a source of income in times of unemployment, rather than in retirement, as is 
the case for workers with a long record of standard employment.  
In conclusion, in both countries, the inadequate protection provided by public and/or 
occupational pension schemes was hardly compensated by the use of private pension schemes. 
In fact, notwithstanding the availability of private pensions the lack of financial resources 
and/or the unwillingness to financially commit in the long term, hampered the ability to access 
198 
 
private income protection. Although there is no formal divide between standard and TA 
workers, TA workers tended to be presented with a disadvantage with regard to access to 
private pension protection and the disadvantage appeared to be quite similar both in Italy and 
in the UK. Therefore, it can be argued that even if no institutional disadvantage is present, 
income insecurity among TA workers engenders an inability to save into private pension 
schemes, which can foster a disadvantage in income protection in retirement. We can talk of 
a spill-over from income insecurity during employment into income insecurity during 
retirement, as the present employment status kept workers from insuring themselves for the 
future. 
Furthermore, redundancy pay was a source of income TA workers were partly lacking in 
retirement compared to standard workers. In Italy, this was due to the fact that they had their 
redundancy pay liquidated at the end of each assignment. By contrast, in the UK case, this was 
due to the fact that they were only entitled to it after 2 years of continuous employment, making 
it difficult for them to accumulate any by the time of retirement, unless, they could only rely 
on the redundancy pay accumulated when in a standard, long-term employment relationships. 
This meant that compared to workers who had been working in the same job for several years 
before retirement, as it is the case of many standard workers, these workers lacked this source 
of income support, further hampering income protection in retirement. 
 
7.6 Personal Sources of Income Protection 
Having analysed the disadvantages experienced by TA workers in Italy and the UK in 
accessing income protection schemes, it is important to investigate whether these workers 
could rely on other institutional arrangements to complement or substitute public and other 
employment-related forms of income protection. This section analyses two main forms of 
income support: formal credit and the family. While the former is provided through the market 
and it may be used to provide income separate from employment, the latter can provide 
informal income protection by decoupling income from individual employment conditions 
(Crouch, 2015). As is discussed, TA workers experienced similar disadvantages in access to 
formal credit in both countries as a consequence of insecure earnings and employment 
prospects, thus reinforcing an already existing disadvantage rather than counteracting it. By 
contrast, the family acts in both countries as a source of income protection, complementing or 
substituting public and contractual income support schemes, hence reducing income insecurity 
from employment. However, the importance and amount of income protection provided by the 
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family strongly varied between the two countries, being much higher and pervasive in Italy 
than in the UK.  
 
7.6.1 Formal Credit 
Formal credit plays an important role in contemporary societies both in smoothen consumption 
over time and in providing liquidity for investments (Crouch, 2015). Furthermore, for TA 
workers in particular, it might help complement or substitute income protection from public 
and occupational schemes, reducing the disadvantages already discussed in this chapter and, 
more generally, reducing income insecurity. Nevertheless, in both countries, for most 
interviewees, access to formal credit was severely hampered by their employment status.  
Firstly, both in Italy and in the UK, as already discussed in section 7.2 of this chapter, the lack 
of employment stability was a significant obstacle to getting a loan or a mortgage, or to getting 
a credit card. ‘I still can’t get that, cause when you’re temping you don’t get a mortgage […] 
I know when you’re temping it is very, very hard to secure a mortgage’ (Mary). ‘That was yet 
another thing I cannot do, getting a loan, because you simply can’t!’ (Giulia). This was 
perceived as a serious disadvantage, in that accessing formal credit would have facilitated 
consumption over time and helped make investments that were otherwise unaffordable (e.g. 
purchasing a car, buying a house), helping decouple income from employment earnings 
(Crouch, 2015).  When the interviewees were able to secure a loan or a mortgage it was 
generally through the help of their partner or their parents who acted as guarantors or, more 
often, who were directly responsible for the payments. As Chiara stated: 
I had to wait a long time before being able to buy a car, because I didn’t have references 
and the temporary contract counts for nothing! I had to call my mum and she acted as 
a guarantor and with the generous payslips of December and January, I got the loan. 
Therefore, they generally needed the help of someone with a secure source of income or with 
enough savings because they were not regarded by formal financial institutions as a reliable 
debtor, given their temporary employment contract. Individually, they were likely to be 
refused any form of credit and they sometimes did not even try to ask a bank as they already 
knew their request would have been rejected. ’I didn’t even try, I knew I couldn’t get a loan 
for the car’ (Bryan). ‘We didn’t have problems with credit simply because we didn’t dare ask 
for it!’ (Alessandro). Nevertheless, in four cases (two in each country), where workers had 
been regularly employed for several months, and with a large amount of savings deposited in 
the bank, they were able to secure a loan without any external help, thanks to their reliable 
credit history and regular earnings. However, the amount received was generally small and 
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interest rates on the funding were higher than they would have been for a person with a stable 
income. As Mary complained: 
You need to have collateral and you’re looking, like a large proportion of your savings 
would have to go on the mortgage, because when you’re temping, you’re not classed as 
reliable, therefore you get the higher end specs of high interests and what you’re classed 
as an unreliable source of funding […] So I think temping staff have a really bad deal 
with the banks for that, like. I mean, they could have a fantastic credit history, but 
because they’re in temporary employment, they’re not classed as reliable for 
mortgages. So, it’s difficult! 
Therefore, a standard job was seen not only as a form of income security per se, but also as a 
way to have access to formal credit individually, or at a more reasonable cost. Thus, a standard 
job was perceived by most interviewees as a gateway to a range of financial services that they 
were otherwise precluded from, and which were considered ‘normal’ in their society.  
Even in the few cases where they would have been able to secure a loan or a mortgage, with 
the help of a family member and thanks to savings, interviewees did want to commit to long-
term financial investments, as they were not sure they would have had enough income to pay 
the fees in the future, thus preventing them from making long-term financial plans. ‘We [her 
and her husband] do need both for the mortgage. We’ve asked and we did get one, but we 
wouldn’t get as good a deal. Also we wouldn’t feel as comfortable that we could make all the 
repayments’ (Claire). ‘I don’t want a loan, I don’t want other preoccupations, I don’t want 
things I have to pay back in the future’ (Chiara). Thus, even when the interviewees did not 
experience a formal barrier to accessing formal credit, income insecurity prevented them from 
incurring debt that they were not sure they could repay. Once again, we can see how 
uncertainty about income prospects makes the interviewees unwilling to engage in any form 
of long-term financial commitment. 
Overall, TA workers in both countries experienced similar disadvantages with respect to 
access to formal credit. Most of them were unable to access formal credit individually, as in 
most cases they needed to have another member of the family act as a guarantor or be directly 
responsible for payments. Moreover, even when they managed to secure credit, the amount of 
money received was more limited and the cost of the credit (i.e. interest rate and collateral) 
were more burdensome than they would have been had they been in permanent employment.  
No systematic difference could be found either between countries or between the ‘precariously 
unstable’ and the ‘precariously stable’ group, given that both were regarded as unreliable for 
the credit system. It can be said that the insecure income from employment spilled over into a 
disadvantage in securing income protection through formal credit, reinforcing income 
insecurity. Therefore, we can argue that their employment status produced a cumulative 
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disadvantage, providing more limited income security from employment and preventing 
workers from accessing alternative sources of income protection from the market.  
Furthermore, their income insecurity prevented them from applying for formal credit as they 
were themselves unwilling to commit financially over long periods of time, given the 
unpredictability of their income sources in the long run. As we have previously seen when 
discussing private pensions, even if no formal institutional divide was present, income 
insecurity constituted a barrier to long-term financial commitments, further constraining 
income prospects. In that respect, it can be said that an experienced divide in income from 
employment translated into a lower ability to secure income separate from employment.  
The divide in access to formal credit has been mostly ignored in the dualism literature, given 
that dualist scholars have predominantly focused on employment-related sources of income 
protection. Nevertheless, this lack of research cannot be justified in the light of these findings, 
which show the importance formal credit is perceived to have in providing income outside 
employment. Access to formal credit (or the lack thereof) has received more attention in the 
precariousness literature (see, for instance, Pedaci, 2007; Morelli et al., 2012), who have 
highlighted the difficulties atypical workers experience in applying for credit. However, more 
research is needed to investigate the relation between atypical employment and access to 
formal credit, in order to better assess the degree of exclusion atypical workers experience and 
to gauge the exact financial disadvantage these workers have (in terms of collateral and interest 
rate) if they are granted credit, as well as the conditions under which this is moderated.  
 
    7.6.2  The Family  
The role of the family in providing income protection was different in the two countries. More 
precisely, while the income protection from the partner (where present) was similar in the two 
cases, income support from the parents was experienced in different ways in the two countries. 
This had enormous consequences for the ability to secure individual income protection, both 
when employed and when unemployed. While, in Italy, the family, specifically the parents, 
was perceived as a primary and continuous source of income, the family’s income protection 
role in the UK was more limited, and generally only present in situations of extreme necessity. 
This meant a different ability of TA workers in the two countries to secure income protection 
through private means, which had an impact on their degree of feeling like ‘outsiders’ as 
regards to income protection.  
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Income support from the partner was experienced similarly in the two countries. The partner, 
where present, was regarded as a significant source of income protection both in Italy and in 
the UK. The partner’s income or his/her savings were generally regarded as part of the 
available resources both for short-term and long-term expenses. The partner’s income was 
considered relevant for any financial planning and were part of the pooled resources for 
everyday living. Furthermore, the partner could help in situations where the individual income 
was not enough to live on. ‘He did help a lot, cause I could pay the bills but nothing more’ 
(Claire). ‘It was my partner, given that he has a permanent contract, although he is only part-
time, that made us have the funding’ (Francesca). The relevance of the partner’s income to 
achieve income security had already been underlined by several scholars studying in-work 
poverty (e.g. Allègre, 2008; Fraser et al., 2011), who highlighted the importance of the pooling 
of resources within the household to secure income for family members with unstable 
employment. However, the partner, unlike the parents, was not always a stable support, as 
people might divorce or the relationship might end. Susanne, for instance, had to quit the 
training she was undertaking and was obliged to go back to temping because of the break-up 
of a relationship: 
I needed some money. […] Without going into a huge amount of detail, I’d split up with 
my boyfriend, so I was kind of… financially I had to then deal with it on my own, so I 
thought, right, OK, better do something. 
By contrast, when it comes to the income support from other family members, the situation 
presented striking differences between the two countries. In Italy, income protection from the 
family allowed those workers to at least partly counterbalance limited access to public or 
market-based forms of income protection. Specifically, as we will see in more detail in the 
following paragraphs, it was mainly the parents and/or the partner’s parents who were the main 
source of financial protection for those workers. No systematic difference in reliance on the 
family could be found between the ‘precariously unstable’ and the ‘precariously stable’ group, 
despite their partly different experience of income insecurity. As already highlighted in the 
precariousness literature (see for instance, Fullin, 2004; Bertolini, 2009; Altieri, 2009), 
atypical workers in Italy strongly rely on the family to achieve a decent standard of living. The 
family plays the role of a safety net of first resort, providing the financial resources workers 
need before they try to access them elsewhere, either through the market or through public 
providers. The analysis confirmed these expectations from the literature, as the interviewees’ 
experience fit well in the familistic model already described by several authors who analysed 
Southern European welfare models (see, for instance, Ferrera, 1996; Martin, 1996; Naldini 
and Guerrero Jurado, 2009).  
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Firstly, the family, particularly the parents, qualified as a safety net on which TA workers 
relied in case of financial distress or to ask for financial help for one-off expenses or long-term 
investments. More precisely, financial protection from the family was considered highly 
important during spells of unemployment. As Giada explained, ‘Now that I lost my job […] 
my parents are helping me financially, I don’t know how I would do otherwise’ or Alessandro, 
‘Of course my parents help me! Thank God, I have them!’. The financial responsibility the 
parents feel towards their children was thought of as natural, and the interviewees felt they had 
to justify in case they were not able to receive financial help from the family. For instance, 
Giulia said: 
No my mum didn’t help me. It was not her fault! She simply couldn’t. She has just her 
pension, not a very generous one. But she helped me in the past […] No I really couldn’t 
ask her [for money]. 
Therefore, aside from the objective lack of financial means, there seemed to be an idea of 
financial obligation from the parents to the children which is culturally bound, confirming 
what has already been stated in the literature on the Southern European welfare model (e.g. 
Guerrero Jurado and Naldini, 1996; Naldini and Guerrero Jurado, 2009). In cases where the 
main source of financial protection was not the parents, it was the partner’s partners that 
stepped in, when the person was married or was cohabiting, again emphasising a social norm 
of obligation between older and newer generations.  
Aside from situations of financial distress, the family in Italy played an important protection 
role by providing housing, as already underlined by Tosi and Cremaschi (2001) and Iacovou 
(2010). Although the large majority of interviewees did not live with the parents, three still 
lived in the same household as their parents, mostly those in their early thirties, but not 
exclusively. Even though this housing arrangement was not necessarily related to a lack of 
income or inability to pay for independent accommodation, two interviewees cited those as 
important reasons while they lived with their parents. ‘I have lost my job […] I used to live 
alone but I couldn’t afford it anymore’ (Michele). Nevertheless, the role of the parents in 
providing housing was mostly experienced in the provision of financial means to buy a house, 
rather than in direct housing. All the interviewees who owned a house were able to buy one 
thanks to the financial help of the parents (or, again, the partner’s parents). Five were living in 
a house the parents had previously owned or lived in a house that was bought by the parents 
with the  purpose of giving it to their children, while in four other cases the parents were paying 
the mortgage either entirely or partly. ‘[The bank] would have never given me a mortgage, so 
my parents and my husband’s parents made a big effort and bought us a house’ (Francesca). 
Nonetheless, none were living in a rented house where the parents helped in paying the rent. 
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This confirms a more general attitude among Italian families, already highlighted by Tosi and 
Cremaschi (2001), which sees buying a house as a long-term investment, but sees rental simply 
as an irrecoverable cost, thus not worth financing.  
However, the parents’ role in income protection was not restricted to housing. Other non-
ordinary expenses were paid for or partly financed by the parents. Financial support was 
generally provided for long-term goods, such as a car, or a fridge, which, on the one hand, 
were seen as investments and, on the other hand, were one-off payments, not requiring regular 
contributions from the parents and perceived as a form of a gift. As we have seen specifically 
when dealing with access to formal credit (see previous section), even when interviewees were 
economically able to fund a loan or a mortgage to buy long-term goods or a house, formal 
financial credit was severely restricted given the lack of collateral or the unstable income 
position. In those situations, the parents or the partner’s parents might act as a guarantor, 
allowing the person to access formal credit, thus facilitating access to market-provided 
financial resources.  
Finally, in four cases, the parents provided regular funding to supplement the salary. This 
happened in situations where the worker’s income or the worker’s and the partner’s income 
were not enough to cover even regular expenses. In this case, the family was extremely 
important in preventing the person from falling into in-work poverty. ‘For the household 
budget, they contribute around 25-30%, but only for regular expenses, not for superfluous 
ones!’ (Fabio, 44). ‘Thank god my parents helped at the time [when a TA worker], I don’t 
know how I would have survived otherwise!’ (Michele). Finally, the income protection 
provided by the parents through services was important, as it did not necessitate relying on the 
market or on public institutions, thus allowing for indirect savings. ‘They helped me a lot, even 
for stupid things, such as moving house, or giving lifts to work. They helped me in anything 
that could make me save money’ (Alessandro). The role of the family was considered important 
also, for instance, in the case of childcare, as previously highlighted by Murgia and Poggio 
(2011), studying precariousness. As Chiara, who had to move to another city in order to find 
a job, says, ‘Fortunately my mum could take care of the kids […] They go having lunch at my 
mum’s, she buys them little things they need’.  
By contrast, in the UK, the parents did not provide an ongoing income protection throughout 
life as was the case for some Italian interviewees. None of the interviewees mentioned their 
parents as a significant support for long-term investment, such as housing, though the vast 
majority of interviewees were renting a place, rather than owning one. The family was rarely 
mentioned as a guarantor for securing formal credit or accessing other market-based financial 
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support. Nevertheless, the parents may have provided housing in case the interviewee was 
temporarily unable to pay a rent, by letting the individual stay at their place. As in the case of 
Claire, ‘That was for 3 or 4 months because I needed to have enough of an income and have 
enough employment – cause getting a flat in London’s horrible’. Housing and direct financial 
support were the most common forms of support the parents provided (or would be able to 
provide).  
However, these forms of income protection were considered a support of last resort, once other 
income sources were not enough or had run out. The majority of interviewees in the UK felt 
they had to be about to run out of savings before asking for financial help from the family and 
not have any other source of available income. ‘I would only ask them after finishing all my 
savings and my partner’s, only if I really couldn’t find any job, any!’ (Bryan). ‘Before asking 
my parents I’d go for my savings and then I’d just… I would be a cleaner, I’d… take any job’ 
(Claire). Thus, income support from the family was asked only after the materialisation of a 
financial need, unlike what we have seen in the Italian case. The only form of support which 
could be equated to the Italian case was in providing services which would have been 
otherwise had to be purchased through the market, such as transport or childcare.  
Overall, the parents in the UK context were perceived as a safety net of last resort, a form of 
income support in case of extreme necessity, when all other options were exhausted. As 
Susanne explained her situation when she was made redundant: 
I could have gone back home, so if the worst had come to the worst, you know, I could 
have definitely.  I would be OK somehow. I mean obviously you don’t want to be going 
doing that; but as a last resort […] I wouldn’t [ask my parents], yeah, I wouldn’t want 
to. I wouldn’t want to. If I had to then I would, definitely, but I just, yeah, I just wouldn’t 
want to. 
Thus, rather than a preventive safety net against poverty, as in the Italian case, where on-going 
income support was available and frequent transfers of resources were provided, support from 
parents in the UK was conceived of only once the risk of poverty had already materialised. It 
can be argued that this reflects the characteristics of the Liberal welfare regime to which the 
UK is said to belong (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Taylor-Gooby and Larsen, 2004), which places 
comparatively little emphasis on the family as a source of income protection. 
Overall, the role of the partner was quite similar in both countries. The current partner was 
seen as an important form of protection, enabling the pooling and sharing of resources within 
the household. By contrast, the family, that is the parents (or the partner’s parents), tended to 
play an extremely important role in the Italian case, providing a form of first resort safety net, 
on which the workers could comfortably rely in case of necessity, or even before the 
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materialisation of a need. The importance of family solidarity in the Italian context meant that 
the disadvantages experienced in income protection through public benefits or the market 
could be partly compensated for by family-provided income support, as long as the family had 
the financial resources to do so. In the UK, by contrast, the importance of the parents in 
providing income protection was much more limited. More importantly, the family was not 
considered a safety net of first resort or a continuous source of protection over the individual’s 
life. The interviewees turned or thought of turning to the parents only once they had exhausted 
all or most other forms of private income protection (such as job earnings and savings) and 
only when in dire need. The parents appeared to act as a safety net of last resort, but help from 
the family was not always taken for granted or considered a certainty. These findings confirm 
the hypotheses from the analytical framework, which claimed the family to play a more 
important role in Italy compared to the UK, as it is characterised by a familialistic welfare 
regime, in line with the comparative welfare regime literature (Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1996; 
Moreno, 2006). 
To conclude, family support in both countries appeared to partly compensate for the limited 
income protection provided by employment, the welfare state and the market. However, this 
role was much more prominent in the Italian context than in the British one; in Italy, the family 
acted even to ‘prevent’ needs from going unsatisfied, de facto limiting the perception of being 
an ‘outsider’ from arising. Even in cases where the support from the family was given after 
other forms of income support were attempted, the family acted to complement or substitute, 
as much as financially possible, income protection from other sources, as already highlighted 
by other authors (e.g. Fullin, 2004). By contrast, in the British case, income protection from 
the family was not considered either natural or normal, and it was mostly provided in situations 
of severe financial distress. In that respect, it did not act to prevent exclusion but rather as a 
relief to it. Thus, in can be argued that the TA workers in Italy had access to a more effective 
source of income protection which could counteract disadvantages experienced in other 
aspects of income protection and they were better able to reduce the divide with standard 
workers, compared to their British counterparts. Nonetheless, this source of protection was 
dependent on the financial resources available to the family, contributing to producing 
intergenerational inequalities.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
Income insecurity due to the employment status engendered multiple disadvantages. The 
experience of the ‘precariously unstable’ appeared to be similar in the two countries, while 
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‘precariously stable’ had a different experience. Thus, rather than a distinction between 
countries as we might have expected, the analysis revealed the distinction between two groups 
with different employment paths. These findings partly contradict a rigid categorisation of 
dualistic outcomes based on country-level institutional arrangements, which has been 
dominant in the dualism literature on social protection (e.g. Emmenegger et al., 2012). The 
individual employment path which, as we have seen in chapter 5, is influenced by several not 
necessarily institutional factors, appears to be the main determinant of the type of income 
insecurity experienced by TA workers, regardless of the characteristics of the social protection 
system. 
Nonetheless, as expected, the characteristics of the institutional setting played an important 
role in shaping the disadvantages TA workers experienced in both countries. However, 
compared to the institutional disadvantages identified in the literature, the analysis of the 
individual experience revealed a more complex picture. On the one hand, while some 
institutional divides were clearly reflected in the interviewees’ perceptions, others were not or 
only partly so. For instance, the perceived fairness and ‘deservingness’ related to contribution-
based UBs was at odds with the initial hypotheses, while the hypothesised limited divide 
expected for UBs in the UK was disconfirmed in the analysis, given that the characteristics of 
the UB system appeared to have contributed to creating a different perceived divide, that 
between benefit claimants and non-claimants. It can be said that in those cases, the institutional 
characteristics of the income protection system interacted with social norms in redefining the 
income protection divide along lines different from the purely institutional ones, in which, 
nonetheless, the institutional characteristics still play an important role. On the other hand, 
minor institutional disadvantages were sometimes perceived as important sources of division. 
For instance, the fact that SSP was only available after 3 days of sickness was experienced as 
a significant disadvantage. This suggests that comparative dualism studies which mostly focus 
on macro-characteristics of social protection systems, which undoubtedly facilitate cross-
country comparison (e.g. Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012), are at risk of 
oversimplifying current institutional divides in contemporary labour markets, as micro-
features of the social protection system can play an equally important role in fostering an 
insider-outsider divide in income protection. 
The analysis also revealed how in the UK, rather than simply talking about a smaller divide 
between atypical and standard workers (Emmenegger et al., 2012) or a divide based on access 
to occupational schemes (Seleeib-Kaiser et al., 2011), different interacting divides are present, 
depending on the employment status, employers’ provisions and tenure. Firstly, it is the fact 
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that TA workers are legally considered workers but not employees that creates a divide in 
access to occupational income protection, rather than the fact that they are non-standard per 
se. In fact, other atypical workers, such as fixed-term employees, do have access to those 
schemes and can be argued not to experience any divide with standard workers. Furthermore, 
access to contractual sick pay and occupational pensions showed how some employers have 
expanded access also to TA workers while others do not provide any to either TA or standard 
workers. Similarly, when discussing redundancy pay, we have seen that the divide is based on 
tenure rather than on the employment status, but this disproportionally affects workers with 
temporary jobs. The picture which emerges is not ‘dualistic’, but it rather shows the existence 
of different pockets of inequality in income protection in an overall patchy system of income 
protection.  
Moreover, the analysis of the individual experience also revealed that even when certain forms 
of income protection were formally available, their insecure income status made the TA 
workers in both countries unwilling to enter the long-term financial commitments required to 
provide income protection.  This was the case, for example, of enrolment into private pension 
schemes or access to formal credit. This meant that even when institutional barriers to income 
protection were not present, the income insecurity engendered by their employment status led 
to an income protection divide. Thus, it can be argued that the investigation of institutional 
divides cannot reveal the overall insider-outsider picture, as institutional divides in one sub-
dimension may spill over into another sub-dimension in which an institutional divide is not 
present, creating a more complex picture of disadvantages than we would expect by analysing 
institutional divides alone. 
Finally, access to personal sources of income protection, such as formal credit and the family, 
showed the importance of these sources in shaping an insider-outsider divide. While similar 
disadvantages were experienced in the two countries in accessing formal credit, the family 
provided a different way of limiting the income protection divide with standard workers, in 
certain cases in Italy even eliminating it altogether. Authors in the dualism literature have 
focused mostly on employment-related sources of income protection, de facto ignoring other 
sources of income protection. This proves an important oversight given that these two sources 
of protection were experienced as significant in the overall experience of income protection of 
the interviewees. As already highlighted by several scholars in the precariousness literature 
(see, for instance, Fullin, 2004, Bertolini, 2009), it is the overall income protection the worker 
has access to which determines her relative degree of inclusion into society, and many factors 
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come into play in shaping this situation.  These findings call for more attention to be paid to 



























8.1 Disadvantages in Atypical Employment 
The spread of atypical employment has been one of the most significant changes in European 
labour markets in the past few decades (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Castel, 2002). 
Atypical employment has generally been argued to be of lower quality compared to standard 
employment, and atypical workers have been said to experience a number of disadvantages 
compared to their standard counterparts (Kenworthy, 2008; Rubery, 2006). In this context, the 
institutional setting has been presented as a dominant factor in shaping those disadvantages, 
fostering different divides standard and atypical workers in a number of employment-related 
dimensions (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009; Emmenegger et al., 2012). As discussed in this 
thesis, two main streams of literature have investigated the disadvantages of atypical workers: 
the dualism literature and the precariousness literature. As I have argued, although both 
streams consider institutions important factors in shaping the disadvantages experienced by 
atypical workers, they differ in the perspective used. 
Scholars in the dualism literature adopt a strongly formalistic approach, conceptualising 
disadvantages in terms of rights and entitlements afforded by the institutional configurations 
of the labour market, the welfare system and the industrial relations system. Their area of 
interest is focused on institutional arrangements, and individual disadvantages are thought to 
be determined by the divides between standard and atypical employment produced by the 
institutional and regulatory system. By contrast, precariousness scholars start by identifying 
disadvantages at the individual level and from there consider a wider range of factors 
producing them. Thus, institutional factors are analysed in interaction with individual 
characteristics and with the broader socio-economic system in shaping the disadvantages. As 
a result, rather than expecting dualistic outcomes, this scholarship allows for diversity of 
disadvantages among atypical workers both between countries and within the same 
institutional setting. In chapter 2, I argued that in order to explore the role institutions play in 
shaping disadvantages among atypical workers, it is useful to draw from both streams of 
literature. While insights from the dualism literature help identify the main institutional divides 
between standard and atypical workers, insights from the precariousness literature are better 
able to shed light on their impact at the individual level.  
As explained in chapter 3, the investigation of the impact of different institutional 
arrangements on individual disadvantages required a comparative research design. Hence, two 
countries with different institutional settings with respect to their labour market, industrial 
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relations and social protection system have been chosen for the analysis. Italy and the UK 
feature contrasting employment regulations and industrial relations systems and are 
characterised by different welfare systems. These differences have been accentuated by the 
contrasting paths towards labour market liberalisation adopted by the two countries.  
The aim of the thesis was both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, it sought to provide an 
analysis of disadvantages experienced by one category of atypical workers in comparative 
perspective. As argued in chapter 3, there is currently a lack of qualitative comparative studies 
on the analysis of experienced disadvantages among atypical workers. Theoretically, the 
dissertation aimed to shed light on the connection between individual disadvantages and 
institutional divides, analysing how different institutional settings affect atypical workers’ 
disadvantages. Hence, on the one hand, this thesis has contributed to the dualism literature, by 
illustrating whether and how institutional divides translate into individual disadvantages. On 
the other hand, it has contributed to the precariousness literature, by explaining how some 
individual disadvantages can be attributed to specific institutional settings.  
 
8.2 Comparing TA Workers’ Disadvantages 
The number of institutions affecting atypical workers’ experience argues for a multi-
dimensional analysis of disadvantage. Following the main institutional divides identified in 
the dualism literature (e.g. Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009) my analysis was structured along 
three core dimensions of experience: employment, work and income protection. For each 
dimension, different aspects of individual experience were investigated, with the purpose of 
having a rounded portrait of TA workers’ experience and the disadvantages they face. For each 
dimension, hypotheses about the role institutions play in shaping the disadvantages were 
derived chiefly from the dualism literature, but these were complemented with insights from 
the precariousness literature and, where relevant, from other streams of literature.  
At a very general level, this thesis has only partly confirmed expectations from the dualism 
literature, presenting a more complex picture of the divides between TA and standard workers 
in Italy and the UK, while providing a detailed account of the similarities and differences in 






    8.2.1  Comparing Disadvantages in the Employment Experience 
As regards employment, the picture offered by the dualism literature in the comparison 
between Liberal and Southern European countries is one of divides between atypical and 
standard workers that tend, both dynamically and statically, to be more pronounced in 
Southern Europe mainly because of a larger gap in employment protection between atypical 
and standard employment. Thus, at the individual level, hypotheses grounded in this literature 
expect TA workers to feel more insecure and to feel more ‘trapped’ in atypical employment 
in Italy compared to the UK.  
As shown in chapter 5, my analysis has partly confirmed these expectations, but also revealed 
a more nuanced picture. On the one hand, TA workers in Italy have been found to see the 
opportunities to become standard continuously delayed, in some cases for several years. TA 
workers in Italy can be argued to feel overall more trapped in atypical employment than those 
in the UK. On the other hand, another group of workers was shown to experience difficulties 
in reaching standard employment, and these workers were present in both countries. Thus, a 
similar experience of TAW as a ‘trap’ can be found in both Italy and the UK, irrespective of 
the employment regulation frameworks. Moreover, the analysis revealed that the two groups, 
although both ‘trapped’ in atypical employment, had extremely different employment 
experiences, with partly different disadvantages. I have suggested that these workers 
experienced quite different types of ‘precariousness’. More specifically, those who could be 
regarded to be the most insecure and whose employment experience was most different from 
standard workers’ experience, were those in the second group, which was present in both 
countries. This contrasts with the hypothesis and commonly made argument that atypical 
workers are necessarily more insecure in Italy than in the UK, and questions the idea that a 
thorough deregulation of the labour market is better for precariousness outcomes.  
 
8.2.2 Comparing Disadvantages in the Work Experience 
Although equal treatment is formally guaranteed by national legislation in both Italy and the 
UK, scholars from the precariousness literature have argued that atypical workers might still 
experience disadvantages in a number of working conditions as some derogations from the 
principle are in place (Vosko, 2009; Wynn, 2014). In particular, the analysis of the institutional 
characteristics showed that, in the UK, for some working conditions, including pay and 
working time, equal treatment does not apply for the first few weeks. Furthermore, a number 
of scholars within the precariousness literature have highlighted the lower individual 
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bargaining power atypical workers have (Markova and McKay, 2010; Pedaci, 2010), making 
it more difficult for them to bargain for better conditions and to voice complaints in cases of 
improper behaviour by employers. Hence, some disadvantages were expected to be found in 
the work experience in both countries, and TA workers to experience a larger divide in the 
UK, because of the derogations from the principle of equal treatment in the first few weeks of 
employment.  
As I discussed at length in chapter 6, the expectations from the precariousness literature were 
broadly confirmed, as the analysis highlighted numerous disadvantages experienced by TA 
workers, and no systematic differences between the two countries. The analysis revealed that 
even when no formal institutional divide was present, as equal treatment was formally 
guaranteed by law, practices in the workplace lead to a divide between TA and standard 
workers. Thus, considering only formal institutional divides does not allow us to grasp the 
actual disadvantages experienced by workers, as formal equality is not always applied in 
practice. Moreover, the analysis has provided important insights as to the reasons why TA 
workers are not willing to counteract those practices or why, more generally, they were unable 
to negotiate better employment and working conditions. The concept of ricattabilità proved 
useful in characterising the weaker bargaining position which TA workers have and which is 
associated to the risk of not having their assignment renewed or of not being called in the 
future by either the hirer or the agency. This weaker position constituted an important 
disadvantage relative to standard workers, which could not be easily attributed to the 
institutional framework.  
With respect to collective representation, scholars in the dualism literature have long argued 
that unions tend to privilege the interest of standard workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; 
Rueda, 2005). I thus expected TA workers in Italy to experience a higher collective 
representation divide than TA workers in the UK, given the higher union power in the former 
case. Nevertheless, according to the so-called revitalisation literature unions have in some 
instances adopted more inclusive strategies towards atypical workers (Heery, 2004; Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2011; Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015), although their inclusivity might still be 
selective (Cerviño, 2000; Durazzi, 2015).  Thus, the alternative hypothesis was formulated 
that atypical workers would feel more represented in Italy partly due to a greater union 
strength, although unions might have adopted only a partially inclusive strategy.  
The findings can be said to partly confirm both hypotheses. Specifically, the interviews 
showed that, in both countries, unions were perceived to mainly represent standard workers. 
Though in Italy there were some benefits in the existence of unions specifically representing 
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atypical workers, these were not enough to compensate for the gap in representation compared 
to standard workers in workplace negotiations. Thus, workers experienced similar 
disadvantages in collective representation in the two countries, despite their very different 
industrial relations systems. 
 
    8.2.3  Comparing Disadvantages in the Income Protection Experience 
Theories of dualism posit that countries which rely on mostly contribution-based benefits, such 
as Italy, have a larger divide in access to income protection, compared to countries which 
predominantly rely on means-tested benefits, such as the UK, as atypical workers tend to find 
it more difficult to accrue sufficient contributions and may have to only rely on second-tier 
means-tested schemes (Palier and Martin, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2012; Emmenegger et al., 
2012), which in Italy are fragmented and not generous (Madama, 2010; Sacchi, 2011). 
However, others have argued that once we consider the importance of occupational schemes, 
atypical workers in the UK and other Liberal welfare states might experience an even larger 
divide (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). Following the analysis of the institutional characteristics of the 
social protection system in Italy and the UK, I refined these hypotheses. Specifically, I 
expected TA workers in the UK to face a more significant disadvantage in sickness and 
retirement, given the potential importance of occupational schemes in these two fields, but a 
smaller disadvantage in unemployment, given the predominance of means-tested benefits.  
My empirical analysis has only partly confirmed these hypotheses, in fact revealing complex 
interactions between institutional and other factors in shaping disadvantages in income 
protection. Firstly, rather than being distinguished along country lines, the experience of 
income insecurity could be categorised depending on the employment path of the worker, 
which is only partly affected by a country-level employment regulations. With respect to the 
experience of income protection, the analysis showed that in accordance with the literature, 
the minor role played by means-tested benefits in the overall Italian social protection system 
appeared to engender important disadvantages. However, in contrast to the dominant literature, 
the analysis revealed a more differentiated picture of the different divides shaped by 
contribution-based and means-tested benefits, showing means-tested could be equally, if not 
more, dualising. Moreover, for the UK, it showed that a ‘dualistic’ representation of the 
income protection divide is far too simplistic, as several divides interact at the same time, 




8.3 Further Considerations: Evaluating Divides between Atypical and Standard 
Employment 
This thesis has provided an overview of the disadvantages experienced by TA workers 
compared to standard workers in Italy and the UK. This brings us back to general debates 
about the existence of an insider-outside divide in contemporary labour markets (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 2001), of labour market dualism (Emmenegger et al., 2012) and an overall 
polarisation of the labour force (Kalleberg, 2013). We might include in these debates also 
positions about the emergence of a new social class of precarious workers (Standing, 2011) or 
an overall increase in insecurity among contemporary workers (Beck, 1992), but also the 
controversial argument that insecurity in contemporary labour markets is a media and political 
construction with little empirical evidence (Fevre, 2007). In drawing at the contribution of this 
thesis to these overall debates, I would first like to consider what this thesis has to offer on the 
conceptualisation of employment-related divides.  
First of all, this thesis has shown that considering ‘divides’ only as institutional, as done by 
most scholars in the dualism literature, can only reveal part of the overall story. I have shown 
that divides cannot be regarded only as institutionally determined and institutions have to be 
regarded as part of a different range of factors influencing the disadvantages atypical workers 
experience. In that respect, findings from my analysis are in accordance with the position of 
many scholars in the precariousness literature who have considered the importance of 
individual and contextual characteristics in shaping the disadvantages experienced by atypical 
workers (e.g. Tucker, 2003; Nienhüser, 2005). We have seen that individual factors, such as 
the support of family members or the individual ability to rely on other sources of income, had 
a strong impact on the experience of disadvantage and on the perception of a divide with 
standard workers. At the same time, contextual factors, such as the prevalent political and 
media discourses on benefit claiming, had also an important impact on the perception of 
‘inclusivity’ of benefits. Furthermore, divides based on the employment status might exist 
even when no formal institutional divide is present. For instance, the analysis of work 
experience has revealed that the intrinsic characteristics of TAW and discriminatory practices 
in the workplaces led to a divide between TA and standard workers even where equality is 
formally guaranteed by the institutional framework.  
Secondly, the analysis has revealed how an institutional disadvantage might be differently 
perceived by workers at the individual level. Specifically, while some were perceived as fair 
and legitimate, others were regarded as unfair forms of discrimination or abuse. Although the 
thesis did not explore in depth the reasons for why this was the case, it has shown how 
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institutionally ‘similar’ divides can translate into very different individual perceptions. This 
further highlights the limitation of considering disadvantages from a purely institutional 
perspective. A summary table of how institutional disadvantages are subjectively perceived is 
shown below. 
Table 9. Institutionally-driven disadvantages and subjective perceptions (not divided by 
country) 
Institutionally-driven  disadvantage Perception* 
   Unemployment-employment cycle Fair/legitimate 
   Trap in temporary employment Unfair 
   Delay in equal basic pay Fair/legitimate 
   Inequality in other elements of pay Unfair 
   Delay in equal working time Fair/legitimate 
   No access to contribution-based UB Fair/legitimate 
   No redundancy pay Fair/legitimate 
   No contractual sick pay Unfair 
   Irregular pension contributions Fair/legitimate 
   No occupational pension Unfair 
   Difficult access to formal credit Fair/legitimate 
Own elaboration. *The perception reported is that of the majority of interviewees who 
experienced a specific disadvantage 
 
Moreover, this thesis has shown that, at times, distinguishing between different employment 
or welfare regimes (e.g. Liberal and Mediterranean) to track dualist outcomes is overly 
simplistic. Specific country-level institutional characteristics proved to be as important as 
macro-features of the institutional system in fostering a divide between TA and standard 
workers. For example, the fact that in the UK TA workers have an ill-defined employment 
status, being considered self-employed in some respects but employees in others, is a specific 
feature of the British labour law which has produced significant divides with standard workers. 
Similarly, the timing structure of statutory sickness benefits in the UK has produced a large 
divide with standard workers when it comes to the first three days of sickness, where TA 
workers are not covered. Thus, the analysis has highlighted the importance of considering 
quite fine-grained institutional features of a country’s institutions and policies in assessing the 
insider-outsider divide, instead of relying predominantly on its macro-level characteristics.   
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Lastly, the empirical analysis has highlighted that institutional divides are not ‘watertight’ but 
instead spill over into different aspects of experience, in some cases creating cumulative 
disadvantage. For instance, we saw how the temporary employment status does not only affect 
employment insecurity, but equally the ability of workers to voice complaints at the workplace 
or to join collective representation, also fostering a divide in working conditions. Similarly, 
uncertain income prospects do not only influence income insecurity but also spill over into 
disadvantages in funding union membership, further reducing possibilities for collective 
representation. In line with insights from the precariousness literature, my analysis calls for 
more attention to be paid to interactions between different disadvantages and the possible 
cumulative effects these might produce.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to both the precariousness and the dualism literatures, it has shown 
the importance of considering both absolute and relative disadvantages. Interactions between 
the two are in fact relevant in shaping individual experiences as they both contribute to shaping 
current divides in the labour market. For example, although stigmatisation in accessing 
unemployment benefits in the UK affects all workers, it disproportionally affects those who 
experience frequent spells of unemployment, such as TA workers trapped in an employment-
unemployment cycle. Similarly, a lack of suitable active labour market policies, although in 
principle having an impact on all workers, disproportionally affects those ‘precariously 
unstable’, who find themselves frequently searching for jobs. 
Overall, in relation to the academic debate on contemporary divides in labour markets, this 
thesis has confirmed many of the disadvantages identified in both the dualism and the 
precariousness literatures, although with the caveats mentioned above.  Nevertheless, the 
thesis has shown that a ‘dualistic’ theorisation of employment-related divides is overly 
simplistic. I have here illustrated many instances in which not all atypical workers can be 
argued to experience the same disadvantages. In the Italian case, workers clearly favoured 
TAW compared with other atypical contracts, as it guarantees equal treatment in several 
working conditions. In that respect, TAW could be argued to present a smaller divide with 
respect to standard employment compared to other atypical contracts (i.e. the cooperative 
contract and the co.co.pro.). In a similar way, in the UK, the ill-defined employment status of 
TA workers does not apply to other categories of atypical workers, such as, among others, 
directly-employed fixed-term workers, who can be said to enjoy a smaller divide with standard 
workers.  
These situations have highlighted that certain forms of atypical employment might be regarded 
as more similar to standard employment than they are to other forms of atypical employment, 
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questioning the idea of a clear-cut insider-outsider divide between standard and atypical 
workers, as already highlighted, for instance, by Hipp et al. (2015). Furthermore, my empirical 
analysis has shown that in the UK, multiple intersecting divides are present, and that, in some 
cases, a TA worker might be regarded as an ‘insider’ while a standard worker might not. This 
shows that, in the British context, even standard workers should not be regarded as all the 
same, and that disadvantages are clearly not simply ‘dualistic’ in structure, a conclusion partly 
in line with what has already argued by Yoon and Chung (2016).  
In relation to the precariousness literature, this thesis has identified two different kinds of 
precariousness experienced by TA workers, which cut across all dimensions of analysis: that 
of the ‘precariously unstable’ and that of the ‘precariously stable’. Only the latter could be 
related to the characteristics of the employment regulation framework in Italy and could thus 
be associated with a specific institutional framework. Thus, simply talking about 
‘precariousness’ when discussing atypical employment risks overlooking important 
differences within the ‘precarious’ experiences of atypical workers, both between and within 
countries. The thesis thus calls for more attention to be paid to the variety of experiences which 
might be labelled under the concept of precariousness and how these can be related to the 
different configurations of institutions in place.  
 
     8.4 Limitations and Future Research 
One of the main purposes of this thesis has been exploratory, given the current lack of 
comparative qualitative studies on the disadvantages experienced by atypical workers. 
Nevertheless, as any exploratory study, it can only provide an initial overview of the issues 
atypical workers experience and how these are structured by the institutional setting. Further 
research is needed in order to complement, broaden and also challenge the findings presented 
in this thesis. 
Firstly, the thesis has partly questioned the dichotomy between standard and atypical 
employment which has been one of the mainstays of the dualism literature. It has shown that, 
on the one hand, other variables might interact with the employment status in producing a 
variety of divides both among atypical workers and between atypical and standard workers. 
On the other hand, it has shown how specific characteristics of TAW in each country might 
lead to a divide with standard employment, rather than the fact that it is non-standard per se. 
Future research may be carried out to investigate disadvantages experienced by workers in 
other forms of atypical employment in Italy and in the UK. Although, as already mentioned in 
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chapter 3, some scholars within the precariousness literature have partly done so in the Italian 
context (see, for instance, Fullin, 2004), there has not been a systematic analysis of how 
specific institutional arrangements affect workers with different atypical employment statuses. 
A more systematic analysis might enable an assessment of the differences in employment, 
work and income protection disadvantages across different atypical contracts. At the same 
time, future research could look beyond the employment status as the main variable of 
analysis, as my analysis revealed how some of the factors shaping divides were not necessarily 
related to the employment status. For instance, in the UK context, employers’ provisions and 
tenure proved relevant in shaping labour market divides.  
Secondly, future research can also be carried out to investigate disadvantages among TA 
workers in countries with different institutional settings. The UK and Italy were chosen as 
representative of two groups of countries, the Liberal and the Mediterranean respectively, 
which present very different institutional characteristics in a number of employment-related 
dimensions, including employment, work and income protection. Future research could 
involve the comparison to countries with a different combination of institutional 
characteristics and for which scholars in the dualism literature have already identified multiple 
institutional divides between standard and atypical workers. This might involve, for instance, 
a country within the Scandinavian group, which has been found to be the one with the lowest 
divide in several dimensions (e.g. Leschke, 2009; Jahn and Rosholm, 2013; Benassi and 
Vlandas, 2015). Alternatively, it might involve one of the core Continental European countries 
which, as we have seen, present partly similar characteristics with the Southern European 
countries, but where the institutional divides have been argued to be less extreme (Barbieri, 
2009; Leschke, 2009; Muffels, 2015). This would make it possible to test how different 
institutional configurations impact on the disadvantages experienced by TA workers and to 
evaluate which possible combination of institutions and policies can minimise those 
disadvantages.  
At the same time, this thesis has shown that atypical workers both between countries and 
within the same one might not only be more or less precarious, but might also experience 
qualitatively different types of precariousness. As already mentioned in chapter 3, most 
comparative research on precariousness has hitherto focused on finding a common 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon. I would argue that instead future research should focus 
on empirically experienced disadvantages, allowing for a variety of experiences to be included 
under the umbrella term of ‘precariousness’. More research is needed in order to provide a 
categorisation of the multifaceted phenomenon of precariousness and how different forms of 
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List of interviewees 
UK 
Name Gender Age Education Current/Most Recent 
Occupation 
Rachel F 43 lower-secondary carer 
Bryan M 35 upper-secondary shop assistant 
Claire F 32 tertiary office clerk 
Kirsty F 32 upper-secondary receptionist 
Mary F 44 upper-secondary office clerk 
Catherine F 41 upper-secondary social worker 
Mhairi F 58 upper-secondary call-centre worker 
Stewart M 30 upper-secondary office clerk 
Susanne F 38 upper-secondary secretary 
Tom M 31 tertiary driver 
Steven M 35 tertiary office clerk 
Chris M 30 lower-secondary warehouse worker 
Andrew M 30 lower-secondary seller 
Lucy F 46 tertiary office clerk 
Mandy F 35 upper-secondary nurse 
Sarah F 47 lower-secondary shop assistant 
Cathy F 33 tertiary secretary 
Lilian F 45 upper-secondary office clerk 
Paul M 42 lower-secondary shop assistant 
Edward M 54 upper-secondary librarian 
Trade Unionist 1 M - - trade unionist 
Trade Unionist 2 M - - trade unionist 
Katrina F - - manager in a TA 




Name Gender Age Education Occupation 
Pietro M 59 upper-secondary social worker 
Michele M 39 lower-secondary warehouse worker 
Rita F 36 tertiary office clerk 
Francesca F 41 tertiary shop assistant 
Alessandro M 33 tertiary shop assistant 
Giulia F 41 upper-secondary receptionist 
Fabio M 44 lower-secondary machine tester 
Chiara F 40 upper-secondary waitress 
Claudia F 44 lower-secondary social worker 
Giada F 31 upper-secondary office clerk 
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Mariangela F 30 upper-secondary shop assistant 
Giorgio M 31 tertiary shop assistant 
Dante M 48 upper-secondary nurse 
Alberto M 54 lower-secondary warehouse worker 
Stefano M 38 lower-secondary call-centre worker 
Beatrice F 52 upper-secondary social worker 
Maria F 30 upper-secondary waitress 
Rosanna F 44 upper-secondary nurse 
Marco M 31 tertiary office clerk 
Paolo M 36 lower-secondary office clerk 
Trade Unionist 1 M - - trade unionist 
Trade Unionist 2 M - - trade unionist 




















Appendix 2. Informed Consent  
 
Contact: Alessio Bertolini 
                PhD student in Social Policy 
                University of Edinburgh 
               S1250360@sms.ed.ac.uk 
                
Procedure: 
I would like to record the interview, if you are willing, and use the tapes to write my materials.   
I will record the interview only with your written consent, and will ask that no personal 
identifiers be used during the interview, to ensure your anonymity. Please feel free to say as 
much or as little as you want.  You can decide not to answer any question, or to stop the 




Participation in this study will involve no costs or payments to you. 
 
Confidentiality: 
All information collected during the study period will be kept strictly confidential. 
If you agree to join this study, please sign your name on the following page. 
 
Declaration: 
I, _____________________________________, agree to be interviewed for the project 
‘Temporary Agency Work in Italy and the UK’ which is being conducted by Alessio Bertolini 
of the University of Edinburgh as part of a PhD research project. 
 
I certify that I have been told of the confidentiality of information collected for this project 
and the anonymity of my participation; that I have been given satisfactory answers to my 
inquiries concerning project procedures and other matters; and that I have been advised that I 
am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at 




I agree to participate in one or more electronically recorded interviews for this project. I 
understand that such interviews and related materials will be kept completely anonymous, and 
transcripts and recordings will be destroyed at the end of the project. and  
 
I understand that my responses may be cited, anonymously, in the PhD dissertation that will 




________________________________________  Date ________________________ 
Signature of Interviewee 
 
 
________________________________________  Date ________________________ 
























Inform Interviewee about:  
 
 The aim of the interview 
 How the information will be handled (confidentiality) 
 Who will be using the results and how 
 Where the results will be made available 
 Ask whether they would like to be informed about the results (this can also help in 








 Educational Level 
 Marital Status 
 Children 
 Household arrangements (people living in the household) 
 Geographical proximity to relatives and friends 
 Housing characteristics (e.g. ownership, tenancy, presence of mortgages and loans) 
 
Past employment experience: 
 Can you tell me about your employment history so far? 
- Where have you worked before?  
- How long were you employed in every position? 
- Why did you change/quit job? 
 
Reasons for being employed through a Temporary Agency (TA): 
 Why did you come to be employed through a TA? 
- What have been the main reasons behind that? 
 
 
Current employment situation (TA employment): 
 Tell me about your current employment situation 
- How long have you been employed through a TA? 
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- In which jobs have you been employed through the TA? 
-  (If more than one) How long did each job last? 
- (If more than one) Why did that job come to an end? 
- (If more than one) How long was the period between one job and the next 
one? 
- What did you do in-between one job and the next one? 
- Have you been employed full-time or part-time? Why? 
- How many hours do you work in a week? 
- How long will the current job last? 
- Are you a member of a trade union? 
 
 
Dimensions of disadvantage 
Employment Issues: 
 
 What do you think are the main advantages of being a TA worker? Why? 
 
 What do you think are the main disadvantages of being a TA worker?  
- How does this affect your employment? 
- How does this affect your personal life? 
- Do you think this disadvantage is specific of TA contracts? 
 
Work-related identity: 
 In your life, what role does the fact of being employed play for you? Why? 
- How does the fact of being a TA worker affect this? 
 
 Is it important for you to have a salaried employment? In which way? 
- Would you answer differently if you had a permanent/more stable contract? 
 
 Do you feel part of the organization you are working for? 




 Which aspects of your employment are most secure? In which way? 
 
 Which aspects of your employment do you perceive as most insecure? In which way? 
- How does this affect your work? 
- How does this affect your personal life? 
- Would you answer differently if you had a different contract? Why? 
- Do you think other employees are better off? In which way?  
 Overall, would you consider your employment as insecure? Why? 
- How much do you reckon the fact of being employed through a TA affect 
your sense of security? 
- How can this situation be improved? 
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- Who/What do you think is responsible for this (e.g. agency, employer, welfare 
state, trade unions)? 
 
 Would you like to have more employment security? Why? 
- How do you think your life would change if you had a more secure 
employment? 
- Do you feel you would have made/ make different decisions in your life if 
you had a secure employment? 
 
Income: 
 What is roughly your pay?  
- What is your hourly pay? 
- What are your average monthly earnings? 
 
 What do you think are the major problems concerning your earnings (e.g. low-pay, 
income instability)? In which way? 
- Do you think you should be paid more? 
- Do you reckon you should work more hours for a decent quality of life? Why? 
- Is instability/uncertainty of income a problem for you? In which way? 
 
 Do other members of the family contribute to the household income? In which way? 
- How important is their income compared to yours? 
 
 Do you receive any material help from relatives or friends that do not belong to the 
household? 
- How important is their contribution? 
 
 Have you experienced any problem in having access to any form of credit (e.g. loan, 
mortgage, credit card)? 
- (If yes) Is this related to your type of employment? In which way? 
 
 Do you know whether you are entitled to any unemployment benefit? 
- Do you think your current employment situation has an effect on your 
entitlement/the amount of benefit you are entitled to? In which way? 
- Is this a problem for you? 
     
 
 Do you know whether you are entitled to any form of redundancy/ severance pay at 
the end of your employment? 
- Have you claimed the benefit? Why? 
- Have you experienced any problem? 
 
 Do you know whether you are entitled to any sickness pay and/or unemployment 
benefit? Maybe separate? 
- Do you think your current employment situation has an effect on your 
entitlement/the amount of benefit you are entitled to? In which way? 




     
 Do you know whether you are entitled to a pension at the end of your career? 
- Do you think your current employment situation will affect your pension? In 
which way? 
- Is this a problem for you? 
 
 Does your employer provide any form of contribution-based scheme (e.g. pensions)? 
- Do you think you would be better off by having a different employment 
contract? In which way? 
- Is this a problem for you? 
 
 Do you receive any tax credit or allowance? 
- (If no) Do you know whether you are entitled to any? 
- (If no) Do you think you should be entitled to any? 
- (If yes) How relevant are these benefits for your overall income? 
- (If yes) Do you think you should receive more/less? Why? 
- (If yes) What are the major problems in receiving the benefit (e.g. 
bureaucracy, timing, stigma)? 
 
 
 Are you worried about the future when it comes to income? 
- What are the reasons why you feel like this? 
- Do you reckon the welfare state has/should have more responsibility (e.g. 
welfare benefits, services)? In which way? 
- Do you think the agency should have more responsibility? In which way? 
- Do you think your current employer should have more responsibility? In 
which way? 
- Do you reckon trade unions should have more responsibility? In which way? 
 
Social Support: 
 When you have a problem at work, to whom do you talk about it first? 
 
 Do you receive any form of support (e.g. emotional, relational, practical) from your 
colleagues? Why? 
- Do you think that the fact that you are a TA worker affect this support? In 
which way? 
 Do you receive any support from your line-manager? In which way? 
- Do you think that the fact that you are a TA worker affect this support? In 
which way? 
 
 Do you receive any support from the TA? In which way? 
 
 Do you receive any support from the trade union? In which way? 
- If not, why is it the case? 
- Have you considered joining a union? Why? 
 




 Do you think the State should be more involved in problems related to TA workers? 
In which way? 
 
- In which specific problems do you think it should be more involved? 
- Why do you think it is not involved? 
 
Conclusion 
 If you could, would you like to have a different employment contract?  
- Which one? Why? 
- In which aspects do you think this would improve your employment 
conditions? 
- How difficult do you think it is to find a different employment? 
 
 Are you currently looking for another job? Why? 
 
 Is there anything that you think is relevant but that has not been mentioned? 
 
 
Thanks the interviewee: 
 Thanksgiving for her time and help 
 Remind her about the availability of the results and whether she wants to be informed 
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